Lecture notes: Updated empires

Empires today

The corrosive power of nationalism

  • today there are not supposed to be any empires left

Anti-colonialism — liberation for all those new states

  • UN and decolonization
  • only very marginal areas left

And yet … “spheres of interest”

  • the US in Central America
  • the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe
  • France in Africa

China establishing a sphere of interest in East Asia

  • Laos, for example, basically a part of China
  • new Chinese IR — returning to the imperial model
  • but updated of course

Other new powers

  • Turkey
  • a lot of self-confidence during the first 10 years of AKP rule
  • Ottoman Empire 2.0

Daesh

  • taking advantage of the breakdown of traditional nation-states
  • traditional empires as an alternative

“Civilizational identities”

  • no need to go full Huntington here …
  • often the result of old empires
  • people feel a communality

Pan-nationalism

  • Pan-Africanism — Zulkarnain will say more about that in a couple of weeks
  • Pan-Arabism — we will talk about that later as well …
  • a resurrected Caliphate

Calls for neo-imperial institutions

  • some of the readings in the week on “failed states”

Actual neo-imperial institutions

  • EU
  • perhaps a future African Union — but Zulkarnain will say more about that

Neo-Ottomanism

In the first decade of the twenty-first century

  • Turkish economy was doing very well—with growth rates similar to those in China—and here too, the country’s self-confidence received a boost

The European Union continued to deny the country membership

  • ignore Europe and instead create a sphere of influence of one’s own

Ottoman Empire as a model

  • at the height of its power included most of the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, and much of Eastern Europe
  • “Neo-Ottomanism” –“Ottoman Empire 2.0”

Goals

  • not control other states politically, but it would draw them closer by means of investments and trade
  • traditional conflicts were to be resolved, and any new conflicts would be settled by means of Turkish military interventions

Ottoman civilization

  • historical dramas on TV, which received large audiences in all former Ottoman lands
  • promoting the revival of traditional Ottoman arts, architecture, and cultural values
  • use of soft power, including diplomacy, economic ties, cultural exchanges, and the promotion of the Turkish language, to build stronger relationships with countries in the former Ottoman sphere of influence

Islam

  • Neo-Ottomanism often highlights Turkey’s Islamic identity and the historical role of the Ottoman Empire as a defender and promoter of Islam

East and West

  • Neo-Ottomanism seeks to position Turkey as a bridge between the two, maintaining strong ties with both Europe and Asia

Critique

  • Aggressive foreign policy
  • undermine the secular identity of the country
  • Turkey way too dependent on Europe economically

Outcome

  • after about a decade, with a declining Turkish economy and pushback from several of the designated members of the system, talk of Neo-Ottomanism came to an end

Pan-Turkism

The cultural and political unification of all Turkic peoples

  • based on a shared linguistic, cultural, and historical heritage
  • a way for Turkic speakers in the Russian empire to defend their identity

Originated in the late 19th century among Turkic intellectuals of the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire

  • a pan-nationalist movement

Had an influence on the Turkish state

Nothing ever came of it

How much is left today?

A new caliphate

  • anti-nationalist groups
  • religion as unifying logic

The ummah — Dar al-Islam

  • Dar al-Harb

Cf. European conceptions of a body

  • Corpus Christianum

Or eklesia

Hizb ut-Tahrir

Ideology and Goals:

  • re-establishment of the Caliphate
  • a single Islamic state governed by Islamic law (Sharia)
  • unify the Muslim community (Ummah) across the world

Cf. the nationalistic and secular governments that exist in many Muslim-majority countries

Methods:

  • non-violent approach
  • focuses on education and intellectual discourse, aiming to convince Muslims to embrace their vision of an Islamic state
  • organizes conferences, distributes literature, and engages in public speaking to promote its agenda

Global presence:

  • has a presence in many countries across the Middle East, Central Asia, Europe
  • both in Muslim-majority countries and in Muslim communities in the diaspora

Controversy and Opposition:

  • banned in several countries, including many in the Arab world, Russia, and Central Asian countries — including Turkey
  • critics argue that its ideology is radical and could promote extremism

Interview

Abdul Wahid

  • recently in the news — here

Why did you join?

  • spiritual vacuum
  • failure of politics

Political and economic system

Rationalism in Islam

  • al-Ghazali

The Golden Age of Islam

They presented a solution

  • it’s good to have grievances
  • it’s good to be angry

Daesh, Islamic State, ISIS

Rationale

  • a unifying force for Muslims worldwide and create a more just, equitable, and Islamic political system
  • attempted to establish their own caliphate by force, violently seizing territory and imposing a strict interpretation of Islamic law

In 2014, Daesh or ISIS, the Islamic state, managed to capture large parts of Iraq and Syria

  • declared that they had established a new caliphate with the city of Raqqa as its capital

Defeated in 2019,

  • but continues to engage in military actions throughout the Muslim world
  • continues to claim religious authority over all Muslims—a claim vehemently rejected by all but a very small minority of believers

How little they actually understand about their own history

  • the actually existing caliphates
  • always very problematic to try to install the kingdom on God on earth

Controversies and criticisms

  • the institution is outdated and incompatible with modern political realities, such as the nation-state system and democratic governance
  • the pursuit of a caliphate could exacerbate sectarian tensions, encourage radicalization, and destabilize the Muslim world.

IR Theory with Chinese characteristics

This is where we find the most elaborate neo-imperialist theories

  •  old ideas of an imperial system have been revived
  • “rise of China” — wondering about it’s place in the world

Claims:

  • the imperial system was better organized
  • fewer conflicts
  • more prosperity

Alternative to the anarchy of the present nation-state system

Revive it in some form

  • but make it more palatable to non-Chinese

China’s place in the world

The “Middle Kingdom”

  • in the middle of its own world
  • everyone coming to visit them
  • the solar system model — we talked about this last time

1860 as a watershed

  • the Europeans “liberate” the Chinese “from their illusions”
  • tributary missions stopped coming — although the Koreans didn’t get the memo right away

Europeans

  • “invite the Chinese into history”
  • marginal place in the world
  • “a developing country”

Mao Zedong’s “Three worlds”

Formulated in 1974

  • after the break with the Soviet Union
  • right at the end of the Cultural Revolution
  • China very poor

Find a new place for itself

  • leader of the downtrodden masses of the world

First World:

  • the United States and the Soviet Union
  • the superpowers
  • characterized by their significant global influence and military might

Second World:

  • countries like Japan, Canada, Europe, and other nations of the global North
  • developed nations with substantial economic power but not as influential as the superpowers

Third World

  • China, India, nations in Africa, Latin America, and continental Asia
  • downtrodden and non-aligned

Cd. Alfred Sauvy’s “Three-World Model”

  • the West
  • the Communist states, including China
  • everyone else

The “rise of China”

  • at the very least be a superpower with its own sphere of influence
  • revival of ancient models — but in updated form

Not just a political order, but a philosophical

  • rethink international relations from the bottom up
  • its most fundamental assumptions
  • establish a new political — and philosophical — basis for a world order

Tianxia, 天下

Tianxia

“All Under Heaven”

  • denotes the world as a whole, everything and everyone that exists
  • a political notion — the world as one realm, one political system, governed by one ruler

Cf. the “Son of Heaven,” Tianzi, 天子

  • ie. the Emperor of China
  • cf. the world of the imperial tribute system, gradually shading off into increasingly insignificant margins
  • there is no outside, no one is a foreigner, the system is open
  • everyone is included — and everyone is subject to the same political order

Zhao Tingyang

Some biographical data:

  • born in 1961
  • professor at Peking University
  • The Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of a World Institution

The world that should be prioritized, not individual states

  • Only in this way can we have peace and deal with challenges such as global warming

Today: failed world rather than failed states

  • no country could possibly be successful in a failed word
  • the US takes over and tries to impose its interests on everyone else
  • but this always serves American interests

Cf. traditional view:

  • rule of men rather than rule by laws
  • the moral character of the ruler
  • the way they follow the rituals, their obligations
  • this is the way the world is held together

The political order is built from the top

  • there should be complementarity and harmony between the world, the state and whatever regional levels there might be
  • they should follow the same logic and they should fit together
  • ut is the order of the world that determines the others.

But this also means that there is a lot of independence for the sub-systems

  • they can do whatever they like as long as they are in conformity with the political framework as a whole

Quotes:

  • “The world, states and families thus need to be consistent in their way of governance, so as to be nothing else but different manifestations of one universal institution. This means that the order and peace of larger political societies is always the necessary guarantee for that of smaller ones. This is thus a descending order from ‘all-under-heaven’ to nation-states to families”
  • “The UN is not a world institution with substantial power to govern the world, but only an organization for negotiating and bargaining each nation’s interests. The UN has no substantial power, and is hence unable to resist a superpower’s dominance over the world.”

US hegemony isn’t good enough

  • “The truth is that domestic democracy can enhance imperialist hegemony over the world; international democracy does just the opposite. Everyone should be allowed to vote in American elections. This is one reason why the United States is losing its political standing in the world, playing different political games in domestic and international arenas.”

Yan Xuetong

  • born 1952
  • Tsinghua University, Beijing

Main ideas:

Yan Xuetong, a prominent Chinese political scientist and a leading figure in international relations theory in China, is known for his unique blend of ancient Chinese thought and contemporary political realism. His political philosophy is deeply rooted in the realist tradition, emphasizing power and morality in international relations. Here’s a summary of his key ideas:

1. **Moral Realism**: Yan integrates traditional Chinese moral thinking with realist perspectives, creating a concept of “moral realism.” He argues that moral factors, in addition to material capabilities, are crucial in determining a state’s power and influence. This approach contrasts with Western realism, which often focuses solely on material power.

2. **Influence of Ancient Chinese Thought**: His work is heavily influenced by pre-Qin philosophers, especially the Realist School (or Legalism) and Confucianism. He often draws on historical figures like Xunzi and Han Feizi, advocating that leadership should be based on moral authority and strategic wisdom.

3. **Critique of Western Liberalism**: Yan challenges the Western liberal perspective that emphasizes democracy and economic interdependence as pathways to peace. He argues that these factors are less significant than power dynamics and moral leadership in shaping international relations.

4. **Importance of Leadership and Morality**: He emphasizes the role of moral leadership in international affairs, arguing that countries led by morally superior leaders will have more influence and be more successful in the international arena.

5. **Power Transition Theory**: Yan is known for his views on power transition, particularly regarding the rise of China. He suggests that a shift in global power is inevitable and that China’s rise will reshape the international order. However, he also warns against aggressive expansion, advocating for a peaceful approach to China’s growing influence.

6. **Advocacy for a New Model of International Relations**: He proposes a new model of international relations that combines moral factors with realist power dynamics. This model suggests that nations should seek to increase their influence through moral leadership rather than solely through military or economic might.

Yan Xuetong’s philosophy reflects a blend of ancient wisdom and modern international relations theory, offering a distinct perspective that challenges some of the conventional Western approaches to global politics. His ideas have gained significant attention and debate, especially in the context of China’s rising role on the global stage.

Qin Yaquing

  • born 1953
  • Foreign Affairs University, Beijing

Main ideas:

Qin Yaqing is a prominent Chinese international relations scholar known for his contributions to the field of political philosophy, particularly in the context of China’s role in global politics. His work is often centered around several key themes:

1. **Relationality in International Relations**: Qin advocates for a relational approach to international relations, emphasizing the importance of relationships, context, and process over static entities or structures. This perspective draws from traditional Chinese philosophy, particularly Confucianism, which values harmony and balance in relationships.

2. **Critique of Western-Centric Theories**: He critiques the dominance of Western-centric theories in international relations, arguing that they may not adequately reflect or explain the behaviors and interactions of non-Western states. Qin seeks to develop theoretical frameworks that are more inclusive of different cultural and historical contexts.

3. **Constructivism and Role of Culture**: Qin’s work is often associated with constructivism, a theory in international relations that emphasizes the role of ideas, norms, and culture in shaping state behavior. He argues that international relations are socially constructed through these elements, rather than being driven solely by material factors like economic or military power.

4. **Chinese School of International Relations**: Qin is a proponent of developing a “Chinese School” of international relations theory, which incorporates Chinese philosophical traditions and historical experiences. This approach aims to provide a more nuanced understanding of China’s foreign policy and its role in world affairs.

5. **Harmony and Coexistence**: Consistent with traditional Chinese philosophy, Qin often emphasizes the concept of harmony in international relations. He advocates for a world order based on coexistence and mutual respect among different nations and cultures, as opposed to dominance or hegemony.

6. **Pragmatism in Foreign Policy**: Qin’s philosophy also reflects a pragmatic approach to foreign policy, recognizing the importance of adapting to changing international dynamics and pursuing flexible strategies to achieve national interests.

Overall, Qin Yaqing’s political philosophy represents a significant effort to integrate Chinese philosophical traditions and contemporary international relations theory, offering a distinctive perspective on global politics and China’s role within it.

Critique of atomism

This is a matter of ontology, a matter of what model we use for the world

  • Westerners see society as made up of individuals and international relations as made up by states which are modeled on sovereign individuals
  • Cf. Thatcher’ — “there is no such thing as society”

Cf. the problem of anarchy

  • everyone is thinking of themselves and no one is thinking of the system as a whole
  • this is an atomistic view

Relationism

  • as an alternative to atomism

Relationships are more fundamental than individual units

  • there is a relationship ontology, not a model that organizes entities but relationships
  • the units are empty vessels that are filled with meaning as the come to form relationships

Compare a game of Go, weiqi

  • (wéi) means “to surround” or “encircle,” and (qí) means “chess” or “board game”
  • all the pieces are similar but derive their power and importance from their place on the board
  • that is, their relation to all other pieces

Confucius: The five relationships

According to Confucius, there are five relationships that matter –

  • between father and son
  • ruler and subject
  • man and wife
  • older and younger brother
  • between friends

They all have mutual obligations. There are things you must do for each other

  • they are all unequal (maybe not friend/friend … ), but they are not relationships of exploitation and servitude
  • these are relationship of mutual concern and care

A relational society

Society is made up of these relationships — not of individuals

  • Cf. Thatcherite point – there is no society here either
  • instead there is only this network
  • all you see are individuals with names and faces with whom you have an actual relationship

Forget about society and care about your relationships

  • There is no idea of a “civil sphere” or “civic virtue”
  • you have no generalized duties towards others
  • China as a “low trust” society

Cf. the way Chinese cities look:

Ugly Chinese cities where every one paints their apartments whatever way they want

Fei Xiaotong on society (From the Soil)

Chinese anthropologist and sociologist

  • Chinese social relations operate through networks of personal relationships
  • the self is at the center and a decreasing level of closeness as one moves outward from the center

The moral order is built from the bottom (Zhao)

The world as built from the bottom in moral terms, just as it is built from the top politically

  • the world should be organized according to father/son relationships.
  • hierarchical, but with care and concern

Becoming, not Being

Nothing ever is a certain way, but everything is in the process of becoming

The process is initiated and you go along for the ride, go with the flow

  • everything is in a state of being born

Policy implications:

  • good statesmanship is a matter of learning to understand the logic of the process and adjusting yourself to it

Institutions started for one purpose may end up serving a totally different purpose

  • they are started for one reason but you never know in which direction they are going

Cf. Chinese dragons

  • always moving and always shifting shape

Or like Chinese ink painting

  • not showing shapes, but showing movement and shape change

Or compare Sunzi

  • how you wait for the right opportunity, make the process work for you, exploit weaknesses in your opponent

The mutuality of opposites

The Western view is that we define yourselves through difference

  • We are what we are not — “othering” etc
  • the logic of in-groups and out-groups
  • the dialectic of thesis and anti-thesis resulting in a synthesis
  • cf. the “clash of civilizations”

Chinese philosophy emphasizes the similarities in opposites and the opposites in similarities

  • day is not the opposite of night, but contains it
  • peace contains war and war contains peace
  • they are being transformed into each other and they are being transformed together

The ability to live with contradictions

  • Legalism and Confucianism
  • communism and capitalism
  • etc

The logic of Yin and Yang

  • the self in the other and the other in the self
  • not the little dot in the field of opposite color

Policy implications

  • mediates antagonisms and force us to look for common solutions
  • we require each other
  • there is much that unites us

Or compare Sunzi’s advice on the logic of warfare:

  • not two massive armies crashing into each other
  • what in the enemy can make them submit to you without a fight?
  • learn about yourself in order to learn about the enemy

Harmony

Difference is not a problem but a requirement

  • harmony is not a question of everyone being the same or doing the same thing

Examples:

  • you cannot cook a dish with only one ingredient or play music with only one tone
  • the body wouldn’t function if it wasn’t make up of different body parts

Things must be different but they must be synchronized to fit together

  • you can synchronize from above or there can be self-synchronization.
  • cf. laissez-faire and anarchist self-governance
  • the ruler as a conductor — Confucius and the idea of li

“Civilization” as a way to synchronize people

  • cooking the barbarians
  • something similar happened in other imperial systems

Power

How power is not a resource or an entity

  • it is not something that you “have”

Instead,

  • power emerges in relationships and in your ability to take advantage of processes
  • cf. guanxi networks — cultivating connections
  • think long-term

In order to gain power

  • look for a way to influence the process
  • it is not a matter of putting a gun to people’s heads but instead finding a way to influence the direction of a current, the lay of the land

Sunzi on the importance of the shape of the battlefield

  • equivalent to the Legalist emphasis on the legal framework
  • this is the frame that will determine how the game is played
  • set up the incentive structure
  • build the pachinko machine (OK, this is a Japanese example)

Practical implications

Ideas like these have been translated into a number of actual policies

  • organize the system according to your rules
  • even if it takes a very long time
  • you have to be patient

Belt and Road

  • building infrastructure—roads, railways, ports—that connects the peripheral states with the neo-imperial center
  • the Chinese are once again making efforts to civilize the barbarians—encouraging foreigners to learn Chinese and to study Chinese culture

Confucius institutes

Non-profit educational organizations established by the Chinese government to promote Chinese language, culture, and understanding of China in foreign countries

  • typically set up in partnership with universities and educational institutions outside China

  • offer language courses, cultural events, and academic exchanges and aim to strengthen cultural and educational ties between China and other countries

Criticism

  • primarily due to concerns related to academic freedom, censorship, and potential influence by the Chinese government.

China in Africa

  • Infrastructure development and investment
  • Trade relations
  • Debt financing: China has provided extensive loans to African countries to fund infrastructure projects and other development initiatives. This has led to concerns about debt sustainability and a potential “debt trap” for some African nations, where they may struggle to repay these loans and become overly dependent on Chinese financing.
  • Cultural and educational exchanges: China has been promoting cultural and educational exchanges with Africa, offering scholarships for African students to study in China, establishing Confucius Institutes to teach Chinese language and culture, and fostering people-to-people exchanges between the two regions.
  • Political and military cooperation: China has been actively involved in peacekeeping missions and providing military support and training to African countries. China has also established its first overseas military base in Djibouti, a strategic location in the Horn of Africa.
  • Public health and medical assistance