Although we had in the space of three days gained two battles, our position at Pa-le-cheaou was far from satisfactory. Our force was very small, and unprovided with the material required for a siege. Our heavy guns were still on the river, and great difficulty was experienced in getting them over the shallows. To have marched direct upon Pekin the day after our fight of the 21st September, would have been a grand movement, had we have been in a position to enforce our threats of taking that city; but to have gone on idly swaggering about what we intended to do, unprovided with heavy guns for breaching purposes, would have placed us in a most false position, when under the very walls of the place. Non-combatants are at all times anxious to push on and make light of military precautions. After any successful operation, it is easy to speak of the facility with which it was accomplished, and, adducing the smallness of your losses in proof thereof, to remark, “Oh, you might have done it with half the [p. 192] number,” forgetting or ignoring the fact that the rapid success was very much to be attributed to the display of force, which ever carries with it great moral power in war, and that the precautions taken were the means of saving your soldiers’ lives.

I have no doubt there are some who would have liked us to have pushed on to the gates of Pekin upon the 22nd, on the chance of bullying the Chinese into surrendering the city to us; but suppose they had not done so, what a degrading position we should have obtained for ourselves, whilst remaining inactive under the very walls, awaiting the arrival of reinforcements and the heavy guns, &c. &c., required for assaulting the place? Before leaving Ho-se-woo, it was unfortunately believed that all fighting was over, and that the Chinese Government was anxious for peace. Had it been otherwise, and the whole affair merely a military operation, we should never have left that place until our heavy guns, and all our available troops had reached it. As it was, relying upon the negotiations then pending, we had advanced with a small force, unprepared for a siege; so that when our diplomacy failed, we found ourselves in a false position, unable to take advantage of the success with which our movements had been attended.

On the 29th September the siege guns reached us, and by the 2nd October, all available troops from the rear had joined us, with the exception of the 1st Royals, which marched into camp upon the evening following, when we had crossed the canal. Sir R. Napier had been sent for after the fight of the 18th at Chang-kiawan, and it was determined that no movement in ad- [p. 193] vance should be effected until the arrival of his division and the heavy siege guns. The regiments advanced by double marches from Tien-tsin, and the following preparations were made for pushing forward. A battalion of marines was posted at Tung-chow, between which and Tien-tsin, regular flotillas of country boats were established. By means of these large quantities of commissariat supplies were collected at the former place as a reserve store, whilst enough for ten days’ consumption was forwarded on from thence in carts and waggons to the front. A post of one hundred French infantry, and an officer and ten sowars was established at Chang-kia-wan for the protection of our mails and dispatches sent by means of mounted orderlies. This was at first most necessary, as our rear was for some time infested with armed banditti, who frequently attacked small parties and fired upon our messengers. In one instance, two sowars, carrying letters, reported they had been fired upon five times between Matow and Chang-kia-wan; and another party had to cut their way through a crowd of armed villagers in the former place. To stop these annoyances, orders were sent back to Colonel Urquahart, then at Matow, directing him to burn that village, which was done by a party of the 8th Punjaub Infantry, and produced the effect desired. Proclamations were at the same time posted up there and at the neighbouring villages, informing the people that it was owing to their own misconduct that that punishment had been inflicted, and warning others of what they might expect in case they acted similarly.

A bridge of boats was established over the canal [p. 194] opposite our camp, and a defensible position selected close by the paved road to Pekin, where it was determined to leave, under a strong guard, all our baggage, surplus ammunition, and siege material, whilst the allied armies advanced to attack Sang-ko-lin-sin’s army, which was reported to be in position to the north of the city, and close to it. His army having been well beaten and driven off from the neighbourhood, the heavy guns were to be brought up and placed in battery beneath the walls, and breach them in the event of the Chinese still holding out.

Reconnoitring parties went out daily towards Pekin during our halt at Pa-le-cheaou, by which means a good knowledge of the country was obtained. Our cavalry was, indeed, of the utmost use to us throughout the whole campaign. Our allies being unprovided with that arm, and engaged in the same work with us, gave us a fair opportunity of judging as to its value. Some people seem to consider that the military inventions of modern times have so changed the principles of war that cavalry can be of no further use, and, in fact, regard its existence now merely in the same light with many other relics of past ages maintained through that influence of conservativism, which has more or less hold over the minds of all. The China campaign has taught us differently. Our two regiments and a half of cavalry there rendered most valuable service. With even that small force we were enabled to scour the country all round our camps to a great distance; and in action against an enemy, whose mounted force was considerable, they gave us the power of following up by rapid charges the effect produced at long ranges [p. 195] by our Armstrong guns. In contending against an enemy similarly provided with a formidable artillery, its use would be all the more valuable, as by its rapidity in getting over the ground an onslaught might be effected upon the enemy’s batteries, which would so employ them and distract their attention, that the infantry might have time for an advance in hue without incurring that heavy loss inevitable if they themselves had commenced the attack. In our actions in the field, the Chinese suffered but very little from our infantry, our cavalry and artillery playing the principal parts, and inflicting almost all the loss which the enemy sustained.

During our halt at Pa-le-cheaou, reconnoitring parties went out almost daily, some of which advanced to within a few hundred yards of the Pekin walls, enabling the staff to acquire a knowledge of the surrounding country, and to glean much valuable information of Sang-ko-lin-sin’s movements from the inhabitants. The people which they met with were civil and obliging, so that in a few days good markets were established, where fowls, vegetables, and fruit were obtainable at cheap rates. Tung-chow, which was about three miles to our right, was completely in our power, as a battalion held one of its gates. The civic authorities there thought it was their best policy to save their city by aiding and supplying us with provisions, &c. &c., in return for which we prevented any of our men or followers from entering the place.

Our Chinese coolies were with difficulty kept under restraint, being most lawless and cruel. The country people had the greatest dread of them, and feared their [p. 196] approach ten times more than that of our soldiers. At night they frequently broke out of camp and prowled about into the neighbouring villages, plundering and frequently ill-using women. One of them, taken in the act, was tried and hanged before all the other coolies. One evening a party of them succeeded in entering Tung-chow, where they made a regular attack upon a pawnshop; but the citizens turned out and beat them off, killing four or five of them.

A fine road runs from Tung-chow to Pekin, passing along from the former place south of the canal as far as Pa-le-cheaou, where it crosses the canal by the fine stone bridge there, and runs along nearly parallel with it, until it reaches the capital at the Che-ho-mun. That road is paved with blocks of granite of about five feet long by eighteen inches wide and deep. At present its condition is very bad, many of the stones having sunk considerably, and those at the sides, where the road is raised, having fallen away. We found that our carts and waggons would not, in passing along it, stand the jar occasioned by its unevenness; so an unmetalled country road, which ran from Tung-chow to Pekin all the way along the north side of the canal, was chosen as our means ofcommunicationn. It was at first hoped that we should have been able to use the canal for transporting our supplies from the Peiho; but upon examination it was found that there were six or seven regular weirs between its two extremities, which would have entailed as many transhipments — the Chinese being ignorant of the use of locks, and that canal being unprovided with the long slips common upon the far [p. 197] famed Imperial Canal, up which the boats are hauled by manual labour. Upon our arrival at Pa-le-cheaou we found a considerable number of very large barges upon the canal, two of which were heavily laden with rice, which we seized for our own commissariat. This canal is called by the natives the lihang-ho (grain-bearing river); there is scarcely any current through it, and its water is consequently of a dark yellow colour, covered along its edge with slimy-looking weeds. It is fed by the mountain streams which pass through the grounds of Yuen-ming-yuen, sweeping in their course round Pekin, to which they form the ditches. In former times much care was paid to the waterworks of the capital, the reservoirs and weirs of which were well built, displaying considerable ingenuity of construction; for years past, however, they have had no attention paid to them, and consequently have fallen into a ruinous condition — the stone weirs having in some places disappeared altogether, and the supply of water being allowed to find its own way across the adjacent country. Since that time the Liliang-ho has been meagrely fed, and at the weirs, where there had evidently been, in days gone by a considerable overflow, there is now only a tiny trickling. The canal ends abruptly at Tung-chow, there being an intervening space of about a hundred and fifty yards between it and the Peiho. The surplus water from the canal flows into that river over a very fine weir, built of granite, fast falling into decay. The Peiho becomes two distinct rivers above Tung-chow, one branch passing close under its walls. It is there only twelve or fifteen yards in width; but below the [p. 197] junction of the two streams it widens out to from thirty to fifty yards.

At Pa-le-cheaou we procured a considerable number of carts and mules; and had we driven the country about, we might have obtained any reasonable amount of them, but all coercion was avoided as much as possible, and money paid for those we took. The conveyances of the country are two-wheeled waggons and wheel-barrows; the former are of two sorts, one being a small covered-in cart with shafts, drawn by a mule or pony, or sometimes by two in tandem. The other is a much larger and more substantially built waggon, also with shafts, drawn by four mules or ponies, one being in the shafts, the other three abreast in front, the traces from which are fastened to the axle-tree. The harness is all made of strong rope made up of twisted untanned thongs. The mules we obtained were fine animals, in good condition, and well suited for transport purposes. The Chinese drivers had most complete power over them and managed them well, talking to them whilst yoking them in and starting them off, which was no easy matter. As the three leading animals were in no way fastened to each other, it was a matter of difficulty to get them to pull all at one moment in starting, and if one turned rusty he prevented the others from going on. It was a curious sight watching our English soldiers yoking them in and endeavouring to start them. The animals, unaccustomed to the Britishers’ voice and mode of treatment, invariably hung back or dragged in different directions. To take a leader by the head was a sure signal for general action amongst [p. 199] the entire team, each animal kicking and biting furiously at his next neighbour. I have often pitied the soldier left behind upon baggage guard, in charge of some such cart without a Chinese driver, when I have seen him making attempt after attempt to get his team in motion. I cannot imagine anything more trying to the temper than such an operation; having, after much difficulty, perhaps, induced all the animals to face in one direction — always a matter of serious labour — and when inwardly congratulating himself upon his success, thinking that all was right and that they were upon the point of all pulling together, he sees one of the beasts put his leg over the loose trace. To rectify this entails a fresh disarrangement of the whole team, and a fresh series of kicks, &c., from the mules, and hearty curses from the warrior. That same team, in charge of a Chinese driver, who would talk and chirrup in some peculiar manner to his beasts, would have been a mile upon its road in the same time that the soldier took in getting it fairly started. Once off, the sturdy mules and ponies draw it at a brisk pace, and all goes well until some obstacle necessitates a halt, when the same tiring process gone through at first starting has to be gone through afresh. The wheel-barrows are similar to those used in the south of China, being a sort of outside Irish jaunting car, with one wheel upon a small scale. They are driven by one man generally; but when the load carried is heavy, a second man is yoked in as a leader, in rope traces, joined in front by a wooden bar which fits across his chest. The country about our camp maintained the same features as in the neighbourhood of Chang-kia-wan, [p. 200] being, however, more wooded, and dotted over more thickly with enclosed tombs of all sizes, some very large and imposing in appearance. Many were adorned with handsome marble monuments, and all those of any importance were surrounded by groves of trees, and neatly built brick walls. Pine trees, planted close together in long lines, enclosed those of the greatest pretensions, and formed an impassable fence for their protection. One of the largest and best kept burial-places was near the stone bridge, and close in rear of the French lines. The Tartar cavalry had encamped around it the evening before our fight of the 21st September, and a considerable number of them were killed there by the French artillery fire during the action. In front of it stood two high pillars of white marble, and a quaintly designed bridge over nothing, of the same material. These and the monuments in the enclosure were richly carved in a grotesque manner, and the entire space covered by the tombs was neatly laid out in paved walks and well-trimmed grass-plots. All the tombs of importance have dwelling-houses attached to them, in which those in charge of the place reside, and where the members of the deceased’s family find quarters, during their annual visits to the spot for the purpose of sacrificing to the manes of their departed relations.

About Canton no ground is ever devoted to purposes of interment which is capable of producing crops, the bleak sides of hills or other barren spots being used as graveyards. There the dead are congregated together, whilst in the neighbourhood of Pekin the tombs are scattered indiscriminately about through the richest [p. 201] farms, large spaces being given up to each, and in no instance is there any considerable number collected within any one enclosure. Every family has, seemingly, its own place of interment.

The weather continued very fine during our halt at Pa-le-cheaou. In August and the early part of September the heat at midday was very oppressive when exposed to the sun, but towards the latter end of September the temperature by day resembled that of an English summer, the nights being deliciously cool; towards October it was so cold at night that blankets and warm clothing were in great requisition. Whenever a northerly wind blew it was chilly even at noon, and in the early morning it was quite unpleasantly cold. We had one or two slight showers during our halt, which were most acceptable in laying the dust, which until then had been most disagreeable, covering everything, even within our tents, so that at any time during the day one could write his name upon the table. Penmanship under such circumstances was a matter of difficulty, the ink and pens becoming clogged with fine sand, which found its way into our very food, rendering one’s camp fare disagreeable irom the highly earthy flavour imparted to it.

The inhabitants, who fled from the surrounding villages during our action, returned gradually in small parties, as the few who had originally stood their ground had been well treated. Before we broke up our camp a considerable portion of the males had come back. They seemed puzzled to understand how it was that a nation, whom they had always been taught to [p. 202] consider as barbarous and fierce, should evince any care for their protection.

Whilst we were awaiting the arrival of our siege guns and reinforcements, almost daily communications passed between the allied ambassadors and the Imperial Government. The first letter received was upon the 22nd September, from the Prince of Kung, the Emperor’s brother, dated the day before, and written, I suppose, after the battle. It said, that as Tsai, Prince of I, and Muh, President of the Board of War, had failed in arranging matters with us satisfactorily, he, the Prince of Kung, had been appointed Imperial Commissioner with full powers to negotiate. As he was anxious to send in Hang-ki and Lou-wei-wan to our camp to discuss affairs, he requested the ambassadors to suspend hostilities temporarily, so that friendly relations might be established. Lord Elgin’s answer informed his Imperial Highness that no arrangements could be entered upon, nor any suspension of hostilities allowed, until the English and French subjects, then prisoners with the Chinese, were sent back; and further, that should any hindrance be made to their return, the consequences would be most serious to the Imperial Government. A good opportunity was also afforded to the newly-appointed Commissioners of disowning all complication in the capture of those who were missing, by an order which Lord Elgin forwarded to the Prince of Kung, with his answer, directing all her Britannic Majesty’s subjects then in Pekin, to return at once to our camp, and instructing them at the same time to warn any of the Chinese authorities, who might oppose their departure, of the danger which they incurred in doing so. [p. 203]

That our ambassador should refrain from violent language in declaiming against the treacherous capture of the prisoners, and appear inclined to overlook it, provided they were at once sent back, and to view it rather as an error committed by subordinates, was so essentially Chinese in its conception, that very probably, had all those captured upon the 18th instant been then in Pekin, or within the new Commissioner’s immediate jurisdiction, he would have availed himself of the opportunity of fixing the crime upon some military inferiors, by disclaiming any participation in it, and by returning the prisoners. Such a line of conduct would have been in accordance with their traditional policy. It is to be remarked that in the Prince of Kung’s letter, there was no mention of the prisoners made by the Tartar army, nor do I believe that he or other members of the Government attached much importance to them, or thought that we should do so either, until, of course, Lord Elgin’s answer reached Pekin.

On the 23rd September another flag of truce came in to our camp, with a letter from the Prince of Kung, in which with more ingenuity than success he attempted to prove that our people, then in Pekin, had been captured owing to their own want of temper, which brought them into collision with some Chinese troops; that they were then in good health, having received no serious bodily harm; but as peace was still unconcluded and the Takoo forts and Tien-tsin still in our possession, it could not be expected that our prisoners should be returned until we evacuated the country. “What occasion is there for alarm about a few British subjects [p. 204] who may be missing?” If we restored the positions which we had captured from the Chinese, they would be sent back upon the withdrawal of our troops from the country. A statement of the circumstances under which the prisoners had been made, as far as we knew them, was returned in answer by Lord Elgin, who stated that the Prince of Kung must have been deceived, if he had been otherwise informed. This gave his Imperial Highness another loophole to retreat through with Chinese respectability: he might have pretended that he had been misinformed, and behead half-a-dozen petty officials to sustain the untruth. The first application for the return of our prisoners having failed, a higher tone was adopted in the second, and the treachery of taking our people prisoners whilst under a flag of truce was denounced in strong terms. That several of our people should be prisoners in the hands of a nation celebrated for cruelty, was a regular millstone around the necks of the Commanders-in-Chief. All were eager to avenge their capture, yet wished to postpone the commencement of operations in hopes of obtaining their release, and fearing lest the assault of Pekin should be the signal for their massacre. As the prisoners had been taken when employed upon diplomatic duty, our ambassador was naturally all the more anxious for their safety; and yet a due regard to public duty prevented him from seeking their surrender by conceding one whit of the original demands made to Kweiliang at Tien-tsin. To have ignored them altogether, would have been not only inhuman, but have allowed an idea to spread abroad in China, that the lives of such a small party of our countrymen was a matter of little moment to [p. 205] us — an impression that might entail serious consequences hereafter at the various ports of the empire, where the moral influence of our nation is the main stay upon which individuals must ever principally depend for protection. To have conceded the most insignificant clause of our original demands, in exchange for the return of our prisoners, would have been a most dangerous precedent in any future war with China, by showing the Imperial rulers the advantages open to them at such times from the kidnapping of Englishmen. The course adopted was a wise one. Lord Elgin refused to recognise Mr. Parkes and his party as prisoners of war taken in battle; all through his subsequent negotiations he spoke of them as persons kidnapped under the most treacherous circumstances, in defiance of all international law and the customs of war. He made their surrender a sine qua non, before he would even suspend hostilities. The Prince of Kung, on the other hand, endeavoured to negotiate for their release, making it contingent upon the withdrawal of our army.

In Lord Elgin’s answer to the Prince of Kung’s letter of the 23rd September, he held out a threat of condign punishment in the event of any injury happening to the prisoners, or of his refusal to send them back. To do so in decided terms was no easy matter, as, from the general rumours we had heard, it was tolerably certain that the statement of their being all well was untrue, and common sense told us that if a melee had really occurred when the prisoners were taken (as stated in the Prince of Kung’s letter), that the officers and men of Mr. Parkes’s escort were not likely to be [p. 206] all taken alive. Therefore, if some had been killed, it would not do to declare finally that no peace would be made until all had been returned, lest such might drive the Imperial Government to despair, and induce them to fight to the last. To conclude peace as rapidly as possible was of great importance; and as but one more month of fine weather remained for military operations, a protracted struggle was of all things to be avoided. Such must have entailed upon us great additional expense, and perhaps loss of life, and could only end by the overthrow of the ruling dynasty, which was not our policy. Our object was, not to weaken the Imperial Government, but to show China how immeasurably stronger and greater in war we were. On the supposition that the Prince of Kung really considered the capture of Mr. Parkes and party as a minor matter, and did not deem them of sufficient importance to be treated for specifically, he would still be naturally disinclined to send back those who then survived until peace had been signed. He knew that all the prisoners had been barbarously used, and would consequently conclude that, if their tale of woe was known to us before peace had been signed, we should base farther demands in the way of indemnification or concessions upon that ground. All along, during the negotiations entered upon subsequent to our departure from Tien-tsin, the Imperial Government appears to have thought that we had some hitherto concealed demands, which we intended to bring forward at the last moment, and that we were only too anxious to have some plausible excuse for doing so. If in our ambassador’s letters to the Prince of Kung it was positively stated [p. 207] that, unless all the prisoners were returned, the reigning dynasty would be overthrown by us, the Imperial Commissioners might argue “that, as some have been already killed, we cannot by resisting to the last and trusting to the chance of war, suffer more than the barbarians have announced that they will impose upon us, if we fail to return all the prisoners, which is now out of our power.” We should consequently gain nothing by such a definite threat.

All these considerations had to be weighed carefully before an answer was returned to the Prince of Kung’s letter.

Lord Elgin’s letter was a masterpiece of its kind, commencing, as I have before stated, by a statement of facts in connection with Mr. Parkes’s capture, and winding up in the form of an ultimatum setting forth the terms upon which he would make peace. The terms were, that if, within three days from the date of writing, the British and French subjects detained in Pekin were sent back, and if the Prince of Kung would consent to sign the convention handed to Kweiliang at Tien-tsin, our army would not advance beyond Pa-le-cheaou. Should those conditions be rejected, the allied armies would advance upon Pekin, a movement which would probably cause the destruction of the Mantchoo dynasty. It was intimated that these conditions were final, and only made from the sincere desire for peace entertained by Lord Elgin, in order to give the Commissioners one further opportunity of averting the destruction of their capital.

The Prince of Kung replied to this dispatch on the 27th September, and evaded giving any positive [p. 208] answer. His policy seems to have been most vacillating. It must have been apparent to him, and to all who acted with him, that, in a military point of view, they were totally unable to contend against us. Much as they might boast of their vast Tartar armies and the Mongol hoards ready to pour down upon us from beyond the Great Wall under their forty-eight princes, yet, after their several defeats in battles fought by them under the most favourable circumstances, their inability to contend against us must have been well known to them.

An apathy seems to have seized upon the Chinese Government. The passive and mulish obstructiveness, for which it has long been celebrated, will not account for their want of decision at that most critical moment. No man seemed to have the determination requisite for saving his country, and by which alone the impending blow might be averted. All lacked the moral courage to confess their weakness before the world. Obstinate pride, or the dread of future punishment, had taken possession of them, and prevented them from acting.

The Prince of Kung’s answer was most curious. Like a true Asiatic he seemed to have acquired a gleam of hope from the fact of some time being given him for decision. Even that trifling concession was construed, by an Eastern train of thought, into an indication of weakness or want of confidence upon our parts; and he consequently considered himself entitled to talk somewhat bigger than he had done in any of his previous dispatches. He asserted that he had had nothing to do in any way with the capture of the Europeans. It was solely an act of the late Commis- [p. 209] sioners; and when the fact of their being bound and in prison came to his notice, he ordered them to be cared for and their wounds attended to. He could not, however, send them back or even appoint deputies for the arrangement of preliminiaries with us, until the allied armies had retreated to Chang-kia-wan. The proximity of our troops to Pekin had already considerably disturbed the people’s minds there; and in the event of any attack being made upon the city by us, he feared it would be difficult to ensure the safety of the prisoners; but he promised that when peace as signed and our armies withdrawn, he would send back Mr. Parkes and party with all honour.

Strange to say the Prince of Kung in his letter to Baron Gros, of the same date, was not so courteous, and wrote in a far more decided manner, intimating that if the French army advanced upon Pekin, all of that nation who might then be prisoners in the capital would be put to death.

As the time granted to the Imperial Commissioners for deciding upon their line of conduct drew to a close, they evidently became frightened at their own temerity, and wrote to Lord Elgin in the most apologetic strain, saying that our interpreters must have misunderstood the meaning of their letters; that they were ready and willing to sign the convention; that that, in the existing state of excitement amongst the Pekin people, it was impossible to send the prisoners back. A hint was also thrown out that Mr Parkes should be used as a negotiator between them. A letter from him, written in Chinese, was forwarded to Lord Elgin at the same time, stating that, at the request of the Chinese [p. 210] authorities, he begged to intimate their wish of opening negotiations, &c, &c. A private note asking for clothes for himself and Mr Loch, also accompanied it, upon the margin of which the latter gentleman had written in Hindostani that the letter was written “by order”; or, in other words, that all that they had written was to be taken cum grano. This was the firts intimation we had had of Messrs Loch and Parkes being together.

Upon some of the clothes sent to them, we had written around the name marked on them, “In three days we shall commence hostilities again,” and, “What is the name of the place in which you are confined?” These sentences were in Hindostani also, so that if noticed, they should be unintelligble to the Chinese, but would be understood by Mr Loch, who knew that language.

By the next letter received from from we learnt that they were lodged in the Kaou-meaou Temple, near the Teh-shun gate.

Before advancing upon Pekin from the Pa-le-cheaou, deputations from the merchants of the Chinese city, came into our camp, bringing presents of fruits and vegetables, and promising that we should be furnished with all the supplies we required, provided we spared that part of Pekin.

Upon the 3rd October, as no satisfactory answer had been returned to our ultimatum, and all the expected reinforcements and heavy guns had arrived, we broke up camp at Pa-le-cheaou, and crossed the canal by the bridge of boats which we had prepared for the purpose, and encamped a cheval upon the paved road [p. 211] leading to Pekin. Head-quarters were established in the Mahomedan village of Chang-chia-ying.

The house occupied by the Commander-in-Chief was a mosque, in which it was curious to see how the architecture peculiar to the Prophet’s religion was mingled with that used in Buddhistic structures. The inscriptions upon the walls and within the building were in Arabic, not Persian, characters. Although the latter is used by all Mussulmen in India, the followers of that religion in China know nothing of it. Close by that village was the large enclosed tomb which had been previously selected as the position for our depot, which, it had been arranged, should be established before we advanced finally upon the capital. It was well suited for the purpose required, being easily capable of defence, and, from its size, well suited for parking therein all our siege train, baggage, &c., which was to be left behind until Sang-ko-hn-sin’s army had been driven from the field. Commissariat supplies sufficient for all our troops up to the 20th October had been collected, and were stored at this depot.

It was arranged between the Commanders-in-Chief, that the allied force was to advance upon the 4th October; but as a large French convoy, which had been expected to arrive on the 3rd, did not make its appearance until the day after, the movement was postponed until the 5th October.

Up to the time of marching, begging letters kept coming in daily from the Prince of Kung, sometimes two in one day; all were concocted in a half-cunning, half-frightened tone. He evidently dreaded our advancing above all things. He felt his inability to pre- [p. 212] vent it, and yet lacked moral courage enough to adopt the only course by which he could avert such a national calamity.

The absolute necessity of conceding all our demands, must have been evident to the dullest of the Chinese Ministers. There was a shilly-shallying about all the later dispatches, for which, in any other country under similar circumstances, it would have been impossible to account. Not so, however, in China, with an absolute monarch, who had left his capital and retired to such a distance from the theatre of operations that all reference to him involved the loss of several days, and from whom it was impossible to obtain any more definite instructions than the vague order “to keep the barbarians at a distance.” His Majesty contented himself with announcing the object desired, but cunningly forbore from entering into any detail of the method by which such was to be effected. By such conduct he reserved to himself at all times the right of beheading his Ministers for the policy they had pursued, even though they had succeeded through it in attaining the object desired. Success does not always secure the Chinese statesman from censure. His Imperial Majesty is capable, at any moment, of sacrificing his faithful agents, in order to give a plausibility to some statement which he wished to be believed. Thus Kweihang was disgraced for not finally settling matters with us at Tien-tsin, although it was never intended by the Government that he should do so. It was deemed necessary to give those mock negotiations the semblance of intentional [p. 213] reality, and so an old and faithful public servant was degraded, apparently, without the least compunction.

With the dread of death or disgrace before a minister, in case of failure, or even of a success which does not exactly dovetail in with his master’s whims or pride, it is not surprising that all Chinese political officers should hesitate before they arrive at any decision in dealing with foreigners.

If the Chinese deputy concedes too little, negotiations will be broken off, and his degradation follow most certainly; whilst, if he concedes too much, his life will be in jeopardy for daring to “sacrifice national honour.”

The Prince of Kung found himself thus unfortunately situated, and his vacillation was the consequence. [p. 214]



At Tien-tsin Lord Elgin and the Commander-in-Chief occupied quarters in a very fine house, belonging to Tsung-han, the Salt Commissioner. It was in the suburb, which lies between the eastern face of the city and the river. The entrance to it was from the quay running along the Peiho, so that all steamers coming up from Takoo could lie just off the doorway and only a few yards from it. The house within was so commodious, that Lord Elgin invited Baron Gros to stop there also, so that with the two embassies and the English Commander-in-Chiefs staff, the place was fully occupied. General Montauban took up his quarters in the Joss-house, where Lord Elgin had stopped during his visit to Tien-tsin in 1858.

A few days after our arrival at Tien-tsin, it was intimated to the French and English ambassadors that Kweiliang, Hang-ki, and Hang-fu had been appointed by the Emperor to act as Commissioners for the arrangement of affairs with us. All were to be in Tien- [p. 161] tsin by the 31st August. Kweiliang, an old man who had frequently before been engaged in carrying on diplomatic business with foreigners, was the chief of the party, and pretended to be most anxious for a peaceable solution to all points at issue between us. Daily meetings took place between these Commissioners and Messrs. Wade and Parkes. Kweiliang, in announcing to Lord Elgin his nomination as Imperial Commissioner, had declared, in a very cunningly worded letter, that he had with him the “Kwan-fang,” or great seal [大篆, dàzhuàn] and that he had power to discuss and arrange all matters connected with the treaty of 1858, and those which were specified in the ultimatum of March 1860. Peace was talked of by all people belonging to the embassies as a certainty, so that in the army all were speculating as to their chances of getting home to England before Christmas. We were told that the only difficulty raised by Kweiliang was as to the strength of the escorts which should accompany the ambassadors to Pekin. Of all things they objected most strongly to any guns being sent along with the parties, alleging that such an arrangement would disturb the minds of all the country people, who were very timid, and dreaded the presence of foreigners. If peace was concluded, “why should we wish to take a large force with us?” Our doing so would be, they averred, an indication of our want of confidence in them. They also endeavoured to persuade Lord Elgin to go up by boat along the river to Tung-chow.

In this manner some eight days of most valuable time were frittered away in discussing preliminaries. It was at last settled, that an interview between the Imperial [p. 162] Commissioners and Lord Elgin should come off on the 7th September, and that the convention should be signed the day following. Messrs. Parkes and Wade had an audience with Kweihang upon the evening of the 6th, when they pressed him to produce his written powers to treat with us. In an interview with Hang-ki which they had had that same afternoon, suspicions seemed to have arisen in Mr. Parkes’s mind, that the Commissioners were not possessed of the requisite Imperial decree, which alone would enable them to sign the convention. These suspicions gave rise to the demand that Kweiliang’s written powers should be shown them. That Chinese dignitary endeavoured to avoid this straightforward request, feigning indisposition, shilly-shallying and beating round about the bush, and trying to gain time in the manner usual with diplomatists of his nation. His manner, however, clearly showed that there was something wrong; and the English gentlemen with whom he was dealing, were far too accustomed to such manoeuvres not to observe it at once. They left him, saying that it was useless to talk any more upon the subject of the convention with one improvided with the necessary powers from the Emperor to act in his name. Lord Elgin immediately informed Kweihang, that owing to the want of good faith shown by him and his colleagues, regarding the authority of which he had implied the possession, he had determined upon advancing directly to Tung-chow, and that until he arrived at that place he declined receiving their visits. The announcement of our failure fell like a shell amongst us. All those who were supposed to be in the diplomatic secrets had been up to the last moment so confident that all [p. 163] fighting was at an end, that the army generally accepted such assurances without questioning. This caused us to laugh all the more heartily when we learnt that negotiations were broken off. Sir John Michel’s division reached Tien-tsin on the 2nd September, the cavalry on the 26th August, the 1st Royals, 67th Regiment, and some guns the day before; Sir Robert Napier’s division on the 5th September. On the 3rd of that last-named month we were in a position to have moved on towards Pekin with the 1st division and cavalry, leaving the 1st and 67th Regiments behind at Tien-tsin as a garrison. As we subsequently discovered from official papers captured in the Emperor’s palace, it was never intended that Kweihang’s negotiations should be anything more than a sham to gain time and so, if possible, prolong operations into the cold season, which they considered too inclement for our constitutions to bear up against. It is to be regretted that our diplomatic agents did not prevent Kweihang and Company from succeeding, by opening their intercourse with him by a demand for the written powers authorising him to sign the convention in the Emperor’s name. Such a precaution was one which would have suggested itself to all ordinary people, and I can only account for its non-adoption, by supposing that long practice in the diplomatic science has the effect of raising our intellectual powers above the process of reasoning common to the uninitiated in its solemn mysteries.

In consequence of negotiations having been thus abruptly broken off, it was determined that our troops should at once commence their march towards Tungchow. Of the road between Tien-tsin and Pekin we [p. 164] knew but little and could obtain but little satisfactory information.

Our means of land transport were but limited, and the fifty carts required by the embassy were only collected in Tien-tsin with difficulty. It was generally believed that the river was only navigable as far as Ho-se-woo for the sort of boats calculated for the conveyance of troops and heavy stores. Of the amount of supplies procurable along the line of route, no positive information could be obtained. It was therefore arranged between the allied Commanders-in-Chief that the two armies should advance by detachments. Brigadier Reeves with 99th Regiment, 200 Marines, Barry’s and Stirling’s batteries, the King’s Dragoon Guards, and Fane’s Horse to start on the 8th September. The French (about 3000 men) on the 10th; Sir John Michel with the 2nd brigade, Desborough’s battery and Probyn’s Horse, on the 12th September. Sir Robert Napier with the 2nd division was to remain behind at Tien-tsin in command, but to be in readiness for advancing at any moment when called upon to do so. Upon Sunday the 9th September, Lord Elgin and Sir Hope Grant left Tien-tsin, and joined Brigadier Reeves’s force at Hookow, and advanced to Yang-tsun the day after. During the night all the native Chinese drivers who had been collected before leaving Tien-tsin decamped, taking with them all their mules and ponies. A violent thunder storm accompanied by heavy rain had enabled them to make their escape without being perceived.

The 11th September was fine, but, owing to the immobility of the embassy from their loss of transport, a [p. 165] march was impossible. Parties were sent out into the country to try and recover the animals or procure others, but without success. Several junks were, however, seized, into which were transferred all stores and baggage for which no other transport was available. This desertion of the drivers was evidently directed by the Chinese authorities, in order to retard our march, and was a very fair indication of their animus towards us.

Upon the 11th September a dispatch from Pekin reached Lord Elgin. It was from Tsai, the Prince of I, a Captain-General of the Imperial Guard, and Muh, a member of the Great Council and President of the Board of War. It said that as Kweihang and his colleagues had failed in bringing the negotiations lately entered into at Tien-tsin to a satisfactory conclusion, the Emperor had directed them to proceed to Tien-tsin to arrange matters with his Excellency the British Minister, and that, as they intended commencing their journey towards that place on the following day, they hoped Lord Elgin would alter his previously announced determination of advancing to Tung-chow, and await their arrival at Tien-tsin. Lord Elgin’s answer was to the effect that he would sign no treaty before reaching Tung-chow, of which decision he had already informed their Excellencies Kweiliang and Company. Two letters reached Lord Elgin on the 12th September from the same source; one of these communications arrived in camp in the morning, the other in the evening. The first expressed astonishment at our advance from Tien-tsin, and was evidently written with the intention of trying what effect a high tone and an affectation of [p. 166] injured innocence would have upon us. As no reply was vouchsafed to it by his Lordship, I suppose they inferred that it had failed in its object. The second letter received was humbler in its general tone and was accordingly answered by Lord Elgin. The whole drift of both these letters was, that our force should return to Tien-tsin, and that his Lordship should reopen negotiations there. A civil but positive refusal was returned.

On the 13th September the English reached Ho-se-woo [河西务, Héxī, find it here]. That town, like all those between it and Takoo, stands upon the river’s bank, there being but few wells and little other water-supply except the Peiho itself. It is the largest place between Tien-tsin and Tung-chow; Chang-kia-wan in its present ruined condition, although formerly a walled-in city, being of less importance. The country through which we had passed was one vast level plain covered, as far as the eye could range, with high standing crops of maize and millet. The road by which we had advanced was unmetalled, but hard and good in dry weather; after heavy rain it would be, however, impassable for all wheeled conveyance. The villages which we passed consisted of well-built houses, mostly enclosed by neatly kept gardens and orchards. The people as far as Nan-tsai-tsun were most friendly and obliging; none had flown from their houses, and all appeared anxious to help us, bringing in fruit, vegetables, &c., into our camp for sale. Between that place and Ho-se-woo there was a marked change visible in the disposition of the inhabitants towards us. Whenever we approached a village the people fled, and shunned all communication with us, [p. 167] Ho-se-woo we found almost entirely deserted, only a few of the worst characters remaining behind for the purpose of plundering the establishments of those who had left. There were two very large pawnbrokers’ shops there, containing great quantities of warm clothing and valuables of all sorts. We placed guards over them, but the Chinese thieves climbed over the walls and roof tops at night and succeeded in carrying off property without being perceived. When this was discovered, all the Chinese remaining in the town were ordered to quit forthwith, in order to save what remained. We procured delicious grapes and very good vegetables there, and the large quantities of yams and sweet potatoes growing in the surrounding fields enabled our army to feed well Ho-se-woo is closely surrounded by orchards of peach, apple, and pear trees, besides numerous clumps of willows. The river is not more than about a hundred yards wide at Ho-se-woo, dwindling away at some points to scarcely fifty, and at one or two places to about twenty yards. The water is clear and good, being above the tidal influence; but wells become numerous in the district north of it.

As it was very doubtful whether the Peiho was navigable at that time of year for large boats beyond Ho-se-woo, and as the supplies procurable from the country were very uncertain, Sir Hope Grant determined upon converting that town into a depot for stores, and establishing a large field hospital there. Admiral Hope had organised flotillas consisting of from sixty to eighty junks in each. An English sailor lived on board each vessel, and each flotilla was under the immediate charge of a commander, with a due propor- [p. 168] tion of naval officers under him. The siege train was floated up the river on pontoons, tracked by sailors or Chinese boatmen. Small detachments of troops accompanied each flotilla at first, marching along the banks for its protection, but latterly this precaution was found unnecessary, and was consequently discontinued. Ho-se-woo was the best half-way station which could be fixed upon between Tien-tsin and Pekin, being about forty miles from the former and the same distance from the latter. As the troops were marching up from Tientsin to Ho-se-woo in detachments, it was determined to collect them at that place, before making any advance towards the capital, so that a halt for a few days there became indispensable. Daily communication passed between the Imperial Commissioners and our embassy. Tsai, Prince of I, and his colleagues seemed so bent upon peace, and the difficulties of transport were so great, that orders were sent back to Sir Robert Napier, directing him to halt at Tien-tsin, as it was not expected that the services of his division would be required in advance of that city.

Upon the afternoon of the 13th September, the day on which we arrived at Ho-se-woo, Messrs. Wade and Parkes with an escort of twenty cavalry, went forward to meet the Imperial Commissioners at Matow, twelve miles from our camp. Upon reaching that village, they found that their “Excellencies” had fallen back upon Tung-chow, disliking evidently the proximity of our army. Our party consequently pushed on for that last-named town, which they entered upon the following day. They had a lengthened interview with the Imperial Commissioners, when, after the usual shilly [p. 169] shallying and childish endeavours to protract arrangements, it was finally settled that the allied forces were to advance to within five li (about a mile and a half) of Chang-kia-wan and halt there, Lord Elgin with an escort of 1,000 men proceeding on to Tung-chow, where he was to be furnished with suitable quarters. He was to meet the Imperial Commissioners there and sign the convention. That accomplished, he was to proceed with the same escort to the capital for the purpose of ratifying the old treaty.

Upon the 16th September Sir John Michel reached our camp at Ho-se-woo, bringing with him the 2nd Regiment, 15th Punjaub Infantry, Desborough’s, battery, and Probyn’s Horse. Upon the 17th the army and 1,000 French marched to Matow, leaving the 2nd Regiment with three guns and 25 cavalry behind at Ho-se-woo for the protection of the hospitals and stores there; 100 irregular cavalry were also left there as an escort for Lord Elgin who remained behind. A small detachment of cavalry was posted at Yang-tsun for the purpose of keeping open the communications, and conveying letters &c. &c. On the same day that we marched to Matow, Messrs. Loch and Parkes went on to Tung-chow to arrange for Lord Elgin’s reception there.

At five o’clock a.m. on the 18th September, our force advanced, having been joined upon the evening before by the 2nd Regiment, which, upon being relieved by the 60th Rifles at Ho-se-woo, had started for head-quarters. Lieut.-Colonel Walker, Assistant Quartermaster-General to the cavalry, together with Assistant Commissary-General Thompson, had accompanied Mr. Parkes’s party to Tung-chow upon the previous evening, the [p. 170] former to arrange with the Chinese authorities as to the site for our camp near Chang-kia-wan, the latter for the supplies required by our troops. It was arranged that Colonel Walker should meet us upon the march on the 18th, and conduct us to the ground indicated by the Chinese for our force to encamp upon.

Upon leaving Matow the road kept near the river for the first two miles, the country around, like all over which we had hitherto passed since we had left Tien-tsin, was highly cultivated, the crops still standing. A little further on the road struck off from the river. Far and near the millet and Indian corn had been cut, which struck many as being ominous, particularly when, upon advancing about a mile further, our advanced guard came suddenly upon a Tartar cavalry picket, which fled when we approached. This naturally put our men upon the qui vive. Military men are far less confiding than civilians in dealing with uncivilised nations. The little experience that I have had goes to prove that the latter are far more rash and less liable to take the precautions which ordinary military knowledge would indicate as necessary. How often have I known civilians, accompanying an army, scoff at the caution of general officers, forgetting altogether that any commander who fails to provide against every possible mistake or probable contingency is deeply culpable. By the strange contrariety of human nature, it is generally these irresponsible gentlemen who are first loudest in their abuse of officers who fail in anything through rashness or want of caution. Notwithstanding the confident assurances which we heard upon all sides from those connected with our embassy, that [p. 171] peace was almost a certainty, every soldier in our force thought that the aspect of affairs was very threatening, when, upon debouching from the village of Woo-tse-ying and approaching that of Le-urh-tsze, we found ourselves in presence of a very large army, covering a front of about five miles in extent. Sir Hope Grant immediately halted the force, and sent orders to the rear that all the baggage should be collected in the village through which we had just passed, upon which place the rearguard was to close for its protection. Large bodies of Tartar cavalry kept closing in towards our flanks, and infantry in force were to be seen pouring in to the position in our front, along which enormous batteries of guns were visible. Shortly after we had halted, Mr. Loch, accompanied by three sowars, galloped in from the Chinese army, bringing with him letters from Mr. Parkes, announcing that all points had been arranged satisfactorily with the Imperial Commissioners. Lord Elgin had previously determined upon sending, post haste to Shanghai for Mr. Bruce, our Minister there, if Mr. Parkes’s interview with the Commissioners upon the evening of the 17th instant should prove successful. In order to carry this out, it was arranged that Mr. Parkes should write from Tung-chow to Captain Jones of the Royal Navy, who accompanied the army for that purpose, telling him of the issue of his negotiations with the Prince of I, and if, as was confidently expected, all our requests were agreed to, Captain Jones was to start off at once for the fleet upon the receipt of Mr. Parkes’s letter, and sail for Shanghai.

Captain Jones received a letter from Mr. Parkes, just before the action commenced, saying that everything [p. 172] had been arranged with the Commissioners. Mr. Loch informed us that he, Colonel Walker, Commissary-General Thompson, Mr. Parkes, five men of the Kong’s Dragoon Guards, and four sowars had left Tung-chow at a little after five o’clock a.m. on that morning, leaving Lieutenant Anderson and the rest of the escort (17 sowars) behind in that place. Mr. Bowlby, the “Times'” correspondent, and Mr. de Norman, an attache to our Minister at Shanghai (with the Commander-in-Chiefs knowledge), had, it appeared, also accompanied the party into Tung-chow upon the day before, and remained behind with Lieutenant Anderson the next morning. This division into two parts of the original party as despatched by Sir Hope Grant’s orders, has never, that I am aware of, been properly accounted for. When it was determined that Mr. Parkes should proceed to Tung-chow, an escort of picked men was furnished for his personal protection.

With a nation so notoriously deceitful as the Chinese, no amount of peaceful declarations, or assurances, warranted the breaking up of that escort into two portions, and leaving one of them behind in a crowded city belonging to men who by no stretch of imagination could be termed friends until peace had been actually signed. To have done so was a disregard of all military precaution, which common sense might have pointed out as most dangerous. Prom Mr. Loch we learnt that when en route that morning for our army, they had passed considerable bodies of troops in and about Chang-kia-wan, and had seen many guns in battery where, on the previous day, no preparations had been made for them, and no troops [p. 173] were to be seen. Mr. Parkes expostulated with the officials on the spot, but they would not or could not give him any satisfactory explanation, merely referring him to their general, who, they said, was away at some distance. Affairs seemed threatening; so Mr. Parkes determined upon returning to Tung-chow, to request the Commissioners to explain why an army was in occupation of the ground where it had been decided we should encamp. He took with him only Private Phipps of the King’s Dragoon Guards. It was at the same time decided that Colonel Walker should remain upon the road with the escort for the purpose of examining the enemy’s position and watching their movements, whilst Mr. Loch should ride on to Sir Hope Grant to inform him how affairs stood. Only one construction could be put upon the matter. It was evident that the object was to entrap us when off our guard, getting us to encamp upon ground commanded by their artillery and completely surrounded by their troops. To surround an army on all sides is always a favourite theory with nations unskilled in war, and one which Sang-ko-hn-sin always endeavoured to effect in his engagements with us. He seemed to think that our forces, if once enclosed upon all sides by his Tartar cavalry, must fall an easy prey to his superior numbers.

The presence of Mr. Parkes and his party in Tungchow, and of Colonel Walker and his party within the enemy’s lines, was a great drag upon our movements, as the Commander-in-Chief naturally dreaded compromising their safety by an immediate attack. Mr. Loch volunteered to return to Tung-chow for the purpose of collecting the party of our people there and bringing [p. 174] them back with him. Captain Brabazon, Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-General to the Royal Artillery, volunteered to accompany him, carrying an order from Sir Hope Grant, directing all our people then in Tungchow to return to our army at once. Two sowars carrying a flag of truce went with them. It was then about eight o’clock a.m. Our cavalry moved out towards our flanks, for the purpose of watching the enemy’s movements, but with orders to avoid coming into collision with them.

Close by the road along which we had advanced, were three small mounds, standing about four hundred yards from the enemy’s batteries in front of the village of Le-urh-tsze. From these mounds a good view of the surrounding country was to be had. We could see the red coats of our dragoons belonging to Colonel Walker’s party, which was moving about through the Chinese troops, whose grey uniforms made the scarlet of our men all the more plainly visible. Whilst halting there awaiting Mr. Loch’s return, Hang-ki, one of the Imperial Commissioners, came in under a flag of truce, requesting to see Lord Elgin; but upon learning that he was at Ho-se-woo in rear, he returned to his own army. A Chinese officer and three men also arrived, saying that they had come to conduct us to the ground arranged for our camp.

Between ten and eleven o’clock, whilst we were awaiting Mr. Parkes’s return, a commotion was visible amongst the Chinese troops, and immediately their batteries opened, and a long line of fire was delivered by their infantry. Colonel Walker and his party were discovered galloping through the enemy, and in a few [p. 175] minutes arrived amongst us. The account which he gave was, that whilst waiting in the Chinese lines for the return of Mr. Parkes and others from Tungchow, he kept moving about examining the enemy’s batteries, &c. &c., as far as he was allowed to do so. At first the Chinese officers were civil, but after some time he perceived their manner changing perceptibly, until they became rude, trying to prevent him from going about. He warned the escort he had with him to be particularly guarded in their conduct and avoid any collision if possible. At one time a number of soldiers pressed in around him, and one of them, from behind him, tilted his sword from its scabbard. A Chinese officer, who was by, however, had it returned to him. Shortly after this circumstance. Colonel Walker’s attention was drawn to a party of noisy Chinamen collected round a French officcer, who, having accompanied the original party to Tung-chow, was then on his way back to the army. Upon seeing Colonel Walker he called out for assistance. That officer at once made his way up to him, and found that he had received a severe sabre cut on his head, and some other wounds about the body. Colonel Walker took him by the hand, and was endeavouring to help him away, when a rush was suddenly made upon him by the Chinese soldiers. They succeeded in drawing his sword from its scabbard, and in endeavouring to prevent this Colonel Walker cut his hand, and was obliged to let go the French officer, who was immediately knocked down, whilst at the same time they tried to pull Colonel Walker off his horse. To remain any longer amongst them [p. 176] without fighting was impossible, and for a few men to contend against crowds would have been ridiculous. He called out therefore to his party to ride for their lives, and all started for our army at a gallop, cutting their way through with only two wounded and one horse shot, although all the enemy near fired at them, and their batteries, as I have already mentioned, let drive at them as they went. Colonel Walker had a most trying time of it, whilst waiting in the midst of the Chinese army for Mr. Parkes’s return, nor could many have conducted themselves with such good temper and composure as he displayed then. Several Chinese officers had invited him and urged him to dismount and go into a house which was near, for the purpose of waiting there; but with wise military precaution he would not allow himself to be separated from his party. Had he done so, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have shared the same miserable fate that Brabazon and Anderson met with.

The firing, once commenced, was kept up vigorously by the enemy. The French, numbering 1,000, with a battery of artillery, were upon our right, and General Montauban sent to Sir Hope Grant to say that he was about to advance direct upon the village and works in his front. As our allies had no cavalry, a squadron of Fane’s Horse was sent to act under the orders of General Montauban, who placed them upon his right flank, directing them and the few spahis composing his own personal escort, to sweep round the village whilst the infantry attacked it in front. This was brilliantly effected under the immediate command of Colonel Foley, C.B., the English Commissioner at [p. 177] French head-quarters, to whom General Montauban had entrusted that duty. As Messrs. Brabazon and Loch had then been away over two hours, it was concluded that they had been detained in Tung-chow. Sir Hope Grant then formed his troops for a movement in advance. There was some rising ground upon our right front, from which our 9-pomider battery made good practice, a squadron of the King’s Dragoon Guards supporting them. The 99th Regiment was deployed and ordered to advance up the road leading to the village in our front, supported by two 9-pounders. The 15th Punjaub Infantry, with the Armstrong guns, took ground to the left; the 2nd Regiment (Queen’s) with Stirling’s 6-pounders and the cavalry were ordered to make a great flank movement to our left.

In describing the Chinese position, I may say that its right rested upon the old walled-in town of Changkia-wan [张家湾, Zhangjiawan, located here], and its left upon the Peiho, a distance of between three and four miles. The Seaou-ho (little river), ran between these two points, and was fordable almost everywhere. Beyond it rose a succession of sand-hills, interspersed with trees and stunted bushes. The road to Tung-chow ran upon our side of it, passing, for a distance of more than a mile along a high embankment, which the enemy had scarped and turned into batteries, with but little labour. At about one thousand yards from the Peiho, was the long straggling village of Leurh-tsze, in front of which several batteries had been constructed with trees and earthwork; and further again to the left was another small village, sufficiently far in advance to enable the batteries thrown up around it to [p. 178] flank with their fire the centre of the line. At about a mile’s distance from the suburb of Chang-kia-wan, a watch-tower stood upon the road-side, in front of which a strong line of batteries had been erected, at right angles to the general direction of the front, and thus flanking from that extremity all the enemy’s position within range. Their position in this manner closely represented a front in modern fortification. Its one great error was having the little river close behind. I suppose it was a dislike to having their cavalry separated from their guns and infantry, as well as the existence of the embankment upon the south side, which induced them to prefer that bank of the stream. Our artillery soon produced a marked effect upon the enemy’s batteries and troops; and the allied armies advancing, soon drove the latter from their fieldworks. The firing of our Armstrong guns was admirable, each shot telling upon the large bodies of Tartar cavalry, which kept moving round towards our left flank and rear. Major Probyn charged with his usual dashing brilliancy, and cleared the ground to our immediate left. Sir John Michel, to whom the movement upon the enemy’s right was entrusted, found such large bodies of Tartars on his front and flank that he could not make the flank movement intended without losing his connection with our main body. The 15th Punjaub Infantry were therefore directed to advance upon the enemy’s flanking batteries, which raked our other troops. They accomplished this in a most creditable manner, capturing several guns. The Armstrong guns were then sent to Sir John Michel, who swept round to the south of Chang-kiawan, whilst the 15th Punjaub Infantry pushed through [p. 179] it. Our allies had in the mean time taken all the works in their immediate front. The squadron of Fane’s Horse, under General Montauban’s orders, had accomplished great things, they and the Arab spahis of his personal escort vying with each other in pursuing the flying enemy. Our pursuit lasted up to about two miles beyond Chang-kia-wan, when we halted and destroyed the numerous camps which were dotted about over the country. These camps were neatly arranged, and were composed of clean, well-made, cotton tents, pitched in squares, the centre space being uncovered, and evidently devoted to cooking and parade purposes. In front of each tent stood an arm rack, made roughly with boughs of trees. Each camp contained large cauldrons for cooking, and altogether their interior economy was highly creditable. There were considerable quantities of powder in almost every tent, so that when the tents were set on fire, the numerous explosions filled the air with volumes of smoke, which shot up in tall graceful columns every moment whilst the work of destruction was going on. Those in Pekin must have had early intelligence of their defeat from these explosions. How the hopes of the war party there must have sunk within them as each succeeding cloud of smoke went upwards, announcing the destruction of their camps, and the failure of all their deeply-laid schemes of treachery. How they must have cursed Sang-ko-lin-sin’s ill-luck, and wished they had never listened to his boasted confidence in victory.

As we afterwards discovered, from captured correspondence, he had written to the Emperor from Ho-se-woo, saying, that although we were advancing from [p. 180] Tien-tsin, our numbers were so very inconsiderable that the Celestial mind might remain perfectly at ease, as the position he had chosen in front of Chang-kia-wan was so very strong, and his numerous troops so well placed, that it would be an easy matter to annihilate the barbarians, if we should advance so far. Whilst he was writing thus to his Imperial master, the Prince of I and his colleagues were treating with our embassy. The French troops had marched over a considerable extent of ground in their advance, and were too tired to advance beyond Chang-kia-wan that evening, so they encamped without the town, which our troops, being in advance, occupied, the cavalry and artillery encamping in its neighbourhood. Our casualties had been only twenty, the French fifteen. The enemy suffered considerably, and left upwards of eighty guns in our hands. During the action, the Tartar cavalry, having circled round our left flank, advanced towards the village of Woo-tsze-ying, thinking, no doubt, that our baggage would fall an easy prey; but our Commander-in-Chief had forestalled them, by having it all collected into one spot just before the action, and leaving a strong rear-guard with it. The enemy’s force was estimated at about 20,000.

Although our action had been a brilliant one, and satisfactory in every way, as we had beaten such a large force with our insignificant numbers and taken or destroyed almost all their guns and material, yet a heavy gloom hung over most of us that evening, from the uncertainty connected with the fate of those in the enemy’s hands. All knew the Chinese to be as cruel as they are false and treacherous; and many feared that the fact of [p. 181] our victory that day would embitter them all the more strongly against their prisoners, and excite them, like truly ignoble barbarians, to seek for some consolation for their defeat, by torturing those who were helplessly in their hands. The missing party consisted of Captain Brabazon of the artillery, Lieutenant Anderson of Fane’s Horse, Messrs. Parkes, Loch, De Norman and Bowlby (the “Times'” correspondent), seventeen picked sowars of Fane’s Horse, one of Probyn’s Horse, and Private Phipps of the King’s Dragoon Guards.

Sir Hope Grant took up his quarters in Chang-kiawan, from which nearly all the inhabitants had fled. That night, either by design on the part of the Chinese or some accident by our followers, the houses near the head-quarters took fire, and it was only by the great exertions of the engineers, and other troops turned out to aid them, that the fire was kept from spreading to all the buildings around.

As a punishment for the treachery of our enemies, Chang-kia-wan was given over to loot. It was a strange sight, for the two following days, to see the crowds of poor people from the surrounding villages pouring in from daybreak until dark for the purpose of sharing in the plunder. To them, the clothes and furniture, which, in the pawn-shops particularly, were stored in quantities, were of great value, although to our men they were of no use, as none had the means of carrying them. I did not hear, upon good authority, of any valuables having been found; but in one warehouse there were about five million pounds of brick tea, called so from its being prepared like compressed vegetables, in blocks resembling bricks. This, as also our cap- [p. 182] tured guns, we were unable to remove from want of carriage.

Chang-kia-wan is a very old walled-in city, and was some two hundred years ago a place of great importance; but, judging from the ruinous condition of its walls, defences, and public buildings, its glory has long since departed. The greater portion of the inner space enclosed within the walls, is now laid out in vegetable gardens, or covered with the debris of streets which have ceased to exist except in name. To the east of the city there is a large suburb, consisting of well-built houses, and having a thriving air about it. This is the case with many Chinese cities that I have seen. The suburbs become of far more importance than the place itself, which dwindles away proportionally with the growth of its more modern rival. A branch from the Seaou-ho winds round the suburb, separating it from the city; a fine stone bridge, with quaintly carved mouldings and balustrades, spanning the river between. This “Little River” flows from the “Whenho,” which unites with the Peiho near Tien-tsin. The Chang-kia-wan branch was once navigable for boats of considerable size, and we were told that it was owing to the failing of the water, and its consequent unsuitableness for traffic, that the decline in the city was chiefly attributable. Around this faded city the country was highly cultivated, and thickly dotted over with well-built villages, and neatly-kept orchards and gardens. Groves of pine trees formed a remarkable feature in the landscape, and curious tombs of all sizes and grades in importance were scattered about in the most picturesque spots. There, as at Takoo and [p. 183] Tien-tsin, the position of every grave was marked by a mound of earth, shaped like an inverted cauldron, with, in most instances, a round ball of earth on top, giving it a finished look. Many of these mounds were neatly plastered over with cement, and some were faced with brickwork. In shape some of them resemble the Burmese pagodas on a small scale. Millet and maize, beans and sweet potatoes, were the principal products of the country. The roads leading towards Tung-chow and Pekin were deep, hollow ways, so much below the general level of the country around, that in many places cavalry might march along them unperceived by people in the fields close by. In rainy weather these roads become small streams, and form the drainage of the country. Each succeeding year of course serves to wear them deeper. To cavalry and artillery in action, or even moving rapidly straight across country in any military manoeuvre, they are a serious obstacle.

Within Chang-kia-wan, and several villages in its neighbourhood, were high marble tablets, covered with inscriptions, setting forth the virtues and amiable qualities of great men or virtuous wives. All these monuments rest upon colossal representations of the tortoise, which in China is the emblem of longevity, and is a favourite symbol with Chinamen. The most important of these marble tablets are protected by picturesquely constructed roofs raised above them, and supported by wooden pillars, generally coloured red. In some of these the yellow tiling denotes that they have either been erected by order of the Emperor, to commemorate the deeds of some public functionary [p. 184] or else to announce an Imperial mandate to be observed by the surrounding people.

Upon the 19th September, Mr. Wade went to Tungchow under a flag of truce, carrying with him orders from the Commanders-in-Chief, desiring that all English and French subjects then prisoners should be returned forthwith, and threatening that in the event of any impediment being shown to their doing so, Pekin would be attacked and taken.

Mr. Wade succeeded in seeing the prefect of Tungchow, who appeared upon the walls of that place. He said that Mr. Parkes had not returned to Tung-chow, after he had left it with the escort, and that he supposed he had gone to our army. The prefect seemed to dread an attack upon his city, but was assured, that if the inhabitants forbore from molesting us, that place would be spared.

Tung-chow was a large city; of its strength or capabillties of resistance we knew nothing. If it was strong and had a large garrison, we could not leave it untaken in our rear, and its assault would have delayed us materially. To procure its neutrality was of great moment to us, as it was there we intended establishing our depots of stores coming up the river. It was, in fact, the port of Pekin; and it was at first hoped that the canal which we knew existed between those two places, might serve us as a means of communication between them. It was subsequently arranged that Tung-chow should be spared, the authorities there aiding us in procuring supplles, &c. &c.

As Mr. Wade was unable to gather any reliable information regarding our prisoners from the Tung-chow [p. 185] prefect, he proceeded from thence in a westerly direction, and soon found himself in presence of the Chinese army, with which he in vain tried to communicate, as their outposts would not allow him to approach, and fired upon him several times when he endeavoured to do so. Lord Elgin joined our head-quarters on the afternoon of the 19th.

Upon the 20th September, a cavalry reconnaissance was made in the direction of the enemy’s camp, the bulk of which was found to be in the neighbourhood of the Pa-le-cheaou (eight-li bridge). An intelligent Chinese soldier was taken prisoner, who informed us that Sang-ko-lin-sin was commanding in person. He stated that several foreigners had been taken to Pekin in carts upon the 18th.

At daybreak upon the 21st, we moved out of Changkia-wan, and formed up facing the enemy at about two miles’ distance from the town. We were then joined by the French, whose strength had been increased to about 3,000 men, by the arrival of General Collineau’s brigade upon the previous evening. All our baggage was collected together and placed under a strong guard, in a village close by, our allies making the same arrangement for theirs. The plan of operations agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief was, that the French were to advance direct to the Pa-le-cheaou, which is a fine stone bridge over the canal running between Pekin and Tung-chow, whilst our force made for a wooden bridge about a mile nearer the capital Our cavalry were at the same time to make a wide sweep to the left, so as to drive in the right flank of the enemy upon their centre, whose only lines of retreat would then be [p. 186] over the canal by the Pa-le-cheaou and the wooden bridge near it, against which the allied forces of infantry and artillery were respectively advancing. They hoped thus to inflict considerable damage upon the enemy, whilst crowding across those two narrow bridges. As the French had been encamped in rear of Changkia-wan since the action of the 18th, we had to wait for some time for them; but upon their arrival the two armies advanced as had been previously arranged. When we had marched a mile, we found ourselves in presence of a large army, their cavalry stretching away to their right as far as we could see, and endeavouring to turn our left flank; their infantry strongly posted in the numerous clumps of trees and enclosures which lay between us and the canal. As soon as we came within range, they opened fire upon us from hundreds of jingalls and small field-pieces, to which our allies replied with their rifled cannon. Sir Hope Grant rode forward towards the French for the purpose of examining the position, and having advanced beyond our line of skirmishers, rode almost in amongst the Tartars, mistaking them for the moment for the French. Upon turning back to rejoin our troops, the Tartar cavalry, seeing him and his numerous staff cantering away from them, evidently thought it was some of our cavalry running away, and at once gave pursuit with loud yells. Stirling’s 6-pounders, however, opened heavily upon them when they were about two houdred and fifty yards from our line, saluting them well with canister, which sent them to the right about as briskly as they had advanced. An infantry battalion close by was ordered by its brigadier to form square, and in that formation fired [p. 187] volleys at the advancing enemy, without, I believe, killing a man of them. Our old soldiers, untrained in all the minutiae of position and judging-distance drill, and armed with the much-abused old Brown Bess, could not certainly have done less damage. Upon more than one occasion during the war, the absurdity of imagining that an enemy can be destroyed by an infantry fire delivered at long ranges, or directed at troops not crowded together in deep formations, was made apparent to all except, perhaps, a few unpractical men, whose judgment was biassed by theories, and from whom no amount of actual illustration in the field could drive the opinions which they had formed upon the sands at Hythe. Upon one occasion I remember seeing a man get up from behind some cover where he had been concealed, about twenty yards from a hue of our skirmishers, and get away safely over a smooth open field, although fired at by every man of ours near him, some having reloaded and fired a second time at him. The enemy’s cavalry, having retreated out of range, re-formed, and seemed in no way disheartened, but kept on moving towards our left, round which flank they appeared determined to get. Our cavalry, which had been moving slowly forwards in that direction, upon arriving within charging distance, went straight at them. Fane’s Horse and the King’s Dragoon Guards in the first llne, Probyn’s regiment in support behind. The Tartar cavalry had halted behind a deep wide ditch, upon seeing our troops advancing towards them, from which position they delivered a volley as our cavalry reached it. The horses of the irregulars are always ridden in short standing martingales, which [p. 188] effectually prevent their jumping well; so, when our line reached the ditch, but very few of the irregulars got over it at first, many of their horses, unable to pull up, tumbling in, one over the other. The King’s Dragoon Guards, however, got well in amongst the Tartars, riding over ponies and men, and knocking both down together like so many ninepins. The irregulars were soon after them, and in the short pursuit which then ensued, the wild Pathans of Fane’s Horse showed well fighting side by side with the powerful British dragoon. The result was most satisfactory. Riderless Tartar horses were to be seen galloping about in all directions, and the ground passed over in the charge was well strewn with the enemy. At no time subsequently during the day would they allow our cavalry to get sufficiently near for a second charge, and I have no doubt but that those who retreated in safety, carried back into the wilds of Tartary strange stories of our impetuosity in battle, and of the dreadful shock of British cavalry, before which they were unable to stand for an instant. Our artillery opened fire upon the retreating forces with good effect, firing slowly, every Armstrong shell bursting amongst them and bringing down the enemy in clumps.

Sir Hope Grant with the cavalry, three Armstrong guns, 99th Eegiment, and Royal Marines moved in pursuit to our left, in which direction we found several camps. The ground was difficult in some places for cavalry and artillery, particularly as we approached Pekin, the roads having steep banks on either side, and the fields enclosed by deep wide ditches, some of which might be claimed as fair hunting jumps. In one of the [p. 189] captured camps we found eighteen guns, and in all the tents were standing. Of course we burnt and destroyed all we took. When the country people perceived that we were doing so, numbers of them turned out for the purpose of plundering the tents of the army which had fled; and it was a strange thing to see peasants coming out from these camps, staggering under the weight of captured clothing, cooking-pots, &c. &c., with which they were hurrying home, evidently dreading lest the Tartar soldiers should return before they had reached their respective villages. As we approached each camp, we could see the enemy streaming out from it, and only in one instance did they attempt any resistance. Our cavalry having approached an encampment which was closely surrounded with trees and broken ground, where they were of course powerless against the enemy’s infantry, which opening a sharp fire, several of our men were wounded. When, however, our infantry and artillery came up, the enemy were quickly dislodged, and the 99th succeeded in bayonetting several. Our pursuit lasted to within about six miles of Pekin, horses and men being well tired and hungry. We halted there for an hour; and I shall never forget how truly acceptable some grapes were which we found in a village close by. The enemy having disappeared from our front and flank, we marched back, making for the wooden bridge over the canal where we rejoined the 2nd brigade. The French had advanced to the Pa-le-cheaou as agreed, taking all the camps which lay near that bridge, over which they drove the enemy, killing large numbers of them in its vicinity; a number were also drowned in their efforts to get across the [p. 190] canal at points where there was no bridge. Whilst Colonel Mackenzie, our Quartermaster-General, was marking out the position for our camp, a fire was suddenly opened by the enemy from the north bank of the canal, to the south of which it had been arranged that we should encamp.

A party of the 15th Punjaub Infantry under Lieutenant Harris, the second in command of that corps, was immediately pushed across the river, supported by a wing of the 2nd Queen’s. The Punjaubees advanced most dashingly, driving the enemy from a camp which stood near the canal and capturing the guns from which they had opened fire. The French encamped to our right, also upon the canal. Our baggage, which had been sent for when the pursuit ended, came up in the afternoon. I should imagine that almost every man in our army ate ducks for dinner that evening; for upon arriving at the canal it was crowded with fine large ducks, which so quickly disappeared, that the next morning, when going there to bathe, I could only see four remaining. These I have no doubt were captured before the day was over, and judging from the manner in which they were being hunted when I saw them, I should fancy they must have been tender indeed when placed upon the table.

Our loss in men during the day had been only two killed and twenty-nine wounded; our allies also, only suffered slightly. [p. 191]



Some very interesting papers were found in the Mandarin’s house at Sinho, containing the correspondence between Sang-ko-lin-sin and the Great Council of State, relative to our probable line of conduct, should we actually land in the neighbourhood of Takoo with hostile intentions. One of these documents was an exposition of Sang-ko-lin-sin’s views of the matter. In it he commenced by commenting upon the English parliamentary debates which had lately taken place upon the Chinese question. Of most of these he had evidently received translations. Referring to our having talked so much and so publicly of our proposed operations in China, he says, the very fact of our having done so was a clear proof that we never intended to carry them into execution, adding that, “those who make war, keep silent regarding their proposed movements; everything is talked over and done in secret, the drums are muffled and no flags are shown.” In short, he gives us credit for making war in a more systematic and a wiser manner than we English are ever able to do, owing to [p. 122] the extravagant freedom allowed to our press upon all subjects. He then goes on to remark, that, as regards the proposition made by a very wise British senator, that our fleet should proceed up the Yang-tse-kiang, and that Nankin should be occupied by our troops, for the purpose of cutting off the supplies of grain, supposed by that intelligent English gentleman to be continually flowing up from thence by the Grand Canal to Pekin, — “Why, as you know, that canal has been rendered useless since 1852. Should the barbarians persist in their avowed intention of invasion, they will, most likely, land at Peh-tang; to do so is very difficult, but as we cannot defend that place, they may succeed in doing so. There is only one egress from thence, to the east of which are large impassable salt-works; and should they present themselves in the open country, my numerous Tartar cavalry is so disposed that they must be annihilated. Should they, however, pass them, there is still the Takoo position, opposite the forts of which they were before so signally defeated, and which are now stronger than ever.” He estimated the entire strength of the allied forces at 30,000 men, and, strange to say, follows up the current events just as they occurred, the only difference being, that, instead of being annihilated, we chased from the field those who were detailed by him to carry out that highly unsatisfactory termination to our existence. A few days before the attack on the northern forts of Takoo, the French commandant of engineers with a few men crossed the Peiho at the point where it had been determined that we should throw our bridge across. He proceeded cautiously along the right bank, until at [p. 123] length he got under a fire from small guns, jingals, and musketry, before which he had to retire, but as the affair seemed to be becoming serious, General Montauban marched down most of his forces to support this small party, and, having sent across a couple of thousand men, made good his position amongst the gardens which surrounded the village. Within about a thousand yards of this point there was a small Tartar entrenchment, from whence the enemy retreated as our allies advanced. Beyond it, the road was so cut up in several places, that, until bridges were thrown across, nothing else could be done; and, in fact, until the boat bridge for the Peiho was ready, the position of our allies on its right bank, was, in every respect, a false one.

Sir Hope Grant objected to the line of action on that bank of the river, and from our post at Tang-koo we could see so much of the enemy’s position on both sides of the Peiho, as to enable us to form a correct estimate of the relative bearings of each fort with the others. It certainly seemed, even to the most inexperienced in war, a dangerous proceeding to leave the north forts untouched, whilst we operated by the right bank towards the defences on the south side. The forts there were evidently much the strongest, and their fire could not be brought to bear upon us whilst engaged in attacking the northern forts, with the exception of the small detached fort furthest up the river on that side, commanding the space between the two northern forts.

From Tang-koo to the nearest fort on the left bank, was somewhat under two miles, and the reconnaissance made by Captain Lumsden of the Quartermaster-General’s department proved, that by a little labour a good [p. 124] and safe road could be made to it, by making a detour so as to keep away from the river as much as possible, and thus avoid any cross fire from the southern banks that the enemy might bring to bear upon us. With this detached fort in our possession, we should be able to look into the similar one on the south bank, enfilade the whole length of the great southern one, and take all the sea defences of the large northern fort in reverse. It was doubtless the key of the whole position, and as such the English Commander-in-Chief considered it the true point of attack. Sir Robert Napier, one of the cleverest engineer officers in our service, was also of this opinion, and from his head-quarters being in Tang-koo, he had opportunities for several days of studying well the nature of the ground and position. Our allies, however, thought quite differently, and their plans, they said, in favour of the advance being made upon the south side, were so evidently in accordance with the rules and science of war, that to attack the northern forts could lead to no satisfactory result. They had never previously spoken out so freely upon any subject, as they then did upon this point; and even those who before were most guarded in their remarks upon our movements, gave free vent then to their opinion. Their arguments were based upon grounds which, no doubt, would have had great weight had we an army of 100,000 men; but with such a small force as ours, the breaking of it into two parts, which must necessarily have taken place, in order to keep up communication with Peh-tang and our fleet, the real basis of all our operations, and from whence our provisions and ammunition were drawn, was, to say the [p. 125] least of it, a very hazardous proposition. We all knew that the enemy had a very large force of cavalry in the field, and were able, even the day we advanced from Peh-tang, to manoeuvre round us, and get between us and that place; how much more easily then might they repeat this, when the bulk of our forces had been dispatched across the river? In fact, if they at all appreciated their own strength, or the false position we should have thrust ourselves unto, as soon as we had crossed the Peiho, the campaign might have easily been converted into one of victory for them.

From that moment we should have been an isolated force without any base of operations, without any means of communicating with our reserve stores, except by moving back a considerable number, and fighting an action to make our way into Peh-tang, which even a few days of bad weather might have at any time rendered almost inaccessible. We should have had to depend upon the uncertain resources of the country in and about Takoo, which we knew to be destitute of any cultivation, and to consist chiefly of mud and salt flats intersected by raised causeways which led to the forts, and along which, the information we had received led us to conclude, we should have had to advance in order to capture those strongholds. To leave the northern forts untaken would be to leave a large force on the left bank who could then operate upon our rear, and besides this, give them a point d’appui on that side, to which they might transport as much of their force as was available for service in the field. The construction of a bridge over the Peiho was no easy matter, and entailed a considerable delay, arising [p. 126] from the fact of its being a tidal stream, with soft, muddy banks; and although boats were procured in sufficient numbers, yet much labour had to be expended in constructing anchors, and collecting other material, and when finished it was not suited for heavy guns.

If we had operated by the southern bank of the Peiho, as our allies wished, and supposing that everything had turned out in the very happiest manner, we could not possibly have been by the 1st September as far advanced in the work of the campaign as we actually were upon the evening of the 21st August, when, in pursuance of Sir Hope Grant’s plan of attack, we had stormed and taken the northern forts. I need scarcely remark that time was everything to us. We had opened the campaign later than was expected at home, having been delayed a month at Talienwan, so that every day was of the greatest value to us. The cold weather was reported by all to commence towards the middle of October, and the climate in November was said to be most intolerable, the rivers being then frozen, and ice for some two or three miles out to sea along the coast.

For a private individual to criticise the acts of public men is generally both foolish and ridiculous; for a soldier to comment upon the deeds of his superior officer, and to presume to award either praise or blame to his chief, is a breach of discipline. Yet it may be allowable here to record the opinion of all in the China army, that no man had ever evinced a more praiseworthy determination, more self-reliance on his own opinions, or a greater fixedness of purpose in steadily carrying out what he believed to be the correct and [p. 127] true line of operations than Sir Hope Grant did upon that occasion. On the one hand were a number of civilians all murmuring at his tardiness, scoffing at his caution, daily and hourly repeating, “What nonsense it is bringing up heavy guns,” — “Why don’t we push on?” “I would take the forts to-night if I had a couple of hundred men!” — “The enemy are bolting and only waiting until we attack to bolt altogether” — such were the expressions in every one of these gentlemen’s mouths. On the other hand, our allies were obstinate in their own opinions as to the necessity of taking the southern forts first, and even at the last moment their general formally protested against the line of conduct proposed and subsequently adopted by the English Commander-in-Chief. Under such circumstances nine generals out of ten would have been driven to some rash act, and yielded either to the impetuosity of those upon whom no responsibility devolved, or to the objections of our allies, urged, as they were, so strongly.

Sir Hope Grant proved himself superior to all these circumstances, and could he have heard or known the manner in which he was lauded by every one in camp on the evening of the 21st August, he would have been well repaid for any annoyance which his determination may have cost him; i.e. if the praises of subordinates are ever dear to those in power, or the approbation of the “oi polloi” ever recompense public men for days of labour, sleepless nights, or the mental and bodily wear and tear experienced by all on whom rests great responsibility and the welfare of the many, not to mention the national honour or the glory of the British arms. [p. 128]

Sir Hope Grant had determined upon not making any onward movement until a depot of supplies, sufficient for the army for ten days, had been collected at Sinho, the heavy guns and engineers’ park brought to the front; and then, when all these were in readiness, he proposed to move out from Tang-koo and take the nearest of the northern forts.

By the night of the 20th August all was in train for this movement, and a road constructed over the great salt flat which extended to the north and west of the nearest northern fort, and which stretched round most of the fortifications of Tang-koo. Under the superintendence of Sir R. Napier, the road reconnoitred by Captain Lumsden was rapidly improved, advantage in the way of cover being taken of the embankments which formed the numerous canals intersecting the salt flat. Bridges or causeways had also been constructed over these canals. On the night of the 19th August pickets were thrown forward, towards the forts, in order to protect the working parties. During the night of the 20th the guns were taken down and placed in batteries which had been thrown up. We had sixteen guns and three mortars in action; the French had four guns, and all these opened fire at daybreak on the 21st instant, the enemy responding from their pieces which bore upon our position. The enemy’s guns in the elevated cavaliers, which before were pointed seaward, had been reversed, and now fired into us as rapidly as they could load and discharge them. Amongst their guns were two English 32-pounders, taken from the gunboats they had sunk last year. [p. 129]

It was greatly to be regretted that Admiral Hope had not sent up our fleet of gunboats two days previously to the mouth of the Peiho, and by keeping them there, make a show of attacking with them. Had such been done, it is reasonable to suppose that none of these guns would have been turned landwards, and we should have been spared much of the heavy fire brought to bear upon us, whilst no loss would have been thereby occasioned to the navy. Only two boats of ours and two belonging to the French took up a position sufficiently distant to be beyond the range of the Chinese ordnance, and yet, at the same time, able to annoy the occupants of the forts. These gunboats fired but very little, and, owing to their being so far off, could not so accurately estimate the effect of their own fire as to be able to ascertain whether the shot fell short, or went right over into the Peiho, behind the northern forts. At about six o’clock in the morning, when the fire waxed hotter and hotter, every one being intent upon the scene then before him, and all anxiously speculating as to when the signal for a general advance would be given, a tall black pillar, as if by magic, shot up from the midst of the nearest fort upon which almost all our fire was concentrated, and then bursting like a rocket after it had attained a great height, was soon lost in the vast shower of wood and earth into which it resolved itself, — a loud, bursting, booming sound, marking, as it were, the moment of its short existence. A magazine had blown up, and in a small enclosed work, such as the one then before us, an explosion of this kind in most defences would have put an end to the contest; but such was not the case in this [p. 130] instance. The fire from it certainly ceased for a minute or two, but before those who, in the interim, had pronounced the affair at an end could acknowledge their mistake, the garrison had reopened from their batteries. As long as a gun was left them they were determined to serve it, and most manftdly they did so, all the while exposed to a most crushing shell fire brought to bear upon them, and with but little, and in some instances, no protection whatever against it, I know of nothing more startling at any time than the explosion of a magazine, and certainly at such moments as these it is doubly impressive. To the soldier exposed to a heavy fire and all the uncertainty attending upon an impending assault, which he knows must soon end the contest one way or another, as also, it may be, his own life, such an event is a relief. It occupies the mind, and serves, by the excitement which it causes, to withdraw thought from those painful subjects which, no matter how one may act, rise up like visions, whether as memories of the past or doubts and surmises regarding the future, and pass in solemn array before the bravest, who, at such times, may have no active duty to perform, and who is then merely a passive spectator, — exposed, however, to all the disagreeable contingencies of bullets, &c., and waiting until, at a given signal, he is up and charging where glory points the way, cheering with all the mad enthusiasm which those only who have themselves fought in a breach can possibly realise and none can adequately describe. Half an hour afterwards a second explosion occurred, and this time in the larger northern fort: whether occasioned by the fire from our Armstrong [p. 131] guns or from that of our gunboats, was a debated point; the artillery affirming the former, and the navy giving the verdict in favour of the latter — with whom I am disposed to agree. By seven o’clock, all the large guns in the fort that we were attacking were completely silenced, most of them being knocked over by our shot. Our columns of assault were then ordered on, the French advancing by the right and approaching the angle of the work resting on the river’s bank, and our party, consisting of the 44th and 67th Regiments, moving straight to their front towards the gate of the fort.

It is very easy when an undertaking of this kind is over, to pick out faults in the arrangements made beforehand, and many are the wiseacres afterwards, who say, “Oh, why was not so and so done?” — “How very stupid to have done so and so!” These remarks particularly apply to hangers-on about the camp, travelling gentlemen, and that class commonly known as adventurers. Errors in judgment are frequently made in all warlike operations, and such wili ever be the case, as long as warfare presents such a vast variety of combinations. One of these mistakes was made in taking up a small pontoon bridge, instead of a number of ladders, or a small plank-bridge made like a fire-escape, to rest on wheels. As it happened, the pontoons were not only useless for the assault, but were really a very great impediment, as they blocked up the narrow causeway along which we had to advance, and exposed a large number of men for a considerable time as they carried them, and who had frequently to stop until a wounded man was removed from the party. A round [p. 132] shot passed through one of the pontoons as we advanced, and rendered it quite useless. A few ladders made of bamboo, and a small number of planks carried along with them would have enabled all to get across both ditches easily, whereas all the English storming-party, who actually captured the place, in conjunction with the French, struggled and clambered across the wet, muddy ditch, having water nearly up to their armpits; the pontoons did not prove of any use, and were the unfortunate cause of many wounds and of several lives being lost. It was the rear face of the fort we attacked, in the centre of which was the gate, having two wet ditches running along the face of the work. From the outside of one of these the wooden bridge had been removed, and the drawbridge of the inner one drawn up. The gate itself was blocked up with strong timbers, placed closely together in rows, and inserted in the ground at the bottom. Mud and earth had been banked up along the interior of this face, so as to strengthen it against our shot. The river face was partly oblique to the line of the bank, so that at its south-eastern comer it nearly touched the stream, whilst in rear, at the south-western angle, it was some twenty or thirty yards from it. Such being the case, the two ditches could not be carried completely round the river face, and so the outer one terminated half-way up the work. The French, who had approached the angle, quickly perceived this, and many men having run round, thus turned the first ditch, although most of the men first up had scrambled across on the ladders. The Canton coolies in the French service carried their ladders, and I have never [p. 133] seen men under fire behave with greater coolness, or perform their allotted work in a more matter-of-fact way. The space between the two ditches was only twenty feet, and this was planted as thickly as close stubble with sharp bamboo stakes, to cross which on foot was almost impossible; these were also placed along under the walls, between them and the inner ditches. The scramble over these two ditches and the staked places next to them was no easy matter, and all who crossed them deserve well of their country. Showers of missiles of all kinds, from pots filled with lime, to round shot thrown from the hand, were showered from the walls, and annoyed the gallant few who were fortunate enough to have reached the foot of the walls unhurt; whilst the poor fellows in rear who ran along the ditches, seeking for some favourable spots to cross at, or the more reckless ones who plunged into the ditch at the places they first came to, were exposed, not only to a rattling discharge of arrows, bolts from cross-bows, jingalls firing handfulls of slugs from the work itself, but also to a flanking fire of round shot, thrown with accuracy from the correspondingly placed fort on the south bank. It was during this period that almost the whole of our loss was incurred; and the narrow causeway, of about sixty yards in length, which led through the deep mud and water, extending along nearly the entire of the face attacked, was soon covered with the dead and dying. The obstacles to be overcome were so difficult, that an unpleasantly protracted time had elapsed before a sufficient number of men had assembled beneath the wall to attempt a scramble over it. The French had [p. 134] succeeded in getting over three or four ladders; but as quickly as they placed them against the walls, they were as quickly thrown down or pushed back by the Chinese within, who, notwithstanding our proximity, were as active in their defence as when some hours previously we had been playing at long bowls with them. Many could be seen jumping on the parapet, and from thence taking deliberate aim at those below; and, having fired, they jumped back again to reload. Colonel Mann, of the Royal Engineers, who was amongst the first over the two ditches, with Major Anson, A.D.C., had, after much hacking and cutting with their swords, succeeded in severing the ropes which held up the drawbridge. Down it came with a crash, but it was so shattered by shot that, at first, it seemed incapable of sustaining any weight. A single beam of the outer bridge had been left by the Chinese; it was quite loose and rolled about, yet it enabled many to cross over. The quaint joking of our men was most amusing whenever any unlucky fellow, whilst crossing, overbalanced himself and fell into the ditch, from whence he climbed up the muddy bank opposite, there perchance to meet his deathblow, ere the very smile at his own mishap had passed from his countenance; such is life, death, and war. Every minute added to the number of men who got across and under the walls, round which they prowled to discover a scaleable place. Our guns still battered away at the parapet, wherever the enemy showed themselves in numbers, or attempted to work the iron guns which were placed almost at every yard along the works. Our allies commenced to ascend the [p. 135] walls cautiously, the first and most daring being of course hurled back ladder and all; but, when men are determined, and their courage is sustained by constantly increasing numbers coming up from the rear (which has of course a proportionally disheartening effect upon the besieged), success under such circumstances is generally on the side of the assailants. Up, rung after rung of the ladder the French crept warily, until at length, with a bound, the first man jumped upon the parapet and waved the tricolor of his nation, whilst every one joined in his maddening cheer, amidst the wild clamour of which his spirit passed away from him to another, and let us hope, a better world. He fell, shot through the heart, in the proudest position in which a soldier can die — who could wish for a nobler death? Almost simultaneously with this event, young Chaplain, an ensign of the 67th Regiment, succeeded in reaching the top of the parapet, partly pushed and helped by the men along with him; he carried the Queen’s colour of his regiment, which he let float out proudly into the breeze; it was a splendid sight to see. A regimental colour has been seldom used upon such an occasion before; it is generally an ordinary Union Jack, made of bunting, that is carried to plant in a breach, the other being a too dearly prized military emblem to risk in such a place, where the explosion of a mine, or the momentary success attending a sortie, might occasion its loss for ever, or hand it over an easy prey to the enemy. It was an inspiriting moment for every one, and each felt that strange sensation which thrills through the frame in all actions, when the turning point has been past, and the clouds [p. 136] of uncertainty, which until then hung around the scene, are suddenly dispelled, revealing success.

Before our flag was displayed, some few had made their way within the gate, the first men of either army actually inside the work being an officer of the 44th Regiment, named Rodgers, and Lieutenant Burslem of the 67th Regiment; these were the small end of the wedge, which is ever quickly followed by the more substantial part. The Chinese stili fought within the works, and the bayonets of both French and English had to come into play ere all resistance ceased. Ensign Chaplain and a small party who followed the colours, rushed up the ramp leading to the high cavalier which formed the principal feature of the fort, and cleared it with the bayonet of all the Chinese there; in doing this that gallant young officer received more than one wound. One Chinese general had been killed during the bombardment, and a second, the chief man who commanded all the northern forts, was shot by an officer of marines after he had entered. This general was a red-buttoned mandarin of the highest military order, and, refusing to submit, fought to the last.

The scene within the works bespoke the manner in which our artillery had done its part, and the debris caused by the explosion of the magazine lay in heaps everywhere, intermingled with overturned cannon, broken gun-carriages, and the dead and wounded of the garrison. Never did the interior of any place testify more plainly to the noble manner in which it had been defended. The garrison had evidently resolved either to fall beneath its ruins, or had been to [p. 137] the last so confident of victory, from the strength of the place and our former defeat, that they never seemed to have even contemplated retreating. Two other circumstances also may have had much to do with the stoutness of the resistance shown us; one is, that the great general who commanded all the northern forts, and of whose death I have just spoken, had accidentally visited the place on an inspection, as the firing commenced, and remaining there, encouraged by his presence and example all who were inside. This is a rare thing in China, where it is proverbial that the officers are almost always the first to bolt, a misfortune to which the common soldiers ever attribute their defeat. The other circumstance is, that the peculiar nature of the defences rendered any exit from the forts almost as difficult for the Chinese as it was for us to get in. We attacked the weakest face; the front which looked down the river was the only place from which they could retreat, and was far more formidable than the rear, so much so, that it was only by letting themselves down by ropes to the foot of the walls, and then scrambling singly through the abattis and bamboo stakes that any could escape. This was a circumstance which also told greatly in our favour when reconnoitring the works, because a few men, availing themselves of any cover which the irregularities of the ground might present, could approach near any fort, knowing that they had only to protect themselves against the direct fire brought to bear on them, the obstacles around the fort serving to protect the reconnoitring party against any sortie quite as efficiently as they protected the garrison against a coup de main. [p. 138]

Thus fell the first Takoo fort, the key to the whole position. Preparations were immediately made for the attack on the large northern fort, which, once in our hands, would give us command over all the river defences.

Our heavy guns were advanced and unlimbered ready for action, to the left of the captured fort, whilst others were placed in position on the raised cavalier inside it. The two forts were exactly a thousand yards apart, having a raised causeway running between them, with wet ditches on either side. Between the causeway and the river the space was deep mud, and across this guns could not be taken; but north of it the ground was firm and well suited for the movement of all arms.

A small party, under the command of an officer of the Quartermaster-General’s department, was sent out to reconnoitre this ground before the troops or guns were put in motion for it, and advancing slowly towards the place in skirmishing order, they ascertained its fitness for the purposes required. During all this time the enemy still kept up a heavy fire, and seemed particularly jealous of the approach of the reconnoitring party. Suddenly a white fiag was hoisted on the large southern forts, and almost immediately afterwards numbers of other white standards floated from every work. Ali firing at once ceased. A man appeared coming from the direction of the large northern fort, carrying a flag of truce, who was met by Mr. Parkes, C.J.B., and a party who were sent out to ask him what was meant by this change. He could not give any satisfactory answer, and said that all he knew was, that a [p.139] white flag had been hoisted in Takoo, and that he had merely followed suit by doing similarly on the north bank. A boat was now seen to put off from the southern side bearing a flag of truce, and having a mandarin in it. He was taken to the fort in our possession, when it was found that he was merely the bearer of letters from Hung, the Governor-General, to Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, both of whom had just come up from the rear. These communications were evidently not considered satisfactory, because, I believe, no allusion was made in them to surrendering the other forts. Under these circumstances all our preparations for attack were still continued, and two fresh regiments were brought up. Although the white flags were still flying, the garrison would not allow any one to approach near the large fort, and were very rude in their gestures to those who accompanied the first flag of truce, who, availing themselves of the opportunity afforded them, went up to the first ditch. The soldiers apparently did not show any signs of succumbing. All this time boats were passing to and fro across the river, removing the wounded men, of whom there many, and some of whom could be seen in different directions crawling and dragging their wounded limbs over the slimy mud near the river’s bank.

A message was sent to the Governor-General Hung, informing him that he would be given two hours to surrender the forts, after which time, should he not do so, our guns would reopen fire. Towards the expiration of the allotted period the sky became heavy and lowering, and a dark mass of dense clouds appeared to [p. 140] windward, rising up in a threatening manner. Our troops began to advance. Still there was no sign of resistance on the part of the enemy; their guns did not open fire, and our men entered the great northern fort and quietly took possession of it. As we entered, we saw crowded together in one part about two thousand Chinese soldiers, who, having thrown away their arms and peculiar military caps, had assumed the guise of peaceable citizens. I have seldom seen men who could so easily transform themselves from one character to another. One moment they were impudent and sturdy soldiers, the next, as if by the slap of a harlequin’s wand, they mysteriously became all at once, not only apparently civilians, but also very meek and humble looking ones. Such were the miserable looking people collected before us, all expecting that at some given signal they should be slain en masse, or honoured by the favour of individual decapitation. When informed that they were perfectly at liberty to go where they pleased, they could not at first understand or credit our leniency, naturally thinking that they must be deceived.

Their traditional history could not furnish a parallel instance in which prisoners, taken in war, were allowed to return intact to the bosoms of their families, or wherever their inclinations might lead them. We afterwards heard that this circumstance was much talked of everywhere, and our clemency greatly applauded.

The storm which had been gathering to windward now came rapidly up, and the rain poured down in torrents, whilst thunder and lightning added to the commotion above. Heavy rain is dreary anywhere, [p. 141] even in the most picturesque countries; but let the reader picture to himself a heavy downpour, falling upon a flat muddy steppe, upon which there was not even a tree or patch of grass, and where distance was only in any way marked by the many ugly canals, with their accompanying high, earthen, unsightly banks. As we stood upon the lofty cavalier of the large northern fort, and looked down from thence upon this dreary expanse beneath, I do not believe human eye ever rested upon a more essentially hideous prospect. The rain increasing each moment, some spot which had been, comparatively speaking, dry before, gradually disappeared beneath the water, until at length it seemed as though another deluge was about to threaten mankind and his habitations. The road by which we advanced to the forts was for a considerable distance quite submerged, and the uncovered spots were so deep with mud that even the very lightest of our guns were only dragged through it by the united exertions of long teams of horses, aided by the tired gunners themselves, who kept spoking away at the wheels. No amount of horses, and of men attached to drag-ropes, could move our heavy guns or waggons; their wheels sank deeper and deeper every minute, until their naves touched the mud. It was fortunate for us that the enemy had surrendered the large northern fort, because under such a torrent we could not have done anything, even against the mildest resistance; no storming-party could have succeeded in crossing the deep mud in front of the works. Every one felt this as he struggled back to his wet tent, across the dreary waste, into the mire of which we sank knee-deep; many left their boots [p. 142] after them, being unable to drag them from the sticky mud to which they seemed as if glued. All of us had been up long before daylight that morning, and had not partaken of “any regular meal during the day. I need scarcely add, all were ravenously hungry. Fancy, under such circumstances, a long dreary ride back to camp, of five miles, over the worst of roads, which, when not fetlock deep, was so slippery that horses could only keep their footing with great difficulty; and then upon arrival to find that during your absence your camp had been completely flooded, and that the little bank you had constructed around your tent, hoping thereby to keep out the rain, had, after the water had either broken through or run over it, served quite an opposite purpose, so that then, when the water was subsiding everywhere else, as the rain ceased, your engineering arrangements had converted your canvas habitation into a pond, on the surface of which, the first thing which attracted your attention on entering, was your pet pair of boots floating about, whilst here and there the upper portions of some heavier article peeped up above the water, reminding you at a glance that most of your property was, unhappily, under it.

By the time we arrived in camp it had grown very dark — a circumstance which increased our discomfort, and prevented us from doing many things towards bettering our condition, which, with daylight to aid us, we could have done. No effort could avail to kindle a fire, and it was with great difficulty that we succeeded in lighting a candle. Our clothes were, of course, thoroughly drenched on us, and not having any “dry [p. 143] change,” all that remained for us was, to be down wet and cold as we were, and court slumber as best we could, after a frugal supper. Some ration biscuit, and a pot of stuff labelled “beef,” but which I feel convinced had no just claim to such a high-sounding title, with a little brandy and water, was the welcome that awaited us, when we reached our temporary residence near Sinho, on the evening of the memorable taking of the Takoo forts.

Before it became dark, more than one communication had passed between the Chinese authorities and the allied commanders, and before the French and English had taken possession of the great northern fort, Mr. Parkes, under a flag of truce, went over into Takoo to have an interview with the Governor-General Hung, whom, after much badgering, he induced to sign a capitulation, in which he surrendered all the country and strong positions up the river, as far as Tien-tsin, including that city itself.

This mandarin was much to be pitied. In the service of his government, want of success is certain disgrace; he alluded to this himself, saying that it was Tan’s misfortune in 1858 to be Governor-General and to be degraded then, and that now it was his own lot; every one had left him, even his private servants, like so many rats, which are said to forsake sinking ships. His officials, too, seemed quite to understand his fallen position, caring no longer to flatter and support a man on whom degradation’s darkest shadow already rested. He appeared to regard the event as a matter of course, or as a Mussulman would say, “of fate.”

The next morning the gunboats were hard at work [p. 144] removing the booms and stakes which blocked up the entrance to the river; they soon cleared away enough to open a passage for themselves, so that within a few hours several of those useful little craft were steaming up the muddy waters of the Peiho. The first grand move had been made: we had captured the forts spoken of throughout China as impregnable, and upon whose fortification every care had been bestowed, and no expenditure spared; every obstacle which the ingenious Chinese could think of had been employed, every trick of defence that their wit could suggest had been resorted to — in a word, the essence of all the military and engineering skill possessed by the vast empire of China, from the plains and steppes of Tibet to the sea-shores of Assam, was exerted to render them invulnerable, and such every man in China believed them to be. News spreads everywhere most rapidly throughout the flowery land, and we were told that, before a fortnight had elapsed, our triumph was announced in all quarters, and the people learned at Canton, that the flags of England and France floated over the waters of the subjugated Peiho.

Admiral Hope, with some French and English gunboats, pushed on to Tien-tsin on the 23rd, and on the 25th, Lord Elgin and the Commander-in-Chief followed, whilst the 1st Royals, the 67th Regiment, and a battery of artillery were conveyed there in gunboats; the cavalry, also, commenced their march on the 25th, and, moving up the left bank of the river, over great open plains of grass, reached Tien-tsin in two days; then the 1st division, moving along the right bank, whilst the French marched up the other, Sir Robert Napier following with the 2nd division, leaving the 3rd Regi- [p. 145] ment behind, in occupation, at the Takoo forts, and the Rifles at the Sinho bridge, for its protection.

Before starting for Tien-tsin, I spent a day inspecting the south forts, having previously examined those on the northern bank, and the more minutely one noted their relative bearings and the extent to which the defence of each depended upon that of the others, the more thoroughly was one convinced of the wisdom displayed by Sir Hope Grant in selecting the key of the whole position for an attack. The large south fort and the smaller one furthest out to sea could not actually bring a gun to bear upon the one we attacked, whilst from it, once we had taken it, we could enfilade the entire length of the largest south fort — to have attacked the position from the sea would have been a fatal delusion; and the more one studied the defences and the obstacles placed in front of them, the more easy it was to understand why our attack in 1859 failed so completely. The great strength of the Takoo forts consists in the locality where they are situated. They stand on the banks of a tidal river, where no part of the surrounding country is more than three or four feet above high-water mark, and most of it covered by the spring tides, while those places which are left dry are only kept so by being enclosed with high earthen banks. Towards the sea, in front of these formidable works, there extends a muddy flat so deep that single men, when unladen, can with difficulty struggle through it; for any storming party to do so under a heavy fire would be almost impossible. But if we suppose them capable of this, and of gaining the harder ground, still, just in front of the outer ditch, there was a stiff abbatis [p. 146] to get through, then two or three wet ditches to cross, having the spaces between them closely covered with pointed stakes; and last of all were the walls of the place, about fifteen feet in height and bristling with cannon and wall-pieces of all shapes and sizes. If anything like the opposition shown to us had been made against an attack from the sea, I do not believe that any troops in the world could have lived through such an assault. It is the custom of the world generally, and the British portion of it particularly, to abuse any one who is so unfortunate as to have met with a reverse or some unlooked-for check; but, whatever may have been said regarding Admiral Hope’s attack on those places in 1859, how much more censure should we have heard if that gallant sailor at the time — perceiving the difficulties to be overcome, and knowing his weakness in having no troops at his disposal — had announced to Mr. Bruce, that his force was inadequate to capture the forts? England would have howled from one end of it to the other, and there would have been no lack of those who would have attributed to the naval Commander-in-Chief other and more unfavourable motives than those arising from extreme caution. These same forts had been taken easily in 1858 by his predecessor, the same line of conduct being pursued then as that which failed in 1859, so that if any brave man will for a moment imagine himself circumstanced as Admiral Hope was upon the occasion referred to, I am sure he will say that he (the Admiral), acted exactly as he himself would have done. Now that we know the exact strength of these works and the formidable resistance which their garrisons are capable of [p. 147] showing, to attempt a landing in front of their embrasures, and with their artillery fire unsubdued, seems like the action of a madman; but, in the absence of such knowledge, and with the possession of this fact, that a year previously they had been captured in like manner, Admiral Hope’s attempt was merely the action of a brave, gallant, and determined seaman. The forts were all made of mud, timber being used for the facing of the embrasures and roofs of magazines. The peculiar feature of their construction was having their principal batteries placed on high-raised cavaliers, the terrepleins of which were elevated about twenty-five feet above the plane of sight. This, of course, gave them great command, and had the further advantage of diverting the principal fire of an enemy from the main body of the works, where, of course, the chief portion of the garrison would be — and brave, indeed, must have been the men who served the guns placed there for any length of time under a heavy fire! Casemates constructed with timber ran along the sea face of all the works, and numbers of guns were placed there, firing from embrasures made like portholes in a ship’s side. In these casemates a large portion of the garrison was quartered, the remainder occupying huts, built after exactly the same fashion as those in the Tartar camps which we took near Sinho, and were reed fascines, bent so as to form a semicircle, placed over a slight framework of wood, mud being plastered over the fascines, and then a coating of mud and chopped straw over all, which rendered the whole waterproof so long as this outer covering received no injury. Once tear a small piece of it away, and then the whole out- [p. 148] side plastering tumbles down after a few days’ heavy rain. The ends of these huts were made of planking, in which were the windows and doors: the hut in which Sang-ko-lin-sin resided was tastefully finished and fitted up with sofas and cushions. Amongst his papers we found maps and detailed plans of each of the forts: upon entering his quarters I was at once struck by seeing one of those little cane-bottomed chairs, generally to be seen in the cabins of gunboats and other vessels of war. It had been taken evidently from one of the sunken gunboats, and placed as a trophy in the great man’s room. Along the walls, immediately above his sleeping-place, there was a long description, illustrated with quaint-looking pictures, of a proposed plan for annihilating the barbarians, should they ever be so successful as to attempt a march upon Pekin. The plan consisted in placing large quantities of combustibles and explosive mixtures upon bulls, covering them over with a sort of umbrella like clothing: these were to be brought in front of our army, having crackers or other fireworks attached to their tails, under the terrifying influence of which the animals were supposed to rush in upon us, the combustibles then exploding, to the utter confusion and destruction of the assembled army. The fact of such a childish plan being, if not approved of, at least entertained by the General-in-Chief of the Chinese army, is of itself a sufficient indication of the national ignorance respecting the science and practice of war. Many people at first believed, that much relating to war and its weapons of defence, &c. &c., had been taught this people by the Russians, with respect to whose conduct in [p. 149] the East so little has ever been known, and consequently, so much suspected. The fact that this picture and its accompanying description found a space on the walls of Sang-ko-lin-sin’s sleeping-room, ought to be a sufficient proof for the most suspicious on this subject, that neither the haughty Chinaman nor his Tartar governors have learned anything from their Russian neighbours. Indeed, the papers found amongst the documents taken from the Mandarin’s house at Sinho showed in what a very suspicious light the celestial authorities looked upon the Russians residing in Pekin, ranking them only a little higher than spies and barbarians, anxious to render us every assistance. The departure also of the Russian ambassador from Pekin a few months before the actual commencement of hostilities proved clearly, that no very good understanding existed between him and the government of that place, and that he did not care to reside inside its walls whilst we were battering outside, should the tide of war ever take us up so far into the country.

There can be no doubt, however, that the Russians had endeavoured to ingratiate themselves into official favour with the Pekin Government, by supplying them with guns and munitions of war, as in one of the dispatches from Pekin to Sang-ko-lin-sin, that chief is warned against the attempts of the Russians “to approach the coast under their old pretence of affording aid and bringing guns,” &c.

Immediately in rear of the southern forts were the towns called Tung-koo and Se-koo; both of these, as also the adjoining position, being known under the title of Takoo, or the “Great Market” [大沽]. Between the [p. 150] forts and the town, which is about a mile, the space was one large salt-flat, intersected by numerous deep canals, which could only be passed by the regular causeways extending between the town and the forts. There was a regular line of entrenchments, with ditches, running round those towns. The amount of labour expended upon the construction of the works had been immense, and if it was regularly paid for, must have cost the Chinese Government a prodigious amount of money. Had a tithe of it been spent under the superintendence of a skilful engineer, the place might have resisted us for months, or, in other words, our expedition must have virtually been a failure, as we were not in a condition to undertake a siege; and even if such had been possible, a few days of bad weather during our attack would have postponed our future operations considerably. If the men who had garrisoned the captured fort had possessed skill and discipline commensurate with their courage and determination, with a fair proportion of really efficient small arms, they might have scorned our attempt to capture the place as we did by open assault. In spite of their present ignorance of war, its customs, weapons, and science, if their inflated self-importance could be brought to realise their deficiencies, and to see clearly how immeasurably superior the Western nations are in all such matters, a very short time only would be required to enable them to assume such an attitude, that no nation, or combination of allied powers, would dare to invade their country. In Europe there are restless adventurous spirits, many of whom have all the requisite energy, and some the military know- [p. 151] ledge, equal to that which on former occasions has enabled men, lost to all ties of home and country, to carve out with their own swords in distant lands that fame and fortune from which unfavourable circumstances, or their own heedlessness had debarred them in Europe; such men, with an equal sum of money and an amount of labour equal to that which was expended upon the Takoo forts at their command, might render that position impregnable in six months.

The road from Takoo to Tien-tsin passes close to the Peiho the whole distance, cutting off, however, the sinuosities for which that river is famous. For the first ten miles the road is simply a low mud embankment, running through numerous villages all close to one another, the intervening spaces being gardens and orchards very neatly arranged and evidently tended with the greatest care. Between the road and the river there was a mass of gardens, trees, and houses, whilst all to the west appeared one vast field of millet, or Indian corn, stretching away over the flat country as far as the eye could reach, with scarcely a house or village to be seen, and no trees. As you approach Tien-tsin, however, habitations and willows are sprinkled sparingly about to the westward. There are no wells, the Peiho supplying all wants of this kind; water is taken from it at the ebb tide, and although then of a dark yellow colour, it is soon rendered as clear as crystal by immersing a lump of alum in it, and merely waving it to and fro for about a minute. This has a remarkable effect, for when you have removed your hand, you may perceive the muddy matter sinking and settling at the bottom, just as if the momentary pre- [p. 152] sence of the alum had converted it into lead. In order to avoid any unpleasant taste resulting from the alum, it must be removed soon. The houses along the road, as well as those composing the villages, are well built and comfortable habitations, all fitted up with fireplaces. The sleeping apartments have the kangs or heating apparatuses which I have previously described. The poorer people build their houses of mud, with thatched roofs and a covering of mud over all. In addition to this, there is also a layer of fine mud and chopped straw plastered over the entire edifice, giving the whole a finished and pointed appearance, such as I have never seen earthen houses elsewhere possess. The angles are all neatly cut, and the walls are even and perpendicular. In the towns and villages there are large numbers of brick houses well tiled over, according to the peculiar fashion of China. The bricks and tiles used throughout all those places which I have visited in that country are of a dark neutral tint, which at a distance looks bluish and strange. Every little hamlet had its joss-house, containing in it the usual unsightly figures, some with many arms and legs, others with black, white, or red faces and limbs, all being as fantastic, hideous, and ungodlike in design, as they were uncouth in execution. I have never seen any people, if I except a few repulsive-looking priests, worshipping in such buildings; and the greater portion of those which I visited were badly cared for, everything within, including the gods themselves, being covered with dust and dirt. Were it not that I occasionally saw here and there a new temple in course of erection, I should have concluded that all respect had now-a-days departed from [p. 153] amongst the Chinese for the idols which their ancestors had venerated and worshipped.

What strikes any one accustomed to European roads as being very peculiar is, that along the highway to the Imperial capital, there is a total absence of stone. The road all the way is merely a good cart-track over hardened mud; after heavy rain it would be quite impassable for wheeled carriages of any sort; and I very much doubt if even cavalry in any number could get over it. So very flat is the surrounding country that the presumption is strongly in favour of its being flooded in wet weather. There is one great difficulty to be encountered in moving an army along this road, namely, the lack of open ground for encampments. We remedied this by moving up in detachments, the cavalry marching by the left bank. At the first halting-place, the guns had to remain on the road for the night, there being a deep ditch on one side and a marsh running along the other. The first march was through a very close country. The road passes through a succession of gardens and villages, with ditches on either side, for many miles. It is also narrow, and does not widen much until Ko-kow is passed, after which it runs over extensive plains, which, at the time of our march, were rich with an abundant harvest. Here and there a Tartar encampment was visible, presenting indications of recent occupation.

At Pei-tang-kow there were four forts and an entrenched camp, lately constructed, at the bend of the river, where it formed a right angle, so that their guns swept down the reach of the stream. This position was intended as a second line of defence, in case we forced a [p. 154] passage through the Takoo forts, the fortifications round Tien-tsin being the third; but the army, on whom devolved the duty of defending the first line, had learnt such a lesson, that no attempt was made to make a stand at either the second or third, and Admiral Hope’s rapid advance up the river, after, the capture of the Takoo forts, enabled him to land and occupy the Tien-tsin forts before the beaten army could be reorganised for another defence. As we approached Tien-tsin, the country became open and suitable for the movements of all arms to the westward of the road; but the tall Indian cor and millet, averaging from six to ten feet in height, prevented us from having a very extensive view. The land was level on all sides, without a mound larger than a grave; the corn was in the ear, but not yet ripe, the middle of September being harvest time. In many places along the road, and particularly near villages, I saw coffins placed at the edge of the cartway. Some were nicely thatched over, or covered with an arch of brickwork, whilst others, containing the remains of poorer people whose relations were unable to provide such an arrangement for their deceased friends as I have spoken of in the former instances, were left by the roadside, just as the undertaker had turned the coffin out of his shop. Every village, through which we passed, contained stores of wood, some of it being magnificent timber, and the rest indifferent stuff, used for firing. The good is reserved for coffins, upon whose construction every Chinaman bestows his “little all,” being anxious to provide a respectable receptacle for his bones. This is such a recognised custom, that a fond [p. 155] son not infrequently presents his father with as handsome a one as his means will admit of as a birthday present, and the gift is received by the parent as the most delicate attention his son can pay him.

At two miles down the river, from Tien-tsin, stand two newly-built forts, one on either bank, both beautifully finished. Their slopes and parapets were much neater and more highly finished than those at Takoo. From these, continued lines of entrenchments stretched round Tien-tsin, uniting again upon the river at about two thousand yards from Tien-tsin to the north of that city, their entire circuit being about fourteen miles. These lines, with a deep ditch in front, were well-made, and consisted of a substanfial rampart with parapet on top. We ascertained that the construction of this vast work cost the Government only at the rate of fifteen pence the running foot, which, if the account be true, would make the entire cost of them somewhat less than 5,000£.

Tien-tsin is a walled city, and in shape a right-angled parallelogram, the longer side being just a mile, the shorter one about a thousand yards; a large suburb stretches out from both the north and south. It is situated at the confluence of the Grand Canal with the Peiho, and is consequently, from its position, a town of great importance. The walls do not touch either of these streams, being some four hundred yards from them, but the intervening space is covered by a dense suburb, in which are situated the best streets and shops of the place. Vessels drawing eleven feet of water can go up as far as Tien-tsin; but above that city, when you pass beyond the tidal influence, boats of a lighter draught [p. 156] only can ascend to Ho-see-woo, from which place to Tung-chow the river can only be ascended by junks drawing not more than eighteen inches of water; and even such vessels experience much difficulty in passing the wide and shallow portions.

Much discussion, both public and private, has been spent on the task of ascertaining the real name of the river we call the Peiho, or rather, of determining which of the two streams flowing into the Gulf of Pechili at Peh-tang and Takoo respectively, should properly be called by that name. No satisfactory answer has as yet been given on these subjects. I took some trouble to collect information on this point, and found that the river marked in our maps as the Peiho, like every other small one in this, and I believe, other parts of China, has no universally recognised name whatever. Its appellations are invariably local, and change every ten or twenty miles. Thus, for instance, at its mouth it is known as the Nan-ho, or “south river,” whilst the river at Peh-tang is called the Peiho, or “north river; ” the two rivers, which are so close together, being thus distinguished from one another in the locality where they fall into the sea, by the geographical position which they relatively occupy.

At Tien-tsin the river is called the Hy-ho, or “ocean river,” because it runs from thence into the sea. Between Tien-tsin and Tung-chow (where it branches off into two distinct streams, both having different names), it is known generally as the Ta-ho, or “great river,” but in many places people call it the Peiho. Local circumstances greatly influence the names of rivers throughout China, so much so, that as far as I could [p. 157] learn, there is not one generally received and understood name for a single river in the empire. When you ask a Chinese the name of a river, he seems so much astonished that it would almost appear that the idea of rivers being distinguished by particular names had never previously occurred to him; and he generally replies, after a moment’s consideration, either the “Ta-ho” or ” Seaou-ho,” i.e. the great or little river. If there happen to be two rivers in his neighbourhood, he distinguishes them thus; but if only one, although it may be an insignificant stream, he calls it the “Ta-ho,” by which the Yang-tse-kiang and brooks no larger than those frequently crossed in the hunting-field are alike known in China.

Rivers flowing sluggishly through a flat country, turn and twist about to a great extent; but I have never seen any stream bend like the Peiho, insomuch that when sailing upon it we could look back and see boats, although bound for the same destination, apparently going in diametrically opposite directions as regards the points of the compass. The angles are in many places so very acute, that it is only with the aid of ropes, on both banks, that steamers of ordinary length can get round them. There is a bridge of boats maintained by the authorities over the Peiho at Tien-tsin, and two over the Grand CanaL Opposite the city on the left bank there is a considerable suburb, and always a vast quantity of salt stacked along the bank. This is brought up the river from Takoo and the surrounding country, where the salt is collected from the marshes and salt-works about the neighbourhood where the Peh-tang and Peiho flow into the sea. This salt is [p. 158] of great value and forms a very considerable article of traffic. It is sent up from Tien-tsin in smaller vessels to Tung-chow, by the Peiho, and from thence by the canal to Pekin, or else, it is forwarded inland to the westward along the Grand Canal. As in ali the Chinese cities I have seen, the suburbs touch the walls, and the ditch is merely a miry sewer that may be crossed anywhere with ease. In many places the walls are sadly out of repair; and although the outward revetment of brickwork stands perfect, yet the inner one, which should support the rampart, has fallen down in many places, causing such breaches in it that you cannot walk well along the top. There are but four gates, one in each side, having straight streets running from one to the other, and in this way dividing the town into four equal quarters. Where these four streets meet there is a high joss house-like building, under which the roadways pass through large gates. The space within the city walls is not nearly covered with houses, and at each comer there are large pools of water, in and about which there are numerous graves, and all appear more or less a receptacle for filth. There are no wells; the water of the Peiho is used for drinking, when cleared with alum in the manner I have mentioned. There are large ice-houses everywhere, which are filled yearly with ice from the river, towards the end of winter. Ice was regularly hawked about the streets daily, during my stay at Tien-tsin, and sold cheap. When dissolved, many people use it instead of the waters of the Peiho, particularly below Tien-tsin, where, owing to the tide flowing up with such force, the water is frequently [p. 159] brackish. In the forts at Takoo there were regular ice-houses, from whence the garrison derived its water for drinking. Grapes, apples, pears, and peaches, could also be procured in great abundance, and at a very reasonable rate; the grapes were very good indeed. The people were civil, and brought us water and tea whenever we halted along the road. Supplies of all sorts were sold to the troops at a moderate price, and there was also an abundance of grain for horses. Indeed, at this season of the year any force of cavalry might march along the Pekin route and find plenty of corn. The cattle eat millet greedily, whilst but few horses, unless very hungry, would touch the paddy. Upon reaching Tien-tsin the force encamped on a fine plain extending beyond the lines of works south of the city, and near the Yamun where Lord Elgin signed his treaty in 1858, and which temple we converted into our general hospital. The French, who had marched up the left bank, encamped close by the river on that side of it. [p. 160]

Wolsely, chapter 1-3







/ / /

… As a place for the organisation of an army, previous to active operations anywhere upon the shores of Pechili, Che-foo is preferable to Talienwan, being situated in a far more productive part of the empire; the province of Shan-tung being famous for its mules and cattle.
During our stay at Talienwan the allied Commanders-in-Chief had several conferences, and complimentary visits were made by the ambassadors, Lord Elgin having arrived at our rendezvous upon the 9th of July. The French navy, having made a careful reconnaissance of the coast near Chi-kiang-ho, on which they had previously fixed as their point of disembarkation, found, they said, that there was not sufficient water for their vessels, and that consequently they must land at Peh-tang with us. This was naturally a great disappointment to us all, and, I suppose, to our allies also.

After several meetings, it was at last finally settled that both forces were to start from their respective stations upon the 26th July, by which time our allies promised to be ready. The two armies were to meet [p. 82] at a point to be indicated by one of our men-of-war, twenty miles south of the Peiho.

Upon Saturday, the 21st July, our transport animals were embarked, and the various corps put their heavy baggage on board ship. Upon Monday, the 23rd, all the cavalry and artillery were embarked, with the exception of Fane’s Horse, which went on board the following morning, when also the remainder of the army did likewise. On the 25th July the ships were employed in getting into the positions assigned for them; and on the 26th, all weighed anchor and started with a fair wind for the general rendezvous off the Peiho.

We left behind at our depot at Odin Bay, four companies of the 99th Regiment, 417 of the 19th Punjab Infantry, and 100 of the Royal Artillery, besides 200 sick and weakly Europeans, and 100 sick native soldiers. Before leaving, we had provided for the accommodation of 440 sick Europeans, and 500 sick natives, with stores of medicines, medical comforts, &c. &c. for that number. During our stay at Talienwan, we had lost by deaths, 2 officers (one by drowning), 28 Europeans and 6 native soldiers, the largest proportion having been in the 1st Royals, the effects of service at Hong-kong telling upon the men.

Our coolie corps had proved itself of great use already, working most cheerfully and well; eighty, however, deserted one night, of whom we heard nothing, until, a few days subsequently, six of the party returned in a most pitiable condition, having, according to their story, been beaten and ill-treated by the inhabitants; some of the party had been [p. 83] beheaded, and all of them imprisoned. The six men had only escaped with great difficulty. Although we lost men by this circumstance, it was of great ultimate benefit, as it showed all the others what they might expect from their northern countrymen if they left us, and made them consequently all the more anxious for our success.

I do not remember having ever witnessed a grander sight than our fleet presented when steering for the Peiho. All ships were under full sail, the breeze being just powerful enough to send them along at about five knots an hour, and yet not more than ripple the sea’s surface, which shone with all the golden hues of a brilliant sunshine. The ships were in long lines, one vessel behind the other, with a man-of-war leading each line — Admiral Jones’s ship, the Imperatrice, keeping on the right flank, and superintending the whole arrangements. The Imperatrice, under topsails only, kept pace easily with the transport fleet, although every vessel of it was crowded with canvas. H.M.S. Cambrian, under Captain Macleverty, led the van, and seemed to carry on a never-ending conversation with the others, one string of signals being no sooner hauled down than it was succeeded by another and another. Looking around upon that brilliant naval spectacle, I could scarcely realise the fact of being some 16,000 miles from England. It was a sight well calculated to impress every one with the greatness of our power, and to awake feelings of pride in the breast of the most stony-hearted Briton. The magnitude of our naval resources was brought forcibly home to the mind of every one who saw such a vast fleet collected in the [p. 84] Gulf of Pechili, without in any way interfering with our commerce elsewhere.

No collection of men-of-war in one spot could impress foreigners with the fact of our power and greatness afloat, nearly so much as that immense display of our mercantile marine in such an out-of-the-way place. Fleets of war exhibit the metal wrought up and finished for immediate use, but in our vast merchant service we have the inexhaustible mine from whence the ore is drawn. Other nations may have the former upon the breaking out of hostilities, but after a couple of years’ war, and the losses consequent thereon, from whence can they recruit? Sailors cannot be made in one voyage, and until other nations can compete with us in their mercantile marine, we may rest assured of having ever our existing preponderance at sea.
Towards evening the French fleet of thirty-three vessels, counting gunboats, &c., came in sight, passing round the Meatow Islands; they were all under steam. As night drew near the wind died away, but freshened again towards morning. The next day we dropped anchor at the appointed rendezvous, which H.M.S. Cruiser indicated, having arrived the day before for that purpose. By the 28th July, all the fleet had arrived. We were anchored in nine fathoms of water, no land being in sight: the 29th being Sunday, nothing was done. Our gunboats, towing a number of Chinese junks with ten days’ provisions for the whole army on board, arrived in the evening. As these junks drew only a few feet of water, it was intended that they should accompany the landing force to the shore, so [p. 85]as to be at hand with supplies. On Monday the whole fleet weighed and bore in for shore anchoring about nine miles from it. The coast-line was then just visible from the mast-heads. A Russian frigate and three gunboats were riding close to us. [p. 86]