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# **Politics, Policy and Policey as Concepts in English and Continental Languages: An Attempt to Explain Divergences**

**Arnold J. Heidenheimer**

This article explores the problem of why most Continental languages lack a term which distinguishes the concept of *policy*, and to what extent political scientists writing in them are handicapped. It employs a diachronic approach to explore historical shifts of meaning within the “polis-family of words” in English and German, with reference also to French and other languages. The analysis is related to the manner in which the concept and term for state flourished in these languages over time, and explores why a convergence in usages of the English *policy* and the Continental *Policey* was aborted in the early nineteenth century. The bureaucratic and ideological roots of the broad Continental *police* concept are traced. Then synchronic analysis is used to explore how in the contemporary setting the presence or absence of a policy term effects communication and conceptualization.

As interest in comparing Anglo-American and Continental policy experiences has grown over the past decade, scholars have become aware that terminological problems are hindering the growth of a genuinely cross-national literature. Among these is that, whereas the distinction between *politics* and *policy* seems easy to make in English, it is much more difficult to express in the Continental languages. As in German and French, these do not possess a term for policy that is distinct from that for politics. In German, *Kommunalpolitik* may mean “local politics” or it may mean “communal policy.” By the same token, Frenchmen have to cover English terms like “university politics” by *politique universitaire*, which also carries the meaning of “university policy.”<sup>1</sup>

Continental political scientists are at times tempted to adopt toward their languages something of the attitude that Shaftesbury expressed toward English in the early eighteenth century:

I must confess, I have been apt sometimes to be very angry at our language for having denied us the use of the word *Patria*, and afforded us no other name to express our native community than that of *country*, which already bore two different significations abstracted from mankind and society.<sup>2</sup>

Shaftesbury held such strong feelings because he regarded terms like *country* and *la patrie* as “Reigning words,” so named because

they "are many times of such force as to influence us considerably in our apprehension of things."

The object of this essay is to compare terminologies over time and language areas so as to allow greater perspective on the capacity of *policy* to serve as a reigning word and key concept. It addresses the question of why Continental languages developed a concept of "Policey," so that they came at times to distinguish terminologically between *Policey* and *Politik*. (Here as elsewhere I use mainly German examples, but the relationships seem very similar in the other languages.) This led them to develop terms like *Medizinpolicey* ("medical police") which were not welcomed into English, where the narrow, or prevention-of-danger sense of police, militated against the broader use of this term. It also addresses the question of how the broad concept of *policy* developed in English with connotations that allowed its employment in a more ambiguously complementary sense to *politics*. Thus it seeks to clarify how contemporary political scientists can discuss relationships between policy and politics in English in a way that Continental political scientists cannot easily do through use of their presently employed native natural language terms.

We are hence dealing with words that are derived from the Greek terms *polis* and *politeia*, from which contemporary terms like *politics*, *Politik*, *politique*, *policy* and *polity* are descended. Writing about what for want of a more convenient label, we can call the "polis-family of words," the German political scientist Sternberger notes that there "is no comprehensive philological study existing so far which would inform us about the curious migration or migrations of these words through the ages, or about the striking changes of meaning they underwent in the course of time." Regarding the English term *policy*, which seems to be descended from the Greek *politeia* through the medieval *policia*, he notes that through it "the English have isolated and bottled. . . an intentional meaning in relative purity." But "how this keyword. . . came to take on, in English, just that noninstitutional, purely intentional sort of meaning," remains for him a particularly unexplored problem.<sup>3</sup>

#### COMPARING CONCEPTS ACROSS LANGUAGES

If we look for an analytical framework that deals explicitly with both the variation of meanings of similar terms across languages

and with changes in concepts over time, one finds no developed schema upon which that we can readily build. However, some historians and political scientists have dealt with the theoretical problems encountered in concept development and change. The political scientist Giovanni Sartori has developed an approach to conceptual analysis that provides guidelines helpful in the attempt to identify more clearly and to specify the problem we are trying to grapple.

Despite the much proclaimed quantitative turn of the social science endeavor, the fact remains that the bulk of our knowledge of ourselves is expressed in a natural language. . . . Resulting from the way in which disciplinary fiefs happen to be drawn, much of the present-day treatment of semantics misses what matters most. . . . I give prominence to the notion of projective semantics. . . which brings to the fore both the *constraints* and *pathways* that any given natural language imposes upon, and affords to, our perceiving, thinking and knowing. . . . “Terms” are the carriers of the stability of language and the cumulability of knowledge. . . . It is precisely because language is not only a means of expression but also a *molder of thought* that allocating a term to a concept—termining the concept—is a most central decision.<sup>4</sup>

Historians like Koselleck developed an approach they label *Begriffsgeschichte* (“concept history”), which has developed some useful propositions, such as

Each concept is associated with a word, but not every word is a social and political concept. . . . A word presents potentialities for meaning, a concept unites within itself a plentitude of meaning. Hence a concept can possess clarity but must be ambiguous.<sup>5</sup>

A theorist who has combined philosophical and historical approaches in expressing the relationship between concepts and words is Quentin Skinner. He concludes that “we can scarcely hope to capture the answer in a single formula, but I think we can at least say this”:

The surest sign that a group or society has entered into self-conscious possession of a new concept is that a corresponding vocabulary will be developed, a vocabulary which can then be used to pick out and discuss the concept with consistency. . . . there is . . . a systematic relationship between words and concepts to be explored. For the possession of a concept will at least *standardly* be signalled by the employment of a corresponding term.<sup>6</sup>

But since it is difficult to distinguish clearly the meanings of *politics* and *policy* even in English, could it be that these are not really distinct and separable concepts, but just different words accentuating somewhat complementary dimensions of the same concept? Heinz Eulau put forward such a view in a 1977 symposium on the place of policy analysis in political science, in which he also alluded to Harold Lasswell's role in renewing the Policy term usage in America:

After a decade of writing about "public policy" nobody seems to know what the new dispensation is all about. . . . Alas, the easy substitution of "policy" for "political" is a clue. What is attempted as a differentiation in reality is only a differentiation in language. There is no differentiation in French where *politique* (politics) is *politique* (policy), or in German where *Politik* (politics) is *Politik* (policy). The use of a single term in these languages suggests that there is no politics apart from policy and no policy apart from politics. The differentiation that *can* be made is *analytic* and does not refer to something concrete. . . . The choice of the term "policy science" has always struck me as unfortunate because it conceals the breadth and depth of the intellectual synthesis proposed by Lasswell.<sup>7</sup>

However, scholars who have examined this problem with reference to the major Continental languages find the English terminology not only richer, but even indispensable for conveying analytically crucial distinctions. Thus a French-Canadian scholar ascertains that:

For all the usages French knows only a single word *politique*. The English language presents a better terminological instrument with three nouns, *politics*, *policy*, *polity*, and two adjectives/adverbs *politic* and *political*. . . . The richer English terminology suggests for us from the start objective answers to the questions: What: Le *political* in the *polity*. How? Through *politics*, whether the actions are *politic* or not. Why? For a *policy* or some *policies*.<sup>8</sup>

A German political scientist also finds, utilization of the English terms indispensable for conveying to German students how *Politik* embraces several distinguishable meanings.

*Policy* and *politics* are part of every *Politik* and may be identified as distinguishable dimensions of political action. . . . One could say that *Politik* constitutes the realization of *Politik* in the sense of *policy*, with the help of *Politik* in the sense of *politics*, on the basis of *Politik* in the sense of *polity*. . . . Concepts like administration, planning,

public affairs are primarily related to the concept *policy*. But when political thinking involves concepts like power, authority, conflict, and participation one would seem to be dealing with a stronger *politics*-orientation.<sup>9</sup>

One reason why political scientists have received little help or stimulus from linguists in tackling questions of this sort is that “what’s in a word” has not played a central role in mainstream linguistic theorizing for some time. Even the linguistic relativists who tried to make a case for the significance of terminological diversity as a shaping variable tended to discount the value of comparing European languages with each other. This held especially for Benjamin Whorf. He put all their languages together under the term Standard Average European and assumed them to have one “mind” and “culture,” even though they exhibit “differences in lexikon that may have cognitive significance.”<sup>10</sup> Recent shifts toward more formalized semantic models have downgraded interest in cross-language variations even further. But the linguist who was asked to write about “Linguistic Aspects of Comparative Political Research” in a recent volume on comparative methodology felt it necessary to advise social scientists not to be misled by the “slogan of modern linguistics that ‘anything can be said in (translated into) any language.’”

This slogan refers to the *potential* equality of all languages, as expressions of human nature. As expressions of social and historical experience, languages are not equivalent. One must reckon in research with the actual inequality of languages. Not only is it easier or more difficult to say some things in some languages; within the present resources of a language it may be impossible to say certain things than can be said in another.<sup>11</sup>

#### HOW CONCEPTS AND TERMS CHANGE OVER TIME

Probing for historical explanations of terminological change requires that we in the first instance formulate the problems in somewhat more specific historical and spatial terms, such as: How were the various antecedents of the present terms *politics*, *police*, *policy*, *polity*, and *Politik* developed during the time that the European national states and languages were taking their modern shape? Has the greater capacity of English to differentiate meanings been demonstrated consistently throughout the modern pe-

riod, or were there relative changes in this respect? If there have been differing changes in the English-German or other such cases, what factors may have been responsible for influencing them? To what extent does the limitation found in French and German hold generally for the other Continental languages? Are there any Continental languages that differentiate more sharply between “politics” and “policy”?

In pursuing the first of these questions, we may follow a number of cues from authors who have examined the various modern derivatives of the Greek core terms *polis* and *politēia*.

Carl Friedrich drew attention to results of the common derivation of *police* and *policy*:

It is no accident that the word policy is so intimately related to that of police. Both derive from the old French *policie*. The Oxford Dictionary tells us that the general connotation of police is “civil administration,” which is charged, of course, with the several courses of action adopted by the government.<sup>12</sup>

Rohe provides yet another clue when he mentions that in the search for basic meanings:

the German language in its contemporary Gestalt leaves us in the lurch because it only contains the homogenized word (*Einheitswort*) *Politik*; the old word *Polizey* became transformed into *Polizei* and assumed a much narrower meaning.<sup>13</sup>

If *policy* is a distinguishable concept, mapping the meaning of terms across both time and languages is a complex challenge that has not been previously tackled. Even at the level of terminology we do not have the kind of tracing of meanings over time and between languages that scholars have produced for some other important terms, such as the term *intelligence*. The evolution of this term has been traced to show how English had developed a meaning for this term since the fifteenth century — in the sense of news, and military intelligence — that did not develop in the Continental languages.<sup>14</sup>

*The Concept “State.”* A better term to which to link an inquiry into the development or nondevelopment of policy terms is the term and concept of state. First, its use has been fairly well mapped over time in the major languages. Second, scholars have developed something of an ideal type through the concept of *stateness*, which should prove at least of heuristic value. And third, the

way in which the concept of state has in theory and practice been linked to the concept of policy, as well as to that of its kin (or even twin?) police, could further enhance our analysis.

The terms *Stato*, *State*, *Staat* and *État* began to be used in an impersonal, post-Aristotelian modern sense in the sixteenth century.<sup>15</sup> In French and German, their use was continued with varying fortune and then grew greatly in breadth of usage and richness of connotation from the eighteenth century. In England the term was officially “received” through creation of offices like that of a Secretary of State. But “from the 17th century onwards England departed from general European development. The political and legal concept of the state was not developed and the term little used.”<sup>16</sup> Even those who did employ it, like Blackstone and Burke, did not use it as an expression for the legal personality of the executive or as an enhancing term for the governmental system.<sup>17</sup>

If *State* is seen as a summing and universalistic concept that stresses the interdependency and integration of institutions and that endows the “public power” with a unique mission, then some modern nations have more “stateness” than others.<sup>18</sup> “State societies” like France and Germany developed historical and intellectual traditions of the state embodying the “public power.” “Stateless societies” fall short of perceiving “the state as an institution which acts.” Englishmen tended rather to see in the executive, “just a bundle of officials, united only by a mysterious Crown which serves chiefly as a bracket to unite an infinite series of integers.”<sup>19</sup>

Applying Nettl’s concept to modern Europe, Tilly notes that, while after 1500 there was a general drift toward increasing stateness, countries moved at differing rates. During the sixteenth century, a “time of significantly rising stateness,” and the later seventeenth century, a “frenzy of state-making,” “international disparities in stateness increased.” France led Europe during most of this period in such defining correlates of stateness as autonomy, differentiation, centralization and internal coordination. In contrast, England “accumulated stateness at a slower pace and at a lower level,” and thus “survived into the 19th century with a rather low level of stateness.”<sup>20</sup> Among the consequences was the terminological deprivation about which Shaftesbury complained.

*Policy as a Term and Concept.* Did the nations and languages with a “richer” state tradition become “poorer” in that they diminished their capacity to distinguish between politics and policy in the way

that English allows? If we want to examine such correlations, we should try to trace the uses of *police*, *polity*, and *policy* in the period since the sixteenth century and show how some meanings were shifted to the terms *Politik/politique*. If one goes to sources like etymological dictionaries and reference works of language use, it is possible to ascertain whether and how cross-language variations in the meanings and usage of words like *Politics* and *Politik*, *Polizey* and *police*, and *policy*, etc. have varied over time. If a layman refers to sources like the *Oxford English Dictionary*, Grimm's *Wörterbuch*, and similar works, he or she does seem to detect some variations; for instance, the differences between the usage of terms like *policy*, *polizey*, *polity* seem to have been much less apparent in the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries as between English, French, and German, than they became later. My attempt at schematizing a complex field is presented in Table One.

It thus appears as though rather similar terms like *policey/police* and *politie/polity* were used in rather undifferentiated but broadly parallel ways in the three languages into the sixteenth century.<sup>21</sup> Then in the period when the leading Continental systems were manifesting their increasing stateness, the terms *policey* and *police* became identified with the patterns of urban and domestic regulation, and later sometimes almost became a synonym for state, as when *The Prince* was published as *Machiavelli's Policei* in the German translation. Thus those states that combined absolutist regime with mercantilist leanings developed what might be called a "broad police concept," which embraced much of domestic rule-making. With the growth of constitutional and liberal precepts, however, this usage went into decline, and most of its meanings were absorbed into the terms *Politik* and *politique*, while a "narrow police concept" became linked to the forces that enforced law and order in the more limited sense.

In English the meanings with which variants of the terms *policy* came to be used in the early modern period were in some ways similar and in some ways different from the manner in which *policey/police* were establishing themselves on the continent. As there, the term came to be used in the general sense of "public affairs." The earliest citation is that to Chaucer's "Pardoner's Tale" (1386), where there is mention of a prince who "useth hasardrye, in all governance and policey." This seems earlier than the first documented Continental usages. In England the term *policy* did not become as entangled with the "police" concept. Later *policy* came to

TABLE ONE  
TERM/CONCEPT CHANGE SINCE THE  
FIFTEENTH CENTURY

FRENCH:	<p>TERMS: <i>policie, politie</i> (from Greek/Latin)</p> <p>Usage: Intensively into 16th century</p> <p>Meanings: Administration publique, gouvernement, règlement, arret</p> <p>Evolution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) <i>pollice, police</i> . . . règlement des matières, ordre, reglement établi dans un État</li> <li>ii) <i>politique</i> . . . manière de gouverner et de diriger (since 1640)</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;">(S: Wartburg, IX, 129-30)</p>
German:	<p>Term: <i>Polizey, Polickey</i> (Alemannic: policy)</p> <p>Usage: 15th to 17th centuries</p> <p>Meaning: Regierung, Verwaltung und Ordnung, besonders eine Art Sittenaufsicht in Staat und Gemeinde und die darauf bezueglichen Verordnungen</p> <p>Evolution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) <i>Policy</i> . . . Sorge eines Staates fuer das Gemeinwohl mittels obrigkeitlichen Zwanges (17th-19th centuries) <i>Polizei</i> . . . Organe des Polizeidienstes (18th-20th centuries)</li> <li>ii) <i>Politik</i> . . . Staatliches oder auf den Staat bezogenes Planen and Handeln (17th-20th centuries)</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;">(S,: Grimm, VII, 1979-82; <i>Volksbrockhaus</i>, 716)</p>
English:	<p>Term: <i>Policy</i> and <i>Polity</i> (from Greek/Latin via French)</p> <p>Usage: 14th through 18th centuries</p> <p>Meaning: An organized or established system or form of government or administration; the conduct of foreign affairs</p> <p>Evolution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) <i>policy</i> . . . a course of action adopted and pursued by government, party, ruler statesman (from 17th century, although variants earlier in overlap with more private usages)</li> <li>ii) <i>police</i> . . . to control, regulate or keep in order by means of the police (from 18th century) (S: OED, VIII, 1070;)</li> </ul>
Sources:	<p><i>Oxford English Dictionary</i> (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933) Walter von Wartburg, <i>Französiches Etymologisches Wörterbuch</i> (Bonn: Klopp, 1928)</p> <p><i>Der Volks-Brockhaus</i>, 12th ed. (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1955) J.L.K. Grimm, ed. <i>Deutsches Wörterbuch</i> (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1854-1960)</p>
Note:	<p>The alternate spellings are presented for illustrative purposes, since there was much variability in customary spellings, into the 19th century.</p>

be used with more institutionalized referents, as in Sir Thomas Smith's treatise, *The Manner of Government or Policie of the Realm of England*.<sup>22</sup> But gradually this meaning came to be transferred to the new term *constitution*.<sup>23</sup>

In German the work *Policey* came into use after 1500 to designate legislative and administrative regulation of the internal civil life to promote general welfare.<sup>24</sup> It was initially taken over from the French-Burgundian by reformers within the Empire, and used by Charles V at the Diet of Worms and then in a 1530 ordinance that came to be called *Policey Ordnung* ("police ordinance").<sup>25</sup>

A key to the important structural differences from England can be found in the police ordinances' initial emphasis on regulating urban conditions. The Continental rulers came to be able to directly impose rules on the cities in the way that was not feasible in England. Thus the French *Ordonnance du Roy* of 1578 was specifically addressed to Paris with the proviso that it should also be extended to other towns. In England, on the other hand the greater autonomy asserted by the common law courts, parliament, and local authorities kept cities from becoming the subject of a distinct body of law, legislation or administrative science. On the Continent, and particularly in the Germanies, the principles of *Polizey* came to be based on the teachings of cameralism, which were taught at many universities after Halle established a chair in "Camerallia, Oeconomica und Polizeisachen" in 1727. The cameralists spelled out on mercantilist assumptions how the ruler should encourage a growing population to maximize both their own happiness and the well-being of the state. Later historians credit them with helping to establish the *état bien policé*, or the "well-ordered police state."<sup>26</sup>

What can be seen as most different about the police ordinances as they evolved in the seventeenth century was that they relied less on moral injunctions supported by religious belief, but were more "pragmatic statements, orders or counsels designed to have an immediate and direct effect in reshaping patterns of public behavior." To meet expanding public needs, so the cameralist creed, one could "increase the potential resources of society by making the fallow productive and the hidden accessible." To this end "the customs, ideas and activities of the ordinary people had to be transformed. . . through the routinization of basic cultural, intellectual and institutional activities."<sup>27</sup>

In the eighteenth century, a definition of *Policey* prevalent in

Prussia identified three different levels at which it might be applied:

In the widest sense . . . as all measures concerned with the internal affairs of a country. . . . in a narrower sense of all those things which are necessary for the maintenance of the conditions of civil life . . . and in a still narrower meaning to concern with hygiene and the supervision of food, handworkers, weights and measures.<sup>28</sup>

Thus the German *Policey* referred to the manner in which the state directed activities of the population. The police ordinances thus implemented well-targeted policies, and one can see how a modern author could try to translate the concept of *Polizeistaat* into the English “policy state.”<sup>29</sup>

The development in English of a meaning of policy related to will and intention, the one which the *Oxford English Dictionary* now defines as “a course of action adopted and pursued by a government, party ruler, statesman,” is first documented in 1430, and is found in *policy* or *polycye* attributed to “soverayns,” “clergye,” *etc.*

Did the English develop the *policy* term with less regulative connotation because they had never experienced a regime based on police ordinances? It was certainly more complex than that. Rather, “some of the basic conceptions underlying the well-ordered police state had been formulated and introduced in England much earlier than on the continent. For this very reason . . . the English Crown did not need to develop as comprehensive a bureaucratic apparatus and a corpus of regulatory legislation, so that individual members of society managed to secure the rights and liberties that enables them to organize and further their productive activities.”<sup>30</sup>

England resisted the use of the broader term *police*, as well as centralization of the constabulary. The capacity of the central government was kept limited so that “the centralized administrative apparatus of the British government could not, even if it had attempted to do so, serve as . . . a medium for the creation of a *Polizeistaat* machinery as was the case in Brandenburg-Prussia.”<sup>31</sup> The detailed *Policey* regulation about which social strata could wear what kind of holiday clothing or jewelry, or how old an infant had to be to allow its parents to put on a funeral ritual, led Englishmen to associate policing with the tyrannous practices of Continental absolutism.<sup>32</sup>

As part of this development English produced and popularized

a variety of words and terms that labeled particular forms of directed courses of action. In a context of declining feudalism and the rise of an urban merchant class, English monarchs found that conflicting interests of their subjects had to be *managed*, another term whose equivalent does not develop in the languages of the absolutist states. Terms such as *to manage* and *to deal* developed meanings that could be related to the activities of individuals, were they shopkeepers or housewives. These terms covered notions of directed activities, activities that could be directed from above but that could also be self-directed.

It can probably be demonstrated that the English *policy* became generalized in a socially downward direction in ways that the Continental term *Policey* could not. That is, terms that were initially attributed to royalty and the higher strata came to be applied also to the actions of ordinary citizens. Such "societalization" seems to correlate with a long-term tendency to use the term with more positive connotations. The variant of the term in the sense of "crafty device, stratagem, trick," very evident for instance in Shakespeare's usage, became gradually obsolescent. "Honestie is the best policie" is documented for 1599, and by mid-eighteenth century a character in Fielding's *Amelia* could exclaim: "Tom, Tom, thou hast no policy in thee." One can hypothesize that this could more easily occur in a political system where the prerogatives of official figures were limited.

In the Continental systems with higher stateness, the terms *Policey* and *Politik* became, over roughly the same time period, semantically further removed from the private world of the burgher and citizen. Both concepts were becoming associated with actions at higher levels of the evolving nation-states. Where *Policey* had originally been linked to municipal regulations, it became increasingly associated with the regulations of the territorial states. As mercantilist regulations covered larger sectors of the domestic arena, the concept of *Politik* was pushed still further away from the level of the citizen and the community. As the absolutist states assured internal order and security under the label of *Policey* they approached a situation in which internally there was "literally only *Policey*, and no longer any *Politik*," in the characterization of Carl Schmitt. "*Politik* in the larger sense, high *Politik*, was then only foreign *Politik*, which the sovereign state conducted with other sovereign states."<sup>33</sup> While the term *Politik* continued to be used in the sense of factional and party contests, the tendency to peg the

term at the level of the sovereign state later found expression in slogans like “the primacy of the foreign policy” (*Primat der Aussenpolitik*).

Shifting accentuation among the various terms which descended from the “polis-family of words” in the European languages probably reflected complex patterns of priority of governmental concerns as between meeting challenges within the domestic and interstate arenas. Thus the shift toward emphasis to domestic problems and regulations led Prussia to establish chairs of *Polizey* science in the eighteenth century, but under the changed international and ideological settings of the late nineteenth century it made more sense to “package” this kind of knowledge under different labels. Thus the sun of a state constellation composed of absolutist mercantilist states favored the flowering of the *Polizey* label, in the way that no longer held true when Prussia-Germany had different priorities later on. Elsewhere I have tried to suggest similarities to the conditions under which “policy sciences” flowered in America in the 1960’s and 1970’s.<sup>34</sup>

#### THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND AFTER: HOW CONCEPTUAL CONVERGENCE WAS AVOIDED

The development through which English and the Continental languages reached their clear divergence on the key terms of *Policy* and *policy* occurred during the period from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries. How did this occur? Why did divergence prevail over convergent tendencies? What inhibited the semantic realignments that might have led to greater convergence? Why did German and the other Continental languages not diversify their usages of *Policey* beyond the domains of security and welfare, so as to make them also applicable to the state functions that were becoming differentiated through the establishment of numerous new ministries? The very phrasing of the questions suggest that it is to the way in which learned elites did or did not avail themselves of opportunities for terminological adaptation that we should look for clues as to how they might be answered. Hence, we will examine the formulations of those who wrote dictionaries and other concept-molding publications, and the labeling practices of jurists and administrators.

*Academic-Literary Trendsetters.* During the eighteenth century there were still trends toward convergence, from both sides. Swift used

*police* in the wider French and Continental sense, and Johnson defined it in his *Dictionary* as “the regulation and government of a city or country, so far as regards the inhabitants.” Burke used it in the sense of “policy,” and Pitt described emergency war legislation as a measure of “war police.”<sup>35</sup>

Scottish usage was particularly prone to pick up the Continental meanings of *police*, perhaps because Roman law traditions helped provide a bridge. Among Scottish eighteenth-century scholars, Adams Smith became particularly important as a mediator between Anglo and Continental political vocabulary; this may partly have been due to the fact that he had earlier been a student of language development. In dealing with the mercantilist regulatory tradition to which the cameralists had attached the *Policey* label, Smith prominently and repeatedly referred to it in the *Wealth of Nations* as “the policy of Europe.”<sup>36</sup> Elsewhere in the same volume he refers to “police of England” in the sense of social and regulatory legislation, as when he uses this concept as a broad category that includes rules like those of the Elizabethan Poor Laws.<sup>37</sup> In other places the term *police* is used in a variety of ways to refer to aspects of the domestic regulations and policy implementation organs of a variety of nations in both Europe and Asia.<sup>38</sup> Thus Smith and some other English but especially Scottish writers seemed to be making at least a semiconscious effort to popularize “police” as an organizing concept in the English usage of the time, and one can see that their efforts were somewhat reciprocated by some of their peers on the Continent.

Within the ferment of changing ideas on political economy on the Continent, one can also identify tendencies to move the meanings of *Policey* away from the orthodox cameralist moorings. In his *Grundsätze der Polizey, Handlung und Finanz* (1765), the more individualistically oriented Sonnenfels elevated a term that brought “course of action” on a par with *Policey*.<sup>39</sup> Thus at this juncture some academics in the “state societies” seemed to strive to shape a term that would distinguish the sense of a *course of action by governments or their officials*. Then the German sociopolitical vocabulary underwent a fundamental transformation during the period encompassing the impact of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period.<sup>40</sup> But convergence was not to come easily, for at the same time there were divergent trends both in the arena of political models and in that of scientific paradigms.

Adaptation of the concept of *Polizey* might perhaps have been

expected to occur during a period when the waves of voluntarist ideas and statist reforms overlapped each other. Prussia was at just such a juncture around 1810, after it had absorbed parts of the Stein-Hardenberg reforms, which can be seen as a revolution imposed by the higher bureaucracy. It was in that year that Krünitz's *Encyclopedia* published in the course of a 250-page article on *Polizey* a disquisition on the "limits of *Polizey*," which concluded:

Polizey has no subject of its own, with regard to which the fixing of its boundaries could be extrapolated. Rather it mingles though only in its peculiar way with all parts of the state administration: From this it follows that there should have to be just as many branches of *Polizey* as there are branches of governmental affairs.<sup>41</sup>

If each branch of the government were perceived as shaping its own *Polizey* principles, the meaning of that term might well have evolved to gradually come to parallel that of the English *policy*.

One could envision that this might have occurred if Stein, together with some of the leading German thinkers of this period, had encouraged a remolding of the term *Polizey* in this direction. But the most important critical thinkers of the time, like Immanuel Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt, influenced enlightened opinion to stress the antithesis between the more delineated goals of the state and the outdated *Polizey* principles of the cameralist tradition.<sup>42</sup> Insofar as the *Polizey* concept had perpetuated the Aristotelian view that the state should advance the welfare of the citizenry, Kant rejected its premises. He argued that the well-being of the state must not be confused with the welfare and happiness of its citizens. He thus indirectly encouraged the shift to a more limited *Polizei* concept, which stressed the security, or prevention of danger, focus of police jurisdiction.

*Legalist Labels.* However, while the broader *Polizey* concept was undermined, the term was only gradually infused by the narrower "prevention of danger" meaning. Thus a second influence relates to the slowness of legal categories to acknowledge what was in effect a qualitative change in the breadth of applied stateness. Although the Prussian *Allgemeine Landrecht* had already in 1794 been revised toward the narrower definition, it was not until 1882 that the Prussian High Administrative Court definitively narrowed in the famous Kreutzberg decision the limits to the *Policey* power of the state.<sup>43</sup>

In the interval legal and political labeling ran riot. During the

post-Napoleonic period of political reaction, Liberals like Görres popularized the term *Polizeistaat* in Germany as a label for the bad old order. Thus the terms *Policey* and *staat* were joined in a rhetorical neologism. As some Liberals pitted the *Polizeistaat* polemically against the *Rechtsstaat*, others like Mohl sought compatibility with a liberal constitutional system by revitalizing the corpus of *Polizeiwissenschaften*. The result was that the “curse of the *Polizeistaat* imposed on political life and thought a half-century of fruitless struggle for and against its principles.”<sup>44</sup> In the nineteenth century use of the *police state* term was relatively rare in English, but when it was employed it was usually coupled with moral condemnation, so there was no similar conflict with advocates of a more positive use of the term.

*Turf Constraints.* A probable third factor inhibiting convergence was the by-product of structural differentiation in the nineteenth-century administrative reforms. Between 1815 and 1870 the control over Continental internal administration came to be partly dispersed from the Interior Ministry to other ministries and boards. What had been subordinate bureaus and divisions within the Interior Ministries were detached and became ministries in their own right. Nonetheless, although the new ministries came to acquire regulatory powers in their special fields, “the enforcement of these regulations remained very clearly a matter for the police authority under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. In the provinces the ordinance-making power still formally rested with the Ministry of Interior’s officials.”<sup>45</sup> This illustration is French, but Prussia and Austria also prevented any wide dispersal of the police powers. Thus the newly created public works or education ministries could not lay claim to the *police* concept, since both the old *policey* and the changing police powers still remained in the “jurisdiction” of the Interior Ministries.

*Effects on the Politik Term.* During the nineteenth century language change accompanied structural change. Gradual advances toward constitutionalism facilitated the reception into German of some key English terms, most notably *Parlamentarismus* and *Partei-system*.<sup>46</sup> By contrast, convergence of *Policey* with its “twin” term *policy* was aborted, probably for reasons that we have suggested. In effect, a distinct term for “a course of political action” slithered out of grasp on the heavily greased public stage. Semantically this led to increasing the overload on the term *Politik*. Thus diachronic conceptual analysis could supply an explication of how, and even

why, their language left German-speaking political scientists “in the lurch.” It can help us to understand why the word *Politik* in contemporary usage is found to be of low value and distinctiveness, “comparatively undifferentiated in its contemporary meaning, unspecific and unambitious, or even indistinct and incommensurate.”<sup>47</sup>

Nineteenth-century development also overloaded the *politics* term in other Continental languages. Sartori utilized another framework in an article originally written for an Italian language history of political ideas. Referring to concepts previously distinguished in Latin, he notes that “the fact that in the 19th century all these terms came together under the word ‘politics’ represents a . . . spectacular change. . . . we have in little more than a century a succession of earthquakes. It is no wonder, therefore, that the word politics currently evokes a mess.”<sup>48</sup>

This suggests that Italian paralleled the German development in the degree to which there was a concentration of meanings in an omnibus *Politik* term. It would seem that German is generally representative of Continental developments. Generally those systems that followed paths toward high stateness, either in the early absolutist or in the later nineteenth-century constitutionalist stage, seemed to end up without the ability to distinguish between the alternative meanings that were, in some form, more available earlier. In French, Russian and almost all the other Continental languages the meanings of *policey* were, insofar as they were not caught up by the narrower “police concept” of the constitutional era, compounded into omnibus terms like *politique* and *Politica*. In various ways the trends in the nineteenth century culminated in situations in which a single term preempted the entire semantic field. Thus attempts to circumvent the conundrum that we have examined in the German case by attaching the meaning of policy to a term from *outside* the family of *polis/politeia* derivatives seems to have been successful in only one Continental language. That language, Dutch, is used in a country that can be seen to share with Britain certain “low stateness” tendencies during important phases of its nation-building.<sup>49</sup>

#### FROM DIACHRONIC TO SYNCHRONIC ANALYSIS

*Placing “Policy.”* Most of the terms we have examined can be shown to fall in one of the three groups which Koselleck holds are

distinguishable on the basis of diachronic analysis. *Politics*, *Politik* and *politique* seem examples of "traditional concepts such as those of Aristotelian constitutional thought whose meanings have in part persisted." The French *police* and German *Polizei*, on the other hand, are examples of "concepts whose content has changed so radically that despite the existence of the same word as a shell the meanings are barely comparable, and can only be recovered historically." The nineteenth-century term *Polizeistaat* as well as recent German terms like *Politikfelder* and *Politiken* seem examples of a third category, that of "recurrently emerging neologisms reacting to specific social or political circumstances."<sup>50</sup>

It is the *policy* term which is most difficult to place in one of these categories. It is not a traditional concept, building on the Aristotelian or any other school. It is a concept whose meanings have changed, but not really radically since the time when some of the earlier meanings were transferred to other terms in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And while the intensity of its usage has certainly varied both in general and academic vocabulary, it has not been a neologism. So a diachronic analysis does not lead us to a simple conclusion. More remains to be done.

*How Does "It" Matter?* In shifting gears to employ synchronic analysis, we can attempt a pragmatic contrast with contemporary problems of cross-national equivalence with the concept of "state." In Sartori's view anyone dealing with the topic of the state in English is handicapped, "for he will miss much of what has been elaborated, in the other languages, in terms of an abstract, juridical and also philosophical theory of the state." The Anglo does not "see" the state, the Continental does or thinks he does.

The problems that Continentals face with the less-differentiated *Politik* term, by contrast, seems particularly related to the "slicing" aspect of words. There is a parallel to how languages differ in naming fewer or more colors distinctively. Does the person using the more limited vocabulary become colorblind to the other colors? "Almost certainly not. It does imply, however, that the colors which are named acquire perceptive prominence, and secondly that the fewer the categories, the greater the range and diffuseness of the colors that are being singled out."<sup>51</sup>

Many Continental political scientists hold that they and other "insiders" of the political sphere can tell from the context of a sentence or thought pattern whether a speaker is employing the terms *Politik* or *politique* in the sense of policy or in the sense of politics.

They believe, in other words, that the problem of the “missing term” is surmountable, and that a series of contextual and amplification mechanisms make it feasible to transpose distinctions between policy and politics fairly uniformly into the Continental languages.

I have attempted to test this hypotheses by sending to the press attaches of various European embassies in Washington the text of a *New York Times* editorial, which denigrated the case for an American industrial policy, and symbolized this by the heading:

*Industrial Policy = Industrial Politics*

I asked them how they would translate its heading if they were asked to replicate its meaning as well as possible for a translation into their respective languages.

The gist of the replies varied quite a bit, even for countries using the same language. Thus the *French* Embassy thought it should be translated as:

*“La politique industrielle = les politiques de l’industrie.”*

But the *Belgian* Embassy suggested a different version:

*“Politique industrielle = politique politicienne de l’industrie.”*

The *Spanish* Embassy interpreted still differently:

*“Una politica industrial = Politica industrial Global.”*

The respondent from the West German Embassy had no trouble translating the first term of the equation as *Industriepolitik*, but could find no briefer way of putting the second than “parteilpolitische Auffassung von der Foerderungswuerdigkeit bestimmter Industriezweige.”

I would hold that this modest attempt at synchronic analysis shows that the amplificatory mechanisms do not seem to work very well, and that if these respondents had difficulty in handling the “slicing” problem of distinguishing the two meanings, so will most other insiders, with and through whom political scientists try to convey their analyses. So the general problem addressed here should not be considered as being only of antiquarian interest, anymore than it can be labelled as only being of legitimate concern for students of linguistics.

*Biases in Accentuation.* It is illuminating to contrast differences in the way that twentieth-century theorists grappling with the concept of the political have approached the task within the English and German traditions. One characteristic attempt in English makes substantial use of the *policy* term.

Politics is involved whenever the policies of one community of non-assignable individuals conflict with those of another. . . .

Politics is concerned with the choice and effective adoption and pursual of public policies. . . .

Anything that may effect the shaping and formulation or nonformulation of policy may fairly be counted as political.<sup>52</sup>

Recognizing that the “body politic is. . . an arena of claims, privileges, rights and obligations,” Montefiore accepts that “rival attempts to demarcate this body” will generate “differing definitions of the ‘political,’ ” *one among which is* “characterizing the political in terms of relationships between friend and foe.”

By contrast Carl Schmitt’s similar attempt to grapple with the concept of the political in the German language and high-state-ness inheritance lays out the categorical prescription that

*The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and foe (enemy).*<sup>53</sup>

Although the policy concept has since Lasswell been new-modeled for political scientists, *policy* is not a new term. But the contours of its earlier evolution are murky, since we lack any sound etymological study of the term in the Anglo-American context. Such an effort might help to further clarify to what extent Anglophones have enjoyed a conceptual advantage over the “deprived” Continentals since the nineteenth century. If Anglophone political scientists have been fortunate in their linguistic inheritance, has this advantage been partly dissipated by insufficient attention to conceptual honing and refinement. Not willing to define public policy as any action by the “state,” they have typically accepted that “many private activities have the appearance of being products of public policy if for no other reason than that they are tolerated by governmental decision-makers.” This leads to virtually conceding that “anything in society can be considered a public policy because public officials allow it to exist.”<sup>54</sup> Thus, although unlike the Continentals Anglophones *could* utilize the term *nonpolicy*, they have left it conceptually underdeveloped.

Many Continentals who have studied the American policy literature assiduously share strong reservations about how well developed a concept it really is. Do they and their colleagues therefore think they are better off by *not* using the English terms, and rather sticking by their undifferentiated *Politik* term? Hardly. In a survey

precisely to this question, fully three-quarters of West German political scientists said in 1984 that they found the English-language way of decomposing the German *Politik* concept as either “meaningful” or “conditionally meaningful.”<sup>55</sup>

Perhaps the context of this reception is not too different from that accorded the concept of “interest” in the seventeenth century. “As happens so frequently with concepts that are suddenly thrust to the center of the stage,” as Hirschman has written, “interest appeared so self-evident a notion that nobody bothered to define it precisely.” But the new concept was a welcome addition to the two concepts which had previously dominated discussion of human motivations, passions on the one hand and reason on the other. “A message of hope was therefore conveyed by the wedging of interest in between the two traditional categories of human motivation. Interest was seen to partake in effect of the better nature of each, as the passion of self-love upgraded and contained by reason, and as reason given direction and force by passion.”<sup>56</sup>

This parallel reminds us that we have not made much reference to the term *polity*, the third of the “polis-family of words.” Not possessing this term in the contemporary vocabulary is less of a handicap for Continentals, since its meaning is largely encompassed within most usages of the term *state*. But when they do employ the *polity* term, political scientists from systems with strong state traditions sometimes articulate a relationship between polity and politics which most Anglophone readers would find somewhat contrived. Thus Rohe writes that “Somewhat more of ‘polity’ induces somewhat less of ‘politics’. . . . He who demands more polity asks for more rules of the game, more commonalities, more political neutralizations. . . . Carried to the extreme this would mean that ‘politics’ is crushed and asphyxiated by an excess of ‘polity.’”<sup>57</sup> For the Anglophone to follow this train of thought he might almost need to have recourse to the loaded concept of “police state.”

Some theorists, like Frohock, hold that one *can* identify “rock-bottom ideas in the concept of politics.” One of these is “directiveness,” another is “aggregations.” Placing these ideas at the *core* of political discourse he conceptualizes a “metaphor of concentric circles.” Whereas the two central terms shape the core concept of politics, “moving to other circles, we find terms with lesser retentive power.” Perhaps many usages of the term *policy* may be located on one of these peripheral circles, away from the core, where “terms

can be retained or dismissed with diminishing effect on other sectors of the language field.<sup>58</sup>

In the context of this metaphor the Continental languages may be said to have only one term because the fuller institutionalization of stateness preempted the entire set of circles for *Politik*. Among German scholars this dilemma has stimulated either "heroic" and historicist attempts to nevertheless identify central meanings, like that of Carl Schmitt, *or* lamentations about decline of conceptual purity, like those of Dolf Sternberger, *or* incorporations of English terms as auxiliary mechanisms, as in the case of Karl Rohe. Such efforts are probably a reflection of the fact that *Politik* has been a more "essentially contested concept" in German than its equivalents have been in English. But the presently growing acceptance of the term "Politik as Policy" can also be seen as the latest in a long history of phases of convergence and divergence in the way that these concepts are termed in the major Western languages.<sup>59</sup>

#### NOTES

The author retains all rights to any further use of the material published here.

The initial stimulus for this research was the realization that my coauthors (Carolyn Adams and Hugh Heclo) and I could write a book on *Comparative Public Policy*, but that ironically that title was very difficult to translate into the languages of most of the countries which were the subject of our comparative analyses. The attempt to probe this problem benefited from a lot of patient counseling from numerous friends and colleagues, and I would like to express particular gratitude especially to John Armstrong, Stuart Lakoff, David Laitin, Karl Rohe and Giovanni Sartori. Others who provided helpful comments or provided useful insights were Carl Böhret, the late Marshall Durbin, Dell Hymes, Alan Kirkness, Reinhart Koselleck, Elizabeth Leinfellner, Geoffrey Nunberg, Walter Ong, Rupprecht Paque, Ekart Pankoke, Hans-Juergen Puhle, Marc Raeff, Carter Revard, Richard Rose, Robert Salisbury, Dolf Sternberger and Tracy Strong. An initial version of this paper was presented at the International Political Science Congress in Rio in 1982, and subsequent versions benefited from comments at the American Political Science meeting in 1983, and at seminars given at several German and Dutch universities in 1984.

<sup>1</sup> One tendency among the Continentals has been to coin appropriate terms. Thus the West German political scientists have sought to introduce the term *Politikfelder* as a surrogate for policy studies. The French and French-Canadians, even more anxious to find an alternative to just importing the English term, have tried to accentuate gender differences by distinguishing between *le politique* for "politics" and *la politique* and *les politiques* for "policies."

<sup>2</sup> Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinion, Times, etc.* (London: Grant Richards, 1900), 2:248 (italics added).

<sup>3</sup> Dolf Sternberger; "Politics' in Language: Twelve Notes on the History of

Words and Meanings: in *Language and Politics*, ed. Maurice Cranston and Peter Mair (Brussels: Bruylant, 1982), pp.26, 31.

<sup>4</sup> Giovanni Sartori, "Guidelines for Concept Analysis," in *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis*, ed. G. Sartori (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984), pp.15-16,51.

<sup>5</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, "Begriffsgeschichte and Social History," *Economy and Society*, 11:4 (November 1982), 409-427. German version in Reinhart Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979), pp. 107-129.

<sup>6</sup> Quentin Skinner, "Language and Social Change," in *The State of the Language*, ed. Leonard Michaels and Christopher Ricks (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 564.

<sup>7</sup> Heinz Eulau, "The Interventionist Synthesis" in "The Place of Policy Analysis in Political Science," *American Journal of Political Science*, 21:2 (May 1977), 420.

<sup>8</sup> "La langue anglaise presente un meilleur outillage terminologique avec trois substantifs, *politics*, *policy*, *polity* et deux épithètes, *politic* and *political*. . . . La terminologie anglaise plus riche . . . nous suggère d'abord des réponses objectives aux mêmes questions: Quoi? Le political dans la polity. Comment? Par les politics, que leus actes soient politic ou non. Pourquoi? Pour une policy ou des policies" (Gerard Bergeron, *La gouverne politique* [Paris: Mouton and Quebec: Laval, 1977], p. 150) (italics added).

<sup>9</sup> "*Policy* and *politics* gehören zu jeder Politik und lassen sich als unterscheidbare Dimensionen politischen Handelns erkennen . . . Man könnte formulieren das Politik die Verwirklichung von Politik—*policy*—mit Hilfe von Politik—*politics*—auf der Grundlage von Politik—*polity*—ist . . . . Begriffe wie Verwaltung, Planung, oeffentliche Angelegenheiten . . . stellen den Begriff *policy* in den Mittelpunkt. Kreist das politische Denken dagegen um Begriffe wie Macht, Herrschaft, Konflikt, Partizipation..dürfte eine stärkere *politics*-Orientierung vorliegen" (Karl Rohe, *Politik: Begriffe und Wirklichkeiten* [Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1978], pp. 65, 68, 80).

<sup>10</sup> Roger Brown, *Words and Things: An Introduction to Language* (New York: Free Press, 1958), p. 259.

<sup>11</sup> Dell Hymes, "Linguistic Aspects of Comparative Political Research," in *The Methodology of Comparative Research*, ed. Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner (New York: Free Press, 1970), p. 320.

<sup>12</sup> Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941), pp. 88-89.

<sup>13</sup> Karl Rohe, *Politik*, p.62.


<sup>14</sup> See next page for full page footnote.

Source: Ruth Schulte, "Intelligence," in Sprachwissenschaftliches Colloquium Bonn, Kurzmonographien (Europäische Schlüsselwörter: Wortvergleichende and Wortgeschichtliche Studien, Vol.II), (Munich: Hueber, 1964), p. 46.

<sup>15</sup> Harvey C. Mansfield, "On the Impersonality of the Modern State: A Comment on Machiavelli's Use of Stato," *APSR*, 77 (1983), 849-57.

<sup>16</sup> Kenneth Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and*

Overview of the Development of the Word *Intelligence* In European Languages



Source: Ruth Schulte, "Intelligence" in *Europäische Schlüsselwörter: Wortvergleichende und Wortgeschichtliche Studien*, vol. 2. (*Sprachwissenschaftliches Colloquium*, Bonn) (Munich: Hueber, 1964), 46.

*Institution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 37.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, p. 25.

<sup>18</sup> J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics*, 20 (1968), 559-92.

<sup>19</sup> Ernest Barker, cited by Dyson, *State Tradition in Western Europe*, p. 43.

<sup>20</sup> Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in *The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 32-35.

<sup>21</sup> Hans Maier, *Die Ältere Deutsche Staats und Verwaltungslehre* (Polizeiwissenschaft) (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1966), p. 121.

<sup>22</sup> Written about 1565 while Smith served as Queen Elizabeth's ambassador to the French Court, the volume proposes to chart or map "the form and manner of the government of England, and . . . the principal points wherein it doeth differ from the policy or government at this time used in France, Italy, Spain, Germany" and other countries which followed the Roman law (Sir Thomas Smith, *The Manner of Government or Policie of the Realm of England*, p. 142).

<sup>23</sup> Gerald Stourzh, "Staatsformenlehre und Fundamentalgesetze in England und Nordamerika im 17 und 18 Jahrhundert" in *Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, ed. Rudolf Vierhaus (Heidelberg: Schneider, 1981), pp. 294-335.

<sup>24</sup> R. A. Dorwart, *The Prussian Welfare State Before 1740* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 14.

<sup>25</sup> Its development into a powerful concept was nurtured from both sides of the Reformation struggles. But the elimination of the Church as a contestant for authority enabled the Protestant princes to monopolize regulatory power, and some of the German Protestant states intensified the use of policy ordinances in the latter sixteenth century. Marc Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change in the Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 56-69.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid* p. 41.

<sup>28</sup> Clive Emsley, *Policing and Its Context: 1750-1870* (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 99.

<sup>29</sup> Kenneth Dyson, *State Tradition in Western Europe*, p. 118.

<sup>30</sup> Marc Raeff, *Well-Ordered Police State*, p. 255.

<sup>31</sup> Rudolf Braun, "Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure and State-Building: Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia," in Tilly, *Formation of Nation States*, p. 299.

<sup>32</sup> But some of the states with highly developed *Polizey* rules and enforcement techniques showed a "definite trend toward "civilizing" criminal processes—that is the transformation of criminal delict and prosecution into a civil action or case in equity" (Raeff, p.135, *Well-Ordered Police State*). "Stateless" societies like England found that lack of an effective constabulary contributed to a

great increase the number of offenses which carried the death penalty. By 1819 there were 223 capital offenses in the English criminal law; in France there were six. David H. Bailey, "The Police and Political Development in Europe," in Tilly, *Formation of Nation States*, p. 353.

<sup>33</sup> Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1963), pp. 10-11.

<sup>34</sup> Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "Comparative Public Policy: The Past Decade in Perspective," *Journal of Public Policy*, 5:4 (November, 1985).

<sup>35</sup> Brian Chapman, *Police State* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 50.

<sup>36</sup> Adam Smith, *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Chicago: *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1952), pp. 2, 42, 51, 170.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 110, 318. Elsewhere, in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith wrote: "The perfection of police, the extension of trade and manufacturers, are noble and magnificent objects." Haakonssen notes that here "Smith strikes that perfect equipoise between irony and encomium which is so typical of him." This posture of Smith, as an ironic commentator on how concepts were tossed around on both sides of the Channel, probably also reduced the chances that his transposition techniques could serve as a model which others could comfortably follow. (Knud Haakonssen, *The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith* [Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981], pp. 91, 95).

A modern scholar on Smith as a mediator of German and English language influences notes that the translators of the German editions of *Wealth of Nations* in 1776 and 1794 utilized the term "europäische Polizey" to capture the meaning of "the policy of Europe" (Erik Erämetsä, *Adam Smith als Mittler englisch-deutscher Spracheinflüsse* [Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Series B, Vol. 125. Helsinki, 1961], p. 95).

Smith's influential German academic followers, like Christian Jacob Kraus, holder of the cameralistics chair at Königsberg, followed through on Smith's terminological innovation in their own influential works, and a later American author translates the subject of Kraus' *Polizey* lectures as dealing with "policy" and kindred subjects (Carl William Hasek, *The Introduction of Adam Smith's Doctrines Into Germany* [Studies in History, Economic and Public Law, No. 261, New York: Columbia University, 1925] p.86).

<sup>39</sup> Albion Small, *The Cameralists* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909), p. 509.

<sup>40</sup> "In German-speaking areas it can be shown that from 1770 onwards both new meanings for old words and neologisms proliferate, altering with the linguistic arsenal of the entire political and social space of experience, and establishing new horizons of expectations" (Reinhart Koselleck, "Begriffsgeschichte and Social History," pp. 409-427).

<sup>41</sup> Johann Georg Krünitz, "Polizey," *Ökonomisch-technologische Encyclopädie*, vol. 114 (Berlin: 1810), 175-471." Da Die Polizey keinen eigenen Gegenstand hat, woraus ihre Gränzbestimmung hergenommen werden könnte, sondern dass sie mit allen Theilen der Staatsverwaltung, aber nur auf ihre eigentümliche Art gemeinschaftlich mitwirkt; so folgt von selbst, dass ebenso viele Äste der Polizey sein müssen, als es Zweige der Regierungsgeschäfte gibt."

Later in the article the author notes that "in almost all European languages two words have come to be formed, *Politik* and *Polizey*, with the former referring to the entire body of wisdom of the state and the latter referring to only part of it." Because of the disagreement about what *Polizey* refers to, and many dozens of deviating definitions are cited, he considers possibly giving up usage of the term in scientific discourse. But then he concludes that "word reforms are often more difficult than substantive reforms" it was the better part of wisdom to make do with the existing terms (p. 206).

<sup>42</sup> Volker Sellin, "Politik," *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett, 1983), 4:789-874.

<sup>43</sup> Georg Christoph von Unruh, "Polizei, Polizeiwissenschaft und Kamera-Listik" in KG.A. Jeserich, et al, eds. *Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichte*, Vol. II, 1983, p. 425; Maier, *Die Altere Deutsche Staats und Verwaltungslehre*, p. 244. In academic settings more instrumental state theories sought to eclipse the regimenting traditions by gradually substituting the label and concept of administration for that of police. Thus although *Polizeiwissenschaften* continued to be taught into the 1860s, they were gradually replaced by *Verwaltungswissenschaften*. One might have expected that this shift toward administrative perspectives might have favored the emergence of a suitable, more neutral and more adaptable policy term and concept, but it didn't.

<sup>44</sup> Kurt Wolzendorff, *Der Polizeigedanke des modernen Staats* (Breslau: Markus, 1918), p. 165.

<sup>45</sup> B. Chapman, *Police State*, p. 34.

<sup>46</sup> Anthony W. Stanforth, "Deutsch-englischer Lehnwortaustausch" in *Wortgeographie und Gesellschaft*, ed. Walther Mitzka (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968), p. 548.

<sup>47</sup> Dolf Sternberger, "Das Wort 'Politik' und der Begriff des Politischen." *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 24 (1983), 6-14.

<sup>48</sup> Giovanni Sartori, "What Is 'Politics'?" *Political Theory*, 1 (1973), 5-26.

<sup>49</sup> The Dutch term *beleid* presently embraces meanings like course of action, set of actions, planning and prudence, which make it very similar to the English *policy*. It is derived from the key verb *leiden*, meaning "to lead" or "to make go," and it is similar to another term used by Dutch political scientists, *bestuur*, meaning "to steer," which is a term for administration. *Beleid* has roots in medieval Dutch and developed many meanings into the seventeenth century, then became partially obsolete in the nineteenth century, but was revived in the twentieth century. See Gijs Kuypers and Jaap Verhoog, "Politics/Policy: The Dutch Context" (Paper delivered at the 1983 Meeting of the American Political Science Association). Why such a term was developed in Dutch and not in Early High German, how this can be related to concepts of stateness, and the presence of *policy* traditions are questions well worth further investigation.

<sup>50</sup> Koselleck "Begriffsgeschichte and Social Theory," p. 417.

<sup>51</sup> Sartori, "Guidelines for Concept Analysis," pp. 18-20.

<sup>52</sup> Alan Montefiore, "The Concept of the Political," in *Neutrality and Impartiality*, ed. A. Montefiore (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 40-41, 276-8.

<sup>53</sup> Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (New Brunswick: Rutgers Uni-

versity Press, 1976), p. 26.

<sup>54</sup> Richard I. Hofferbert, *The Study of Public Policy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), pp. 6-7.

<sup>55</sup> Hans-Hermann Hartwich, ed. *Policy-Forschung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ihr Selbstverständnis und Ihr Verhalten zu den Grundfragen der Politikwissenschaft* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1985), p. 462.

<sup>56</sup> Albert Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

<sup>57</sup> Rohe, *Politik*, p. 79.

<sup>58</sup> Fred M. Frohock, "The Structure of 'Politics,'" *American Political Science Review*, 72 (1978), 867.

<sup>59</sup> Kari Palonen's effort at an interpretation of the macrohistory of the *Politik* concept, which seeks to distinguish various *Politik* conceptions in a broad spectrum of German writing up to 1933, reached me after conclusion of this article. He makes an interesting attempt to search for something like a proto-concept for "Politik as Policy," long before any German used this expression. His report is negative in the sense that he can find no reshaped and reflected articulation of the *Politik* concept which could be said to have adequately anticipated the subsequent formulation. He traces the attempts by Kelsen and others to break the previous tight conceptual link between "Politik" and "State" but concludes that these efforts to counter the "Politik from above" perspective were not radical enough to permit the "Politik as policy" perspective to achieve a breakthrough up to 1933. He sees attempts in this direction as coming more from neo-Kantians, whereas such dynamic philosophical tendencies of the interwar period as existentialism and phenomenology are regarded exerting inhibiting effects. Kari Palonen, *Politik als Handlungsbegriff: Horizontwandel des Politikbegriffs in Deutschland 1890-1933* (Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium, 28) (Helsinki: Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, 1985) pp. 113-14.