

Turkey's Public Diplomacy in Flux

From Proactive to Reactive Communication

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In the Driving Seat of Turkey's Public Diplomacy

Turkey is a new actor in the public diplomacy scene, but it is experienced in engaging in various communication activities since its establishment as a modern republic.¹ Nonetheless, Turkey's rapid rise and equally quick decline in its global reputation during the tenure of the AKP makes it one of the most intriguing case studies in public diplomacy. Together with Turkey's rising global presence, Turkish political elite believed Turkey's story should be shared with the rest of the world. The motto of Turkey's public diplomacy is "Turkey has a message and story to share." This motto stems from the assumption that Turkey's problems arise from being misunderstood and not being able to explain itself clearly. For that reason, Turkey's public diplomacy is in fact tied to its reputation and whether Turkey still has an appealing story to tell the world.

There are a number of internal and external drivers behind Turkey's growing interest in public diplomacy as a strategic communication activity. First, Turkey has experienced a steadily growing economy, particularly during the second half of the 2000s.² This economic growth has enabled Turkey to strengthen and establish new state-run institutions while simultaneously utilizing them for its foreign outreach. Turkey's relative economic progress has by extension increased its diplomatic presence across Africa, while expansion of air-travel routes has contributed to Turkey's soft-power capacity.³ Together with the economic prosperity, Turkey invested in establishing various state institutions undertaking educational exchanges, international broadcasting, advocacy, and cultural diplomacy. However, Turkey's economic downturn in the second half of the 2010s, which worsened in 2018, impacted funding, human resources, and planning of Turkey's public diplomacy apparatus. While Turkish Airlines and Turkey's diplomatic network are still expanding, the extent of their sustainability in current economic crisis is questionable.

Turkey's new foreign policy vision laid the foundation of its public diplomacy.⁴ In contrast to earlier, yet sporadic efforts, public diplomacy as a communication strategy has been part and parcel of Turkey's outreach initiatives under the consecutive Justice and Development Party (AK Parti or AKP) governments. Public diplomacy efforts predominantly took form under Ahmet Davutoğlu's strategic-depth vision, a policy approach that draws from Turkey's historical,

geographical, and cultural ties to nearby states.⁵ Subsequently, Turkey has relied on the attractiveness of its soft-power assets based on cultural affinity with Central Asia, as well as some of the other regions that the country engages with.⁶ Underlining Turkey's cultural affiliations was a fundamental element in the Davutoğlu-era foreign policy doctrine, in which Turkey sought better ties with the nations established under the former Ottoman territories. During these novel public diplomacy efforts, the AKP government initially assigned Turkey's public diplomacy to their one-time political ally, the network led by self-exiled Muslim clergy Fethullah Gülen.⁷ The Gülenist schools, their cultural organizations and think tanks, were major components of establishing Turkey's international communication network and creating long-lasting relationships. Following the fallout between the political allies, the Turkish state lost its access to various communities across the globe, particularly in Africa and the United States.⁸

In the present day, Turkey is investing in building its own public diplomacy infrastructure, strengthening those that already exist, and engaging in a communication offense. The cumulative economic and political drivers of Turkey's public diplomacy has prompted the establishment of institutions emphasizing cultural and educational exchanges with regions of strategic importance to Turkey. Yunus Emre Cultural Institute (YEE), Turkey's own version of cultural foundations; Directorate of Overseas Turks (YTB), Turkey's diaspora agency; and professional exchange programs were key endeavors of this era, emphasizing Turkey's cultural affinity and kinship with its region. Endeavors during the strategic-depth/zero-problems era underscored Turkey's relations with its immediate region and aimed to make Turkey more appealing as a role model in the Middle East. Throughout the first decade of the ruling AKP government, Turkey exerted itself as a rising regional actor by pursuing a value-oriented foreign policy and engaging in dialogue in Somalia, Myanmar, and Syria.⁹ Nonetheless, Davutoğlu's departure from office and the continuous crisis mode in Turkey resulted in a de-emphasis on soft-power attraction. In this regard, current public diplomacy, particularly post-coup attempt, reflects a shift to a more situational and reactive communication structure that is grounded in crisis communication.

Turkey recognized problems with its global reputation when facing international scrutiny over its historical policies vis-à-vis Kurds and Armenians, two major pressing issues challenging Turkey's reputation.¹⁰ These issues were slowly beginning to see some reforms in the social and political sphere predominantly from 2011 to 2015. Several attempts of political and structural reforms in regards to the Armenian, Jewish, Kurdish, Alevi, and Roma communities have been critical to Turkey's democratization discourse.¹¹ As a result of these developments, the communication of these positive changes taking place within Turkey, especially at a time when Turkey was invested in the European Union (EU) membership accession, became one of the drivers for Turkey's public diplomacy. Consequently, state-sponsored publications, documentaries, exhibitions, concerts, and conferences highlighted this change.¹² Turkey's soft power and public diplomacy at that time was directly correlated with its democratic reforms other than Turkey's own political elite.¹³ However, following the parliamentary elections in 2015, the reforms vis-à-vis minorities also lost momentum due to the rising nationalistic sentiments and the fall back into security priorities. As of this writing in 2018, democratization reforms have stalled and Turkey has become a more insular society as opposed to having a more open society during the EU-fostered reforms. For that reason, Turkey needs to explain itself and justify its undemocratic actions to global audiences.

The Turkish government faced a coup attempt in July 2016, for which the government sees the Gülenist network responsible and subsequently has recognized as a terrorist organization. The coup attempt was followed by attempts to inform foreign audiences in respect to the Gülenist network and the coup attempt. The failed coup not only galvanized the domestic populist rhetoric but also boosted Turkey's efforts in circulating its own narrative in both domestic and international spheres. A large number of social media accounts and websites were created under the

auspices of state-sponsored organizations, nonprofits, and government-affiliated think tanks.¹⁴ State agencies also distributed print and online publications in multiple languages that offered Turkey's official account of the coup attempt.¹⁵ TRT World, Anadolu Agency (AA), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) countered undesired narratives in a synchronized effort by utilizing various digital and print media in many languages. These efforts have been directed towards the domestic and foreign audiences, thus making Turkey's public diplomacy more interconnected with domestic developments and constituents. On the international public diplomacy front, Turkey is emphasizing relationship-building efforts in Central Asia and Africa through international exchanges and cultural diplomacy in order to curb the existing power of the Gülenist network. As a result, Turkey's public diplomacy post-2016 has an additional layer of agenda setting, that of informing and pleasing domestic audiences.

Turkish foreign aid, such as its humanitarian and development aid, have been integral to Turkey's global communication efforts and its brand identity as a "donor state" and "benevolent country."¹⁶ Turkey has a strong network of government and nongovernment actors in its public diplomacy toolkit that provide foreign aid and emphasize Turkey's nation brand.¹⁷ The politics and rhetoric of humanitarian aid highlights Turkey's historical connections with the generous Ottoman image in congruence with contemporary aid initiatives. The overarching narrative situates Turkey as a safe harbor for immigrants throughout the Ottoman and modern Turkish histories.¹⁸ Under consecutive AKP governments, Turkey has provided foreign aid to countries in dire need such as Somalia, Palestine, Myanmar, Haiti, and Ecuador. Turkey's activism in Somalia is an integral part of its foreign aid efforts and has been communicated to domestic and foreign audiences. In 2014, with \$74.5 million, Somalia was the fourth largest recipient of Turkish aid after Syria, Tunisia, and Kyrgyzstan.¹⁹ Turkey is also the fourth largest donor to Somalia, after the United Kingdom, United States, and EU.²⁰ Aside from foreign aid, Turkey invests in Somalia's education, transportation, agriculture, and health by bringing in the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD).²¹ Simultaneous to these developments, Turkey has opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia, further expanding its hard-power capacity and presence in Somalia.²² Turkish foreign aid is part and parcel of its branding but also a way to justify its value-oriented foreign policy discourse.

While aid to other parts of the world remains important, the Syrian refugee crisis is a cornerstone of Turkey's foreign aid. It serves as a functional and a communicative perspective and relief efforts are instrumental in communicating Turkey's benevolent nation brand.²³ In 2015, Turkey was ranked as the second most generous donor country, partially due to its \$3.2 billion donation towards Syria and Syrian refugees.²⁴ Turkey is currently hosting over 3 million Syrian refugees, and has set up 21 refugee camps for over 200,000 refugees.²⁵ TIKA and AFAD oversee Turkey's foreign aid. TIKA was established in 1992 but has been transformed into a global aid agency under the AKP government. As an indirect result of this transformation, TIKA is currently utilized in promoting Turkey's image domestically and abroad.²⁶ AFAD works as an umbrella organization in Turkey and collaborates with other organizations overseeing emergency humanitarian relief.²⁷ AFAD has responded to disasters and emergencies taking place across the globe and has carried out humanitarian aid operations throughout the Arab uprisings in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. Both agencies have been leading Turkey's aid efforts in Somalia, Myanmar, and Syria.²⁸

The objectives of Turkey's public diplomacy are expanding its sphere of influence and explaining its message to shape global public opinion. In the aftermath of recent political turmoil, Turkey is placing an emphasis on disseminating its narrative and particularly incorporating Turkey's domestic shortcomings into its public diplomacy discourse. Its democratic backsliding and diplomatic rows with a number of neighboring countries, and its allies, in more recent years have

undermined Turkey's capacity to appeal to international audiences. As of 2018, Turkey's public diplomacy incorporates damage control, tactical offense, crisis communication, and countering discourse that harms Turkey's reputation. Continuous efforts to defend and justify its actions, particularly when it comes to human rights and democracy, hampers Turkey's once hopeful story. What remains from Turkey's public diplomacy is an inconsistent story and plethora of efforts that are not as appealing to Western audiences.

Overview of Turkey's Public Diplomacy Toolkit

Turkey's public diplomacy toolkit is comprised of advocacy, cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, and international broadcasting.²⁹ The institutions leading such initiatives have strong political affiliations with the ruling AKP, with the exception of the MFA. Therefore, oftentimes Turkey's public diplomacy is conducted on behalf of AKP rather than the state of Turkey. In 2018, Turkey transitioned into a presidential system that eliminated the seat of the prime minister and gave vast power to the president without any checks and balances. Under this new structure, President Erdoğan came to represent both the state apparatus and the government. Therefore, Turkey's public diplomacy has a simultaneous agenda to advocate and advance Erdoğanism.

Advocacy is a leading practice in Turkey's public diplomacy and is undertaken by several state institutions. The Turkish Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy (KDK) is the leading institution in Turkey that has the official mandate to coordinate public diplomacy activities. During the Davutoğlu era when Turkey paid attention to its global image, KDK was designing projects such as meeting with foreign press, journalism exchanges, roundtable discussions, and conference series.³⁰ KDK also has been instrumental in monitoring and publicizing Turkey's official development aid (ODA) among both domestic and international audiences by providing statistical data and infographics.³¹ However, since the reshuffle of the government in the snap elections of 2015, the Office of Public Diplomacy has become a defunct institution. Currently, the KDK is inactive and remains obsolete. As a result, at the moment a primary institution for Turkey's diplomacy only exists on paper. The vacuum is filled by other state agencies conducting their own version of public diplomacy initiatives, at times overlapping with one another.

The Prime Ministry's Directorate General of Press and Information (BYEGM), which in 2018 became the Ministry of Communication under the new presidential system, was another state agency in charge of information affairs and advocacy. The directorate published information booklets and conducts seminars and meetings in efforts to share Turkey's policy vision.³² The BYEGM also hosted foreign diplomatic delegations and has been involved in pro-Turkey advocacy in regard to Turkey's foreign policy.³³ In its current structure, the Ministry of Information is the main arm of Turkey's information efforts. One of the most important actors in Turkey's public diplomacy is the MFA, which oversees the promotion of Turkey's interests abroad and the advocacy of Turkey's policies. According to the Lowry Institute Digital Diplomacy Index Turkey is the eighth strongest diplomatic network in the world with 229 diplomatic posts.³⁴ More importantly, the MFA was ranked the 25th most expansive digital diplomacy network in the world in 2016.³⁵ In 2017 Turkey ranked 37th in the digital asset portfolio.³⁶ This vast diplomatic network allows Turkey's missions to do advocacy work and collaborate with other state institutions to develop cultural and aid programs. The MFA assists in the coordination of Turkey's public diplomacy activities abroad such as co-hosting film festivals, music engagement, exhibitions, and facilitating program development visits for aid agencies. The MFA has two offices that oversee public diplomacy. The Directorate General of Information (ENGM) was established in 2011 in order to share Turkey's narrative. ENGM dedicates its time to respond to allegations in the face of crises, thus are focused on crisis communication. The MFA is also engaged in Turkey's cultural promotion overseas through the Overseas Promotion and Cultural

Affairs (TKGM). In doing so, the MFA collaborates with other relevant institutions and organizations in its public diplomacy activities.

Cultural Diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy is another area in which Turkey is striving to have prosperity. The Yunus Emre Institute (YEE) is Turkey's leading cultural diplomacy actor. Established in 2007, the YEE is a partner in the Global PDNet and oversees cultural exchanges such as concerts, calligraphy workshops, film festivals, and various art classes.³⁷ It operates in 47 offices around the globe and is gradually expanding. Bringing students across the globe for Turkish Summer School, a month-long program in intensive Turkish classes, YEE aims to build bridges with students from different parts of the world. As a fairly new institution, the YEE is at arm's length to the Turkish government yet it is not immune to the domestic dimension of Turkey's public diplomacy. Likewise, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism is one of the most engaged actors in Turkey's public diplomacy when helping to promote its tourism, history, cinema, and other forms of fine arts. Aside from hosting and attending international tourism fairs, such as the World Expo, the Ministry of Culture has led a number of initiatives on digital platforms, such as *Come See Turkey*, *Turkey ... Home Of*, and *GoTurkey* in order to attract and engage international audiences. Turkey's geographical location as a major tourism hub in the Mediterranean and the civilizations that Anatolia has hosted over millennia play a central role in its cultural diplomacy discourse. In this regard, there are attempts to highlight Anatolian civilizations and new discoveries such as Göbeklitepe, the world's first temple and a site currently on the tentative list of world heritage sites.³⁸ *Turkey ... Home Of* campaign's 360 videos add an extra layer of user engagement for promoting Turkey's culture. Faith tourism is a very important part of Turkey's cultural diplomacy discourse as Anatolia is home to many different civilizations and is considered the cradle of faiths.³⁹ In this regard, as the faith tourism industry is growing Turkey is working on meeting its potential as a hub for this alternative tourism.⁴⁰ Aside from distributing promotional films on Turkey, the Ministry of Culture offers grants for art-house filmmakers to produce films that could have the potential to be represented in international festivals. In doing so, Turkey partners with Euroimages and award-winning films such as *Mustang*, *Yumurta*, *Uzak* among others.⁴¹ The Ministry of Culture also co-sponsors international sporting events in Turkey to bring awareness to Turkey's culture and at the same time to create platforms for engagement such as golf tournaments. In fact, the Turkish Airlines Euroleague Basketball and Turkish Airlines Open Golf Tournament are two globally recognized events.⁴² Public diplomacy scholar Efe Sevin defines The International Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY—Uluslararası Türk Kültürü Teşkilatı) as the region's United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). TÜRKSOY was established under the Turgut Özal administration at a time when Turkey recognized reaching out to non-Western countries. In operation since 1992, TÜRKSOY is one of the most well-established actors in Turkish public diplomacy in improving relations with the Turkic world. Since its establishment, TÜRKSOY developed programs to preserve and promote Turkic culture by way of commemoration events, scientific meetings, festivals, artist meetings, publications, and official meetings.⁴³ Aside from more traditional cultural diplomacy actors, Turkey is investing in engaging with Muslims in the Balkans and other communities with which Turkey has cultural affinity. Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is a key actor in facilitating that engagement.⁴⁴ It also serves as a platform to enforce Turkey's patronage especially onto the Balkans and imposes a state ideology.⁴⁵ In this regard, Diyanet is instrumental in diaspora building. Diyanet's more recent role in Turkey's public diplomacy is partially tied to the fallout with the Gülenist network. Previously the Gülenist

network has had strong links in Central Asia and assisted the government in their religious outreach to that region.⁴⁶ However today the state is using Diyanet's overseas offices to curb the Gülenist network and nourish relations with Western Balkan states particularly in Bosnia.⁴⁷

Educational Exchanges

Turkey has also been actively involved in educational exchanges first with Central Asia then with Europe, and eventually expanding its reach to other regions. As a result of its EU bid Turkey has been partaking in the ERASMUS program, which is designed to facilitate academic exchanges between Turkey and participating European states. The Turkish Higher Education Council (YÖK) has provided scholar and student exchange programs for decades particularly with European universities. Modeling on ERASMUS and similar educational exchange programs, the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) launched the Türkiye Bursları (Türkiye Scholarships) program in 2012 to foster international student mobility to Turkey. While there were scholarships available for international students under bilateral agreements going back to the 1960s, Türkiye Scholarships is the most comprehensive scholarship program funded by the Turkish state.⁴⁸ The undergraduate programs of Türkiye Scholarships target students in the affinity regions (the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia) and Africa.⁴⁹ These programs aim to build relationships and at the same time create networks of future leaders in developing nations who will gain appreciation for Turkey through their experiences as exchange students. A fairly new development in Turkey's educational exchanges is the establishment of the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF) in order to curb the influence of the Gülenist network in Africa and Central Asia.⁵⁰ Maarif Foundation's motto, "Our aim is to raise goodwilled people around the world," overlaps with Turkey's self-acclaimed role as a value-oriented, benevolent nation.⁵¹

International Broadcasting

Given the acute crises and the pressing need to share Turkey's position on key issues, Turkey launched an aggressive campaign to redesign its international broadcasting structure. AA, Turkey's national press agency, was established in 1920 to broadcast Turkey's voice in the international arena. In the past few years, AA expanded its base. Operating in 31 countries, AA expanded its news services in 13 languages, which are integral to Turkey's public diplomacy, thus Turkey's regional proximity.⁵² AA is also active in the digital sphere by posting infographics, news snippets, and news photos on social media platforms. Turkey's expansion into the international broadcasting market accelerated in the aftermath of the fallout between the Gülen network and the government. The failed coup attempt and Turkey's difficulties in its foreign affairs gave Turkey the impetus to put an emphasis on international broadcasting. TRT World was established as a result of these developments as part of Turkey's public broadcasting network. TRT World is an English-language 24-hour news channel based in Istanbul, Turkey with an aim to provide new perspectives on world events.⁵³ An overview of Turkey's public diplomacy structure shows there are plenty of institutions with an increasingly centralized control centered within the president's office. Many of these offices are occupied by political allies and associates rather than qualified individuals.

Does Turkey Still Have a Story to Tell?

Turkey's relative transformation that took place under the first two AKP governments was notable and was reflective of the way the rest of the world sees Turkey. Moreover, this transformative period marked by various democratizing reforms shaped the way Turkey situates itself in

world politics, so much so that soft power and public diplomacy became two core elements of Turkey's foreign policy in its attempts to gain global presence.⁵⁴ During the time public diplomacy was central to Turkey's international communication efforts to engage with foreign audiences. There was some degree of strategy behind Turkey's public diplomacy, especially under Ahmet Davutoğlu's tenure. EU-related reforms, Turkey's Western anchor and strong position within the transatlantic alliance fostered a positive story that Turkey could tell. However, recurring political turbulences shifted the attention to the domestic constituents and have resulted in a system where the objective is to please the domestic electorate and political elite. The domestic dimension of Turkey's public diplomacy, a natural flaw of public diplomacy practice in hybrid regimes, is reflected in the tasks and duties of Turkey's public diplomacy institutions and their overlapping agendas.⁵⁵ Centralization of power and authority under President Erdoğan makes Turkey's public diplomacy toolkit more susceptible to nepotism, corruption, and interference. Together with the decreased independence of public institutions there is less room for conducting public diplomacy as the interests of the Turkish state have coalesced with the interests of political elites.

As a result of the shifts and political affiliations within its public diplomacy toolkit Turkey's public diplomacy has a shortage of structure and institutionalization. Turkey is a constantly changing young country and is in a volatile region. It is uncertain whether Turkey's existing public diplomacy toolkit will survive and sustain itself even in a post-AKP or post-Erdoğan scenario given its lack of institutional structure. Currently, the interwoven mechanism of party politics and public diplomacy actors introduces a strong domestic dimension to Turkey's public diplomacy. As a result, Turkey's public diplomacy, particularly in broadcasting and advocacy, becomes synonymous with public affairs. In other words, telling Turkey's story to foreign audiences even through less politicized means such as culture is overshadowed by the Turkish government's reputation. Turkey's more recent outreach to foreign audiences does not have the same credibility as it once did and does not generate the interest it once provoked. At the moment Turkey is having a monologue with itself when it comes to communicating with foreign audiences, particularly a Western audience. Its cultural diplomacy and foreign aid, two areas Turkey is strong in, are also being challenged by Turkey's declining reputation. For that reason, Turkey's reach beyond friendly areas necessitates a broader strategy that includes institutionalization as well as reinstating its global appeal by putting its own house in order. However, in this period of political uncertainty, Turkey's public diplomacy fails to deliver a legitimate story of hope that it once had, especially to the West, and it lacks a cohesive strategy. Turkey is a striking example that demonstrates no good public diplomacy can save bad policies.

Notes

- 1 The establishment of the Anadolu Agency as its national news agency, its participation in international beauty pageants, the organization of İzmir international fair, participation in world Expos, and the establishment of agencies such as TÜRKSOY and TİKA in order to reach out to the Central Asian communities are a few examples of Turkey's outreach across the decades. See also Vedat Demir, "Historical Perspective: Ottomans and the Republican Era," in *Turkey's Public Diplomacy*, ed. Senem B. Çevik and Philip Seib (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 43–65; Efe Sevin, *Public Diplomacy and the Implementation of Foreign Policy In the US, Sweden and Turkey* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
- 2 Altay Atlı, "Businessman and Diplomats," *Insight Turkey*, 13, no. 1 (2011): 109–128; Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkey's Demonstrative Effect and the Transformation of the Middle East," *Insight Turkey* 13, no. 2 (2011): 33–55.
- 3 Orçun Selçuk, "Turkish Airlines: Turkey's Soft Power Tool in the Middle East," *Akademik Ortadoğu* 7 no. 2 (2013): 175–199.

- 4 For more on Turkey's foreign policy activism, see Zeynep Arkan and Müge Kınacıoğlu, "Enabling Ambitious Activism: Davutoğlu's Vision of a New Foreign Policy Identity for Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 17, no. 3 (2016): 381–405.
- 5 Ahmet Davutoğlu is the former chief foreign policy advisor to then prime minister Erdoğan (2002–2009), former minister of foreign affairs (2009–2014) and former prime minister (2014–2016) serving under consecutive AKP governments. As the minister of foreign affairs he led Turkey's foreign policy by his zero-problems policy and strategic-depth doctrine, two frameworks he introduced in his previous academic work. The strategic-depth doctrine situated Turkey as a regional power, a center country, and an order-instituting country building on humanitarian responsibility, including that of foreign aid. As such, Turkish policy makers, led by Davutoğlu, have argued that Turkey's foreign policy was grounded in moral values and that it drew on historical responsibility. Based on this doctrine, Turkey undertakes a strategic role in the global Muslim community and as a protector of Muslim nations. Therefore, an underlying reason for Turkey's foreign policy activism and public diplomacy towards the Ottoman territory has certain ideological roots. See Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring*, International Policy and Leadership Institute, SAM Vision Papers No. 3 (Ankara: Republic of Turkey MFA Center for Strategic Research, 2012), www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/bakanmakale_tepev.pdf; Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 41, no. 6 (2013): 865–870; Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 6 (2006): 945–964; Behlül Özkan, "Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism," *Survival* 56, no. 4 (2014): 119–140.
- 6 Sevin, *Public Diplomacy*.
- 7 Fethullah Gülen is a self-exiled Turkish Islamic clergyman who has a vast support network of followers across the globe, particularly in African countries, which has helped Turkey to open up to new markets. His network in Turkey was in a de facto political alliance in the early stages of AKP rule, however diverging political stances on several key issues caused a gradual fallout resulting in a full-fledged war in 2013. The government of Turkey accuses Gülen's followers of inciting the coup attempt and has thereby designated the network as a terrorist organization. Many of the top-level Gülen supporters have left Turkey while others remaining have been prosecuted or purged.
- 8 For the origins of the Gülenist network and its relations with the AKP see Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, "Delectation or Hegemony: Turkey's Religious Actors in South Eastern Europe and Central Asia," *Euxeinon* 23 (2017): 15–24.
- 9 More on AKP's values based discourse frames can be found in Ugur Cevdet Panayırıcı and Emre İşeri, "A Content Analysis of AKP's Honorable Foreign Policy Discourse: The Nexus of Domestic-International Politics," *Turkish Studies* 15, no. 1 (2014): 62–80.
- 10 Strained relations between Turkey and Armenia as a result of genocidal events dating back to the Ottoman era have been a major obstacle in Turkey's EU bid. Likewise, the prolonged conflict between the state apparatus and the Kurds ever since the Ottoman Empire results in massive internal displacements and oppression that continue to this date. The observants of the Alevi religious tradition have also been subjected to systematic assimilation and do not enjoy the same level of religious freedoms as Sunni Muslims do.
- 11 Ziya Öniş, "Sharing Power: Turkey's Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony," *Insight Turkey* 15, no. 2 (2013): 103–122.
- 12 In fact, in 2013 the Turkish government published a book in four languages titled *Silent Revolution: Turkey's Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002–2012* that praised Turkey's reforms under the AKP government and suggested that Turkey's progress was due to its reforms.
- 13 For example, the publication of the presidential chief advisor emphasizes Turkey's reforms and argues Turkey's soft power derives from its democratization. See İbrahim Kalın, "Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey," *Perceptions* 16, no. 3 (2011): 5–23.
- 14 Websites such as www.fetogercekleri.com, which is located on Twitter as @FetoGercekleri, by Bosphorus Global; www.15temmuzetkinlikleri.com; <http://15temmuzdirenisi.com>; <http://15temmuzsehritleri.com/> Anasayfa.
- 15 The Office of the Presidency has three publications and one documentary available on its website: www.tccb.gov.tr/en/activities/15july. TRT World published an informative booklet, see <http://researchcenter.trtworld.com/images/files/History-and-Memory.pdf>; extensive coverage of the coup attempt is also presented on <http://15.07.gov.tr/#home>.
- 16 Senem B. Çevik and Efe Sevin, "A Quest for Soft Power: Turkey and the Syrian refugee crisis," *Journal of Communication Management* 21, no. 4 (2017): 399–410; Turkey's foreign policy discourse on sub-Saharan Africa reflects the images of the major actors and how those actors aim to design Turkey's nation brand. See

- also Gökhan Bacık and İsa Afacan, "Turkey Discovers Sub-Saharan Africa: The Critical Role of Agents in the Construction of Turkish Foreign Policy Discourse," *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 3 (2013): 483–502.
- 17 Senem B. Çevik, "The Benefactor: NGO and Humanitarian Aid," in Senem B. Çevik and Philip Seib, eds., *Turkey's Public Diplomacy* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 121–152.
- 18 The notion of Turkey as a safe harbor takes credence from the Ottoman benevolence towards Sephardic Jews, Balkan migrations during the early twentieth century and in the 1980s, as well as the Kurdish refugee influx from Iraq between 1988 and 1991. Turkey's open borders policy to various refugees at different time periods is emphasized in Turkey. The Safe Harbor exhibition was curated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and toured across the globe, <https://en.unesco.org/events/exhibition-safe-harbour-turkey-restoring-hope>. Similar views can be found in Lincoln McCurdy, "Turkey's Safe Harbor," *The Hill*, July 8, 2015, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/247107-turkeys-safe-harbor>. TRT World is also an advocate of this term, see www.trtworld.com/turkey/turkeys-kilis-is-a-safe-haven-for-syrian-refugees-420407.
- 19 KDK website, <https://kdk.gov.tr/haber/turkiyenin-dis-yardimlari-2013/494>.
- 20 Kathryn Achilles, Onur Sazak, Thomas Wheeler, and Auveen Elizabeth Woods, *Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia: Risks and Opportunities For Building Peace* (Istanbul: Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Center, 2015).
- 21 M. Wasuge, *Turkey's Assistance Model in Somalia: Achieving Much with Little* (Mogadishu: Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2016).
- 22 Abdirahman Hussein and Orhan Coskun, "Turkey Opens Military Base in Mogadishu to Train Somali Soldiers," *Reuters*, October 1, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-turkey-military/turkey-opens-military-base-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-idUSKCN1C50JH
- 23 Çevik and Sevin, "A Quest for Soft Power."
- 24 GHA Report 2016, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, <http://devinit.org/post/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2016/#>
- 25 Amnesty International, 2016. For Turkey's refugee response see www.afad.gov.tr/en/2601/Turkey-Response-to-Syria-Crisis
- 26 Senem B. Çevik, "Narrating Turkey's Story: Communicating its Nation Brand Through Public Diplomacy," in *Middle Powers in Global Governance*, ed. Emel Parlar Dal (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 213–230.
- 27 AFAD About Us: www.afad.gov.tr/en/2572/About-Us
- 28 Gaye Asli Sancar, "Turkey's Public Diplomacy: Its Actors, Stakeholders and Tools," in *Turkey's Public Diplomacy*, ed. Senem B. Çevik and Philip Seib (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 43–66.
- 29 I did not include listening as a component of Turkey's public diplomacy due to the very limited amount of public opinion polling and public diplomacy evaluations. However, Turkey's network of state institutions in the Middle East, Balkans, and Central Asia are performing better in taking cultural variables in consideration before designing public diplomacy initiatives.
- 30 Sancar, "Turkey's Public Diplomacy."
- 31 KDK website, <https://kdk.gov.tr/verilerle-yukselen-turkiye>
- 32 Sancar, "Turkey's Public Diplomacy."
- 33 Office of the Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, www.byegm.gov.tr/English/activities/P9
- 34 Lowry Institute Global Diplomacy Index, https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowryinstitute.org/country_rank.html#
- 35 Digital Diplomacy Review 2016, <http://digital.diplomacy.live/ranking-and-rating>
- 36 Digital Diplomacy Review 2017, <http://digital.diplomacy.live/digital-diplomacy-atlas-2017>
- 37 Yunus Emre Institute Homepage, www.yee.org.tr/en
- 38 The Turkey Home campaign YouTube video on Göbeklitepe, www.youtube.com/watch?v=o8yfdIaDRac
- 39 Faith Tourism in Turkey, www.goturkeytourism.com/things-to-do/faith-tourism-in-turkey.html
- 40 Nuray Türker, "Religious Tourism in Turkey," in *Alternative Tourism in Turkey*, ed. Istvan Egresi, GeoJournal Library book series, vol. 121 (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2016).
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