


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## Nineteenth-century statecraft and the politics of moderation in the Franco-Prussian War

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In the nineteenth century there was a distinct form of moderation in European statecraft. This moderation worked within the broader the framework of the European concert where the exercise of prudence and forbearance acted as the measure of state conduct in European politics. The overarching intention behind moderation was to maintain a balanced, peaceful Europe. Using the context of the Franco-Prussian War, this study attempts to highlight the place of moderation in diplomacy, as contemporaries understood it. In doing so, it provides an enriched perspective of nineteenth-century statecraft.

**Keywords:** diplomacy; Great Power politics; moderation; the Franco-Prussian War

A number of historians posit that in nineteenth-century Europe, statecraft possessed a distinct character of restraint and moderation in diplomatic matters concerning European affairs.<sup>1</sup> Chief among them is Paul Schroeder, who argues in his authoritative monograph *The Transformation of European Politics, 1768–1848* that diplomacy after the Napoleonic Wars functioned as a concert system of restraint and balance.<sup>2</sup> In so doing, Schroeder attempts to uncover those ‘subtler, harder to detect’ historical forces that sought to ‘inhibit, control, limit, and ultimately direct change’.<sup>3</sup> The point of Schroeder’s work is to look at the mentalities or ‘deep structures’ behind European politics. Rather than viewing the teleological outcomes of diplomacy such as rivalry, treaties and warfare as the means and ends in and of themselves, Schroeder seeks to explain the thoughts and processes behind diplomatic conduct.<sup>4</sup> As Schroeder relates, many statesmen throughout the century believed at some level ‘that the European system had to be balanced for purposes of stability, peace, and a tolerable international atmosphere’.<sup>5</sup>

In a different historiographical tradition, historian Federico Chabod’s magisterial study of Italian diplomacy, *Italian Foreign Policy: The Statecraft of the Founders, 1870–1896*, is of equal consideration.<sup>6</sup> *Italian Foreign Policy* provides a superb example of the history of mentalities and its potential use in diplomatic history. Chabod sought to capture ‘*le premesse* [the premises]’ behind the European concert, political equilibrium and the general sense of Europeanism, which informed those Italian statesmen of the Cavourian Right during the post-unification years. While Schroeder’s argument tends to be singularly driven, Chabod attempts to elicit the kaleidoscopic world of statesmen, ideas and historical forces that collectively formed the hatchings of nineteenth-century diplomacy, particularly the idea of moderation in European politics. *Italian Foreign Policy* remains a study of skill and intelligence, providing a nuanced insight into the world of the Italian statesman. While Chabod’s observations are directed specifically at Italy’s post-*Risorgimento* context, such

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is the usefulness of his interpretative method that *le premesse* of moderate Italian statecraft can easily be broadened to the European-wide context.

Building upon the insights of both Schroeder and Chabod, this study provides an enriched perspective on nineteenth-century understandings of diplomacy. It argues that nineteenth-century statecraft often rested upon a number of key pragmatic and idealistic considerations. This mixture of pragmatism and idealism pointed to a type of moderation in diplomacy, which measured statecraft in terms of its prudence and forbearance, as well as the ability of states to work within a realm of restraint, limit and limitation. The purpose of this moderation was invariably to contain the excesses of revolution and war for the sake of a stable, peaceful Europe. Using the particular context of the Franco-Prussian War, this study explores this broad idea of moderation in nineteenth-century European politics, as contemporaries understood it.

The Franco-Prussian War itself provides a particularly significant context in which to consider the interplay of moderation in nineteenth-century Europe. During the Franco-Prussian War, the statesmen of the non-belligerent powers – Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Italy and Russia – demonstrated the role of moderation in nineteenth-century diplomacy, bringing to life Schroeder and Chabod's historiographical points. The actions of the non-belligerent powers revealed that while war was often a tool of foreign policy, moderation was likewise a tool of European statecraft, utilised within diplomatic contexts to affect strategic policy initiatives. Particularly as the two belligerents – France and Prussia – pursued their own immediate state interests against the broader interest of European stability, the non-belligerent's moderation highlights the often fraught tension between power politics and concert diplomacy in times of war where the future *status quo* of Europe was often contingent on one belligerent's victory over another. The actions of the non-belligerents were crucial in defining the extent to which the actions of the belligerents affected Europe. If left unchecked, war could dramatically upset European equilibrium. Policies of moderation by non-belligerent powers within a wartime context acted therefore to restrain and limit the effect of war, protecting as far as possible the status quo of European politics.

Moderation worked as part of the broader framework of the European concert. At the Concert of Vienna in 1815, the statesmen of the powers implicitly agreed to work in concert to safeguard the equilibrium of Europe.<sup>7</sup> The concert attempted, as well-known nineteenth-century jurist Pasquale Fiore put it, 'to reconcile the past and the present', by reaffirming the rights of states and placing a mandate for the future workings of Europe under the oversight of the Great Powers.<sup>8</sup> In essence, the concert meant that 'all international events that affected Europe, however small or divisive', as Maartje Abbenhuis contends, 'were understood to be the responsibility of the great powers and they were, and held themselves, responsible for mediating, restraining and organising solutions to benefit the system as well as to benefit themselves'.<sup>9</sup> Such largesse was in aid of the much wider goal of guaranteeing a genuine foundation of stability and permanency in Europe by guarding against revolution and war, both of which represented threats to the stability of the international system of Europe, each capable of drawing the continent into the vortex of anarchy and unchecked hegemony.<sup>10</sup>

The European concert, like a slow seed, gradually took root in nineteenth-century understandings of diplomacy. Within this framework, moderation was not a doctrine. Rather, it was a distinct mode of statecraft based on the normative standards of the concert and a general understanding of appropriate international conduct. By exercising moderation, statesmen implicitly surveyed the field of high politics not only with an appreciation of the objective nature of diplomacy, but also with an acute sense of the need

to achieve diplomatic means with a measure of restraint in order to preserve the peace of Europe. This diplomacy looked at the interests of the state with a broad, foresighted understanding of European politics. In that sense, true state interest was not based so much upon immediate gain. Rather, true state interest relied on contingency in the present and in the future, something that could only be achieved by adhering to the European concert, maintaining political equilibrium, and conducting foreign policy with fairness and reasonableness in mind. In this paradigm, the pursuit of immediate state interest through war was always a factor in the calculation of any Great Power strategy. However, moderation acted as a means of mitigating overzealous foreign policy, preventing the rule of power politics from dominating the international system. Moderation therefore acted as a policy of consensus, regularly employed by the majority of Great Powers against those powers acting immoderately within a specific diplomatic context in order to guard the political equilibrium of Europe.

During the Franco-Prussian War, moderation was widely understood by many statesmen. The Hohenzollern Crisis of July 1870 highlights this particularly. The crisis centred on the announcement of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a member of the Prussian royal house, as the candidate for the Spanish Throne. Leopold's candidature angered the Imperial French government, which since the Austro-Prussian War of 1867 harboured suspicions over the designs of Prussia. After King Wilhelm of Prussia withdrew the candidature in response to French pressure on 12 July 1870, the Imperial government further insisted that Wilhelm promise that no other Hohenzollern would be put forward as a candidate for the Spanish throne again. Failing to receive this assurance and after the Prussians published an 'insulting' telegram, France declared war on Prussia.

Considering the seriousness of war, the casual observer might well be tempted to relegate the events of the crisis to the realm of triviality. By nineteenth-century standards, many contemporaries thought the issue owed more to eighteenth-century dynastic politics rather than to modern statecraft.<sup>11</sup> British Foreign Secretary Earl Granville for one did not believe the Hohenzollern candidature to be of any consequence for France.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, in the interests of maintaining the peace of Europe, Granville assumed the role of mediator, advising the Prussians to exercise 'a wise and disinterested magnanimity' in withdrawing the candidature, noting pensively how 'some of the greatest calamities to the world have been produced by small causes, and by mistakes trivial in their origin'.<sup>13</sup> Granville was a statesman who did not hold much weight, in his words, to 'special interests', preferring instead to be guided by due process and order in diplomatic affairs.<sup>14</sup> The need to find Spain a monarch in order to restore the troubled nation to a state of stability as well as protect France's interests ultimately hinged on a greater need to preserve the peace and stability of Europe. While the particular susceptibilities of the French were a mystery to Granville, his use of shrewd conciliatory language belied an appreciation of the nature of European politics and how diplomatic crises required the active participation of disinterested powers to mediate and counsel the disputant parties.

Similar to Granville, the statesmen of Austria-Hungary, Italy and Russia also tendered their nation's good offices in July 1870 with an eye towards resolving the crisis by diplomatic means. Perhaps a little more sensitive to continental affairs, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count von Beust immediately saw the potential repercussions of such a candidature, noting to his Paris Ambassador Prince Richard von Metternich (not to be confused with his more illustrious father, Prince Klemens von Metternich) how Vienna was in 'a veritable panic' at the news.<sup>15</sup> Taking the Chancellorship of the Austrian Empire after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, Beust sought to avert any more political

disasters for the Habsburgs.<sup>16</sup> To that end, the prospect of a Franco-Prussian conflict represented Beust's 'chief nightmare', adversely affecting not only immediate Habsburg interests but also the wider European equilibrium.<sup>17</sup> Believing that the Hohenzollern candidature presented a 'serious complication', Beust wrote to his Berlin Ambassador, stating bluntly: 'We want peace to be assured quickly'.<sup>18</sup> The preservation of peace ran foremost in the thoughts of statesmen and most observers. In Italy's case, Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Visconti Venosta explained to deputies in the Camera dei Deputati:

The Italian Government has followed the path that has been naturally drawn, uniting its efforts with that of the other interested powers, after all the tranquillity of Europe ought not to be disturbed unnecessarily [shouts of *Bene!*]... This path has been a genuine work of conciliation, because, in this dispute, we consider the principal interests of Italy to be the conservation of peace; it is this principle interest to Italy that it is to the general interest of all of Europe.<sup>19</sup>

With such thoughts emanating at the diplomatic level, the statesmen of Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Italy and Russia understood their duty as one of preserving the peace of Europe. Above all else, war needed to be avoided. Failing that, war needed to be limited and circumscribed to prevent the outbreak of a general conflict, which would represent an even bigger calamity. Thus, once the crisis took on greater, more troubled dimensions after Gramont's infamous declaration on 6 July, Beust could but only reemphasise that 'the only sentiment' that animated Austro-Hungarian foreign policy was 'the desire to contribute to the maintenance of peace'.<sup>20</sup> 'No other interests guides our policy', Beust continued, 'and it is one that is strong enough to induce use to take an active part in these efforts'.<sup>21</sup> The words of Beust and Visconti signified the praxis of moderation as statesmen of these powers understood it at the time. Moderation in this particular context emphasised the duty of the Great Powers to exercise both their moral and objective influence, to mediate between the disputant powers, to restrain the overzealous actions of those powers, and to convey the general interest of Europe.

Given such sentiment, it is understandable the collective gasp Europe made when the French Foreign Minister the Duc de Gramont made his infamous declaration in the Corps législatif on 6 July. In response to an interpellation in the chamber at the Palais Bourbon, Gramont declared to deputies that the placement of Leopold onto the Spanish Throne could disturb to France's detriment the 'current balance of power in Europe' as well as put 'into peril both the interests and honour of France'.<sup>22</sup> Gramont continued by remarking that the French government counted at once on both the 'wisdom' of the Germans and the 'friendship' of the Spanish to prevent the candidature; otherwise, Gramont said in a scarcely veiled threat, the French would know how to fulfil their duties 'without hesitation and without weakness'.<sup>23</sup> The effect of this declaration was tremendous; as historian Malcolm Carroll correctly notes, 'instead of moderating the situation' the Imperial government involved the honour of both France and Prussia 'with the result that it became difficult, if not impossible, for either to yield without an open acknowledgment of diplomatic defeat'.<sup>24</sup> The full meaning of Gramont's declaration was perhaps even clearer through his diplomatic correspondence. The same day that he made his declaration, Gramont also wrote to his St Petersburg Ambassador stating clearly that 'if Prussia insists on installing Leopold to the Throne of Spain, *c'est la guerre*'.<sup>25</sup>

As far as the Imperial government was concerned, a Hohenzollern monarch in Spain presented a serious security threat, diverting France's vigilant watch from the Rhine and incapacitating the nation's ability to defend itself from Prussia with the threat of a second front on the Pyrenees.<sup>26</sup> Against the other power's policies of moderation, there was an undercurrent of sentiment in the French public sphere and in the Imperial government that

looked at a confrontation between France and Prussia as an inevitable axiom. One could count within their ranks the Empress Eugénie, Prime Minister Émile Ollivier and Gramont as well as the ubiquitous *militēs gloriosi*, or in the words of conservative politician Adolphe Thiers, ‘the generals in the hope of becoming marshals’ and marshals who wanted to become ‘dukes and princes’.<sup>27</sup> Their voices chanted in near unison for the French Empire to be restored to glory through a war against Prussia, being quite prepared to exacerbate the crisis without heeding the grave warnings or calls from restraint from other quarters.<sup>28</sup> The need to save the flagging popularity of the Napoleonic regime meant that policy direction had been given up to firebrands within the Imperial government, particularly Gramont, whose handling of the crisis even shocked Prussian Chancellor Count von Bismarck. Writing to the Prussian Foreign Office from his retreat in Varzin, Bismarck called Gramont’s declaration ‘arrogant and clumsy beyond expectations’, even asking whether the threat contained in the declaration was ‘more out of ineptitude or prejudice’.<sup>29</sup>

The tension between the conciliatory diplomacy of the other powers and the belligerent stance of France highlight the variant dynamics of nineteenth-century statecraft. For the non-disputant powers, a conciliatory approach to the Hohenzollern Crisis was the most sensible option in resolving the conflict. However, in the case of France, the crisis was seized upon by individuals within the Tuileries Court as well as some members of the public as a means of exciting patriotic ardour against the common foe of Prussia. Previous policies of moderation, such as the London Conference of 1867, where France and Prussia compromised over the question of Luxembourg, had been superseded by the basic need to remain popular and in a position of strength in the face of a perceived threat from Prussia.

To the statesmen of the other powers, however, there was a limit to how much individual domestic politics ought to adversely affect European interests. To them, the French appeared to be flagrantly violating key assumptions of diplomatic conduct, making unilateral decisions, and failing to resolve the crisis in a manner conducive to moderate sentiments. Beust’s annoyance was particularly evident, writing candidly to Metternich:

Immediately the question of Prince Hohenzollern’s candidature for the Spanish Throne has taken a particularly menacing path for the repose of Europe, our only concern has been to maintain peace. Our voice has been clearly heard in Paris, Berlin, and Madrid, pleading in favour of conciliation. We cannot consider ourselves as arbitrators of a dispute brought on so unexpectedly, and it is not up to us to pronounce judgement on the value of the claims produced on both sides.<sup>30</sup>

French antics clearly frustrated the efforts of the other powers. Gladstone for one was irreproachable over France’s stance, exclaiming to Granville that ‘by her rash and violent conduct’ France had ‘created a strong revulsion of opinion against her’.<sup>31</sup> Granville officially related the British government’s sense of irritation to Paris, saying that unless the French were prepared to return to a position of ‘moderation and forbearance’, then an amicable settlement was unlikely.<sup>32</sup> Russian Chancellor Prince Gorchakov, a veteran of the diplomatic circuit, all but wrote off any hope that the crisis could be peaceably resolved.<sup>33</sup> Regardless, Gorchakov still sensibly urged the Prussian government, much like Granville, ‘to act with prudence and moderation’ and not to let the language of the French government and the press influence them.<sup>34</sup> While France’s position was obstinate and unsavoury, the other powers nevertheless pushed Prussia and Spain to make concessions to appease the French. Italy, perhaps the more lenient of the powers towards France, was also concerned over the situation. Well aware that the candidature was fast becoming a *casus belli*, Visconti looked to Britain for guidance, authorising his Berlin



Minister Count de Launay to work alongside Loftus so as to spare Europe from the 'conflagrations that menace it'.<sup>35</sup>

Unfortunately, the diplomatic crisis quickly escalated into a war between France and Prussia. The French government's belligerent position, particularly after the Prussian King had withdrawn the Hohenzollern candidature, meant that other factors had superseded the due process of conciliation. The Imperial government moved earnestly towards a war footing, issuing the order for mobilisation on 16 July and declaring war on 19 July. Bismarck solidified Prussia's own plans for war, drawing on the 1866 treaties of alliance between the states of the Norddeutscher Bund (North German Confederation) and the south German states. Well aware of the potential nationalistic dimensions of the conflict, Bismarck had done little to soothe the crisis, hoping to use the opportunity to further Prussia's unification project.<sup>36</sup> Ultimately though, France was the proactive party in the crisis and Bismarck needed only to sit back and allow the ineptitude of the Imperial government and its Foreign Ministry under Gramont to direct proceedings.

Indeed, the annoyance and exasperation of the other statesmen towards France was evident. Gorchakov openly criticised the foolishness of Gramont in his visit to Berlin in late July. Against Wilhelm's 'wisdom and moderation', Gorchakov characterised the conduct of Gramont and the Imperial government as being based upon 'arrogance and precipitancy'.<sup>37</sup> Feeling himself at the absolute end of proceedings, Granville at the last minute even appealed to the twenty-third protocol of the Congress of Paris in 1856, which called on the powers to mediate disputes before resorting to war, offering Britain up as a friendly power to both parties, in the hope of mediating a settlement without the need for the 'great calamity' of a war.<sup>38</sup>

Given the lengths that Austria-Hungary, Britain, Italy and Russia had gone to avoid such a calamity, it is little surprise that these same powers all declared their neutrality in the affray, thereby confining the war between France and Prussia. The powers all declared their neutrality in the affray thereby confining the war between France and Prussia. The statesmen of the neutral powers set their scope of action around maintaining a moderating influence, by confining the war. On this count, Gorchakov expressed the assumptions of most statesmen when he noted in August, 'each of the powers, in not engaging in the conflict have brought about in small measure, an attempt at maintaining peace, even when they were convinced in advance of the uselessness of their efforts'.<sup>39</sup> Tsar Alexander II seconded his Chancellor on this score, informing an Austro-Hungarian diplomat at the onset of the war: 'It is necessary that we both stay strictly neutral in order to contain the length and scope of the conflict because if not, the only thing that will benefit will be revolution'.<sup>40</sup> In a corresponding stream of thought, the Tsar also emphasised to the British Ambassador the need for both Britain and Russia, as peripheral powers on the Western and Eastern flanks of Europe respectively, to maintain 'a strict neutrality' as well as hold 'identical language' in a bid to 'localise the war'.<sup>41</sup>

Collectively, the policy of Russia epitomised essential elements of the neutral power's conduct during the Franco-Prussian War. During the Hohenzollern Crisis, the statesmen of Austria-Hungary, Britain, Italy and Russia attempted to mediate and prevent war from breaking out. Now that war was upon them, these same statesmen now worked toward localising the war, thereby making it more manageable and less likely to disturb the general peace of Europe. The change in strategy appeared to merge seamlessly in the minds of the non-belligerent statesmen. In peacetime, moderation was broadly expressed through attitudes governing restrained conduct in diplomacy. In wartime, confining and limiting the scope of the hostilities became the mantra of the non-belligerents.



Attached to the idea of confining though was also the idea that at some point the neutral powers would have to actively end the conflict through diplomatic intervention or mediation. Once news of French defeats at Forbach and Wörth came streaming in during the early weeks of August, Gorchakov remarked to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador that a moment in the conflict would eventually arrive when the neutral powers would have to collectively intervene '*sans cocarde* (without cockades)' – that is, to intervene without joining either belligerent's side.<sup>42</sup> Gorchakov's understanding of diplomatic intervention was fuelled by concerns that further French defeat could weaken its position considerably in any future peace negotiations. Unquestionably, the powers would have taken the same stance if it appeared that Prussia was on the verge of defeat. The point was to ensure that neither of the belligerent powers would be significantly diminished in terms of its standing and its ability to conclude as equitable a peace as possible. The ultimate goal then was to maintain European stability and prevent any dramatic upset in political equilibrium. As Gorchakov remarked, when the time arrived for mediation, a just and durable peace would be needed: one that did not extort 'humiliating concessions' from France, as that would be inconsistent with the 'interests and welfare of Europe'.<sup>43</sup>

The dual policy of limiting and ending the war formed the sustaining logic of the non-belligerents during the limited stages of the war. They hoped that the war would end within a short period of time and would not drastically upset European equilibrium. Unfortunately, no one quite had the premonition to foresee the extreme turn that the war would take after Napoleon's spectacular defeat at the Battle of Sedan into a war of attrition. After Sedan in September 1870, the newly installed French Government of National Defence, largely under the influence of radical politician Jules Favre, Léon Gambetta as well as a host of other left-wing politicians raised the stakes of the conflict, declaring a total war against the so-called German aggressor. In recalling the Jacobin tradition of 1793, as historian W.R. Fryer notes, the French government attempted to furnish a new mass army to replace the Imperial corps lost at Sedan.<sup>44</sup> The German Alliance's peace terms, which included territorial demands for the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, spurred on France's renewed war effort. As far as the Government of National Defence was concerned, such demands were far too exacting for the French to bear, forcing them into continuing the war. Foreign Minister Favre wrote to French representatives abroad in late October, laying out the government's justification for continuing the war:

It is good that France should know how far the ambition of Prussia reaches. She does not stop at the conquest of two of our provinces; she coldly pursues her systematic work of annihilation. After having solemnly announced to the world, by the mouth of her King, that she had no quarrel except with Napoleon and his soldiers, Prussia now persists in destroying the French nation. She ravages our soil, burns our villages, overwhelms our peasants with requisitions, has them shot when they cannot satisfy her requirements, and uses all the resources of science to aid a war of extermination.<sup>45</sup>

With their intent to cauterise the French nation and systematically annihilate the French people, the Germans had ruined any hope for an honourable peace, as Favre saw it. The French government played on the fearful rhetoric of extermination and annihilation through propaganda, conjuring an existential national crisis in order to impel a new war effort. Out of Prussia's territorial demands for Alsace and Lorraine was borne the French government's unequivocal wartime policy of 'not an inch of our territory, not a stone of our fortresses'.<sup>46</sup>

Analogously, on the German side, the cumulative effect of victory upon victory by September had given the conflict the heady air of a national war of unification. While the

war dragged on, behind the scenes a German nation was being forged not so much with blood and iron but through treaties and diplomacy between the *Norddeutscher Bund* and the southern German states. The path to unification then was a combination of politicking amongst the various states secured against the backdrop of victory. It was on this path to unification that Alsace and Lorraine played a vital role. As far as many of the southern German states saw it, the German victory needed to be sealed through the strategic acquisition of both provinces.<sup>47</sup> This was seen as necessary because Alsace and Lorraine acted as a defensive bulwark against potential French aggression, not to mention that many Germans saw both provinces as belonging to the German nation, being both ethnically and linguistically German.<sup>48</sup>

It is also worth pointing out that behind the scenes in the German camp, there was a conflict between the civilian and military arm of the Prussian state over the war effort, which was innately tied to the national mission of German unification. While Bismarck was the drum major of Prussian statecraft in peacetime, during the war he found himself largely at odds with Prussian military leaders.<sup>49</sup> The German war effort was led largely by General von Moltke and his staff of officers, who, as Otto Pflanze argues, firmly believed that military strategy was the domain of the general, 'whatever its effect upon the attitudes of European powers and the negotiation of peace'.<sup>50</sup> In peacetime, the Prussian military acquiesced to the authority of Bismarck's chancellery – a compliant tool of civilian statecraft – but in wartime, the generals believed that they possessed primacy over state policy. To them, the much-anticipated Franco-Prussian showdown was construed as an opportunity to completely raze the troublesome French nation to the ground and settle once for all the centuries old Franco-German rivalry.<sup>51</sup>

An unyielding rationale such as this conflicted entirely with the statecraft of Bismarck who, like most statesmen, believed that war had measurable diplomatic outcomes – one of which was not to destroy a Great Power. For Bismarck, the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were the ends to the conflict. Aside from the indemnity, there were no other peace terms that Prussia could legitimately force onto France through the continuation of war. Although even in this instance, Bismarck was somewhat hesitant about demanding Lorraine, considering that large French-speaking districts marbled that particular province. Moreover, Bismarck was well aware that Europe would simply not allow France to be completely ruined without some serious diplomatic repercussions for Germany and nor did Bismarck want France to be completely ruined – only kept in check.<sup>52</sup> In many ways, Bismarck was a relative voice of moderation against the militaristic directorship of the German High Command, attempting to appease German nationalists and Prussian military leadership, while not appearing too offensively overzealous to the other powers.

The war dragged on through the winter months of 1870 and 1871, becoming less and less conventional. The terrorism of French guerrilla forces combined with the blanket 'slash and burn' strategy of the German occupiers created a vicious cycle of violence. The unconventional character of the Franco-Prussian War shocked most of the rest of Europe. As it was, Austria-Hungary, Britain, Italy and Russia's collective attempts at diffusing the Hohenzollern Crisis and then confining and limiting the war had testified to their individual policies of moderation during what one could characterise as the limited stages of the Franco-Prussian War. And it may have been the case that the Franco-Prussian War would have remained a truly nineteenth-century war: that is, a localised conflict 'initiated by governments to achieve key objectives' and 'managed within an international system in which the great powers promoted restraint and the maintenance of a political equilibrium', as Abbenhuis explains.<sup>53</sup> Keeping the war limited, preventing it from dragging on, and ensuring that the settlement of the conflict would not be detrimental to the permanent

stability of Europe all formed the broad basis of the localised conflict for nineteenth-century statesmen. At one level, the Franco-Prussian War remained a localised conflict, being successfully contained between France and the German Alliance, but at another level, the war was clearly outside of the boundaries of limitation, particularly in terms of how each belligerent conducted their war effort and their diplomacy during the conflict. Had moderation amongst both belligerent parties prevailed, the war would come to a discrete end in which peace would be made once a clear victory was attained, such as in the Italian War of 1859 and the Austro-Prussian War, or if the war had become too extraneous, such as in the Crimean War. However, in the case of the Franco-Prussian War, the Battle of Sedan on 1 September 1870 saw a clear Prussian victory, while the war of attrition during the winter months of 1870 and 1871 clearly demonstrated the conflict's devastating impact as an economic and human drain on both nations. Yet in spite of these two conclusive realities, the war continued in earnest, possessing the dual character of impending national disaster and looming national victory for the French and the Germans respectively.

As Europe looked on at these worrying developments, Beust and Visconti were particularly cognisant of the need for some sort of action, being close allies of France. However, their concerns went beyond just concern over their ally. To them, the restoration of peace and stability featured as their primary motivating factor in their diplomatic endeavours. Beust was the most vigorous advocate amongst the neutral statesmen to advocate for some form of action or intervention.<sup>54</sup> He had taken to heart Gorchakov's comment that a time would eventually arrive when the neutral powers would have to intervene collectively '*sans cocarde*'.<sup>55</sup> On 12 October, Beust thought it prudent to take up the words of Gorchakov, writing to his Ambassador in St Petersburg: '*Le moment d'intervenir est peut être [sic] venu, et en effet je ne vois pas de cocarde, mais je ne vois pas non plus d'Europe*' (Perhaps the moment has arrived, and indeed I do not see any cockades, but nor can I see Europe anymore).<sup>56</sup> In failing to see Europe, Beust was increasingly becoming impatient at what he saw as the cumbersome pace of peace.<sup>57</sup> On 13 October 1870, during those difficult post-Sedan months of the Franco-Prussian War, Beust privately confided to his Berlin Ambassador: 'I cannot hide the feeling of apprehension that I feel when one day before the court of history part of the responsibility will fall on the neutrals; that they saw with indifference the silent danger of unheard of evils that was placed on the table in front of them'.<sup>58</sup> At the time, Beust was alarmed at what he saw as the unwillingness of the neutral powers to intervene on behalf of peace, believing that the failure to do so would have a profound effect on European equilibrium.<sup>59</sup>

Visconti was likewise distressed at France's situation, floating about ideas for peace in the hope that they would eventuate into something substantive. On New Year's Day 1871, Visconti wrote to his London Ambassador, asking whether armistice or peace terms could be brought up in the upcoming London Conference on the Black Sea.<sup>60</sup> The opportunity it presented, with all the powers of Europe in attendance, including Prussia as well as France, appeared to be an excellent opportunity as far as Visconti was concerned to cease hostilities. In fact, to Visconti it appeared 'morally impossible that Europe meeting under such unfortunate circumstances' could not express, 'at least from a humanitarian point of view, the strong desire for the cessation of war'.<sup>61</sup> Unfortunately for Visconti, this was something that Granville felt was not appropriate for the conference, especially given that the position of both belligerents on the matter of an armistice and peace was already well known by that stage.<sup>62</sup>

The inaction of the neutral powers was down to a lack of influence they had over the belligerents during the post-Sedan stages of the war. The neutral powers could hardly be

held to account for the inability of the belligerents to negotiate. After all, the neutrals had limited the war – a major success in of itself – and were acting as intermediaries between the belligerents offering their counsel and their good offices to bring about an end to the war. Unfortunately, the belligerents were unwilling to compromise in order to end the hostilities. While this was evident to most statesmen, it still did not prevent the genuine sense of anxiety. Thus even though the neutral powers' failure to arrange an armistice exasperated Visconti, who quietly deplored 'the inaction of the other neutral powers', he was nevertheless conscious of the fact that Italy could not 'do anything useful in isolation'.<sup>63</sup> And nor could the neutral powers do anything particularly useful, for that matter, as Visconti well knew military intervention was out of the question and German demands would not be altered unless the powers were prepared to back up any threats with the force of arms.<sup>64</sup>

As individuals that were inclined by 'nature of their training and mental habit' to ponder, their achievement in limiting the war was ostensibly overshadowed by their moderate disposition during the affray and the feeling that vital principles of diplomacy were being crushed under the dominion of material power.<sup>65</sup> This left a lingering sense of helplessness over what was fast transpiring into a distressing situation for European onlookers. Even the ever-resourceful Granville privately despaired, saying to Lyons in December 1870: 'I see no chance of peace – I cannot say how my heart bleeds for the misery of France – I lie in bed thinking whether there is nothing to be done'.<sup>66</sup> Upon receiving Bismarck's forecasts of the calamity if they were to bombard Paris in October 1870, Granville felt compelled, partly out of frustration and shock, to counsel the Prussians against such a move. In impassioned tones, Granville wrote to Loftus in Berlin on 20 October 1870, calling on the King of Prussia to exhaust 'every attempt for peace' before giving the orders for an attack on Paris and to ensure that 'the conditions of peace were just, moderate, and in accordance with true policy and the sentiments of the age'.<sup>67</sup> As with most other statesmen, Granville assumed that as the victorious power Prussia would fulfil the duty of a magnanimous power by exercising restraint in its dealings with the defeated party. Prussia was ranging far beyond the frontiers of legitimacy in their designs to bombard Paris. The Prussians, however, were largely unmoved by Granville's exhortations.

Granville's attempts to lessen the effects of Prussian force corresponded with the Tsar's own attempts to moderate Prussian peace demands. The Tsar had remained in personal communication with the King of Prussia throughout the war, urging him not to make territorial demands and to moderate his government's policy for the European good.<sup>68</sup> To the Tsar's requests, Wilhelm replied that he could only follow the 'universal' needs of the German nation to protect itself from the French.<sup>69</sup> From this basis, Gorchakov reasoned that unless the neutrals themselves were prepared to advocate peace negotiations by the 'force of arms' then Prussia was unlikely to mitigate their demands.<sup>70</sup> The dilemma from this was evident: only an armed intervention by the neutral powers was likely to put an end to the war, but this would only have brought about a general war and an even bigger calamity.

The diplomatic stalemate came at a time when the war would reach even greater crescendos. After holding out against their German besiegers, the bombardment of Paris began on 6 January 1871. With this development, the plight of Paris became the centre of Europe's war-weary gaze. As it appeared to many contemporaries, now Prussia had spent the goodwill of Europe, much like France had done during the Hohenzollern Crisis, exceeding the mandate of legitimate state conduct and carrying on designs that were incompatible with the moderation and restraint expected of Great Powers. In the eyes of

Europe, Prussia's conduct and territorial demands of Alsace and Lorraine combined to create an odious demonstration of the impunity of force over international legitimacy: of 'might over right'.<sup>71</sup> As far as many were concerned, it seemed that 'Prussian force had now passed all desirable limits; Bismarck and his empire were going too far, becoming too potent'.<sup>72</sup>

As it was for the French, events eventually came to a head in the Government of National Defence, much to the relief of Europe. The bombardment of Paris coupled with the complete collapse of the French initiative after a string of unsuccessful battles by mid-January had proved the futility in continuing the war. It likewise served to demonstrate just how out of touch and isolated the war party in the French government, largely led by Gambetta, had become.<sup>73</sup> Against Gambetta there was a growing party of peace under the influence of Favre and Thiers, who had now joined the republican government. In January, they set to work reinvigorating efforts for an armistice, the outcome of which resulted in Favre meeting with Bismarck in Versailles on 24 January. Four days later an armistice was signed, enabling the survivors of Paris to be supplied with aid and for nationwide elections in France for an elected government to negotiate the peace.

Signed on 10 May 1871, the Treaty of Frankfurt, which was negotiated between Bismarck and Thiers, required France to pay an indemnity of five billion francs with certain districts of France to be occupied until the balance was paid. As expected, Germany demanded the cession of Alsace and most of the districts of Lorraine as well as the strategic fortress of Metz.<sup>74</sup> A raft of smaller stipulations rounded out what was a particularly delicate peace. The annexations provided a buffer to France, while the indemnity was intended to cripple the defeated power for at least 10 to 15 years. Thus, the treaty was not a moderate peace as far as onlookers were concerned, aimed at encouraging a return to normalcy between the two powers. Instead, it was a peace based on Bismarck's strategy of keeping France in check while he entrenched the new German Empire into the European political system.<sup>75</sup> A moderate peace understandably did not suit Germany's immediate interests, as Bismarck believed that France would attempt to undertake a course of *revanche* regardless of how generous the peace was. Thus keeping France diminished in its standing was Germany's guiding policy in terms of maintaining peace along its western border.

With this unsavoury reality, the peace gave onlookers an impression of the new *status quo* of Europe for which they would have to contend with. Granville for one felt compelled to deride Germany's cruelty as well as Bismarck's perceived immorality, declaring the terms to be an unbearable burden on France and an all-round loss for Europe. Granville formally protested the size of the indemnity of six billion francs as being an onerous amount that the French were in no position to pay.<sup>76</sup> Granville offered to intervene on this occasion to negotiate a more realistic figure. Fortunately for the French, the peace negotiations would eventually reduce the figure down to a marginally less breath-taking five billion francs. Looking on, Granville privately admonished both the peace terms and its creator, Bismarck, exclaiming to Lyons on 1 March:

*Vae Victis* indeed! How hard the conquerors have been, and what a mistake in a great county like Germany to give up all direction of its affairs to one bold unscrupulous man! We do not believe in France being able to bear the burden which has been put upon her.<sup>77</sup>

Likewise, other neutral statesmen derided the peace terms, sharing in Granville's sympathy towards the fallen French, marked also by a strong degree of pessimism. The devastating war combined with the victor's peace deeply offended the sensibilities of most of the non-belligerent statesmen who held genuine moral scruples over the conduct of



Germany and the future of Europe. It was a salient fact to many that the Franco-Prussian War was marked by a distinct lack of moderation and pointed to a new status quo in Europe. On this count, Visconti went so far as to question whether the localisation of the war had achieved anything beneficial for Europe. Indeed, while it had kept Italy and Europe out of a general war, Visconti still felt compelled to ask in despondency: 'Now who benefits from localised war, the vanquished or the victor?'<sup>78</sup> To his mind, Europe certainly was not the beneficiary of the war, which had succeeded primarily in distorting Europe's balance of power. This was all the more demoralising for Visconti, who was all too aware that as the least impressive of the powers Italy could never make a place for itself in Europe unless there was a stable political equilibrium.<sup>79</sup>

Undoubtedly, the Franco-Prussian War upset the existing order. Yet despite this, the statesmen of the Great Powers were nevertheless keen to re-establish some form of normalcy. The London Conference provides an indicator of these attempts to reinstate the principles of the concert in European politics. Even though France was humiliated and greatly diminished in its standing, the need to have a French presence in the conference was still crucial. After much encouragement by the powers, France was persuaded to send a plenipotentiary to the conference in January whilst their capital remained under bombardment. Despite the circumstances, it was still a heartening sign for many, as Beust wrote to Metternich on 3 March:

We are happy to assist as far as in our power, the new government of France to repair *les maux* that the disastrous war had caused to this country. As far as we are concerned, we will seek, as in the past, to establish *meilleure entente* with France over the questions of European politics that will arise. We are glad to see today a representative of France participating in the resolution of incidents that occupy the London Conference. Without this cooperation, we could not regard the work of the plenipotentiaries as completely satisfactory, and we believe that it is a fact that bodes well for the future to see the importance attached even now to ensure the consent of France on such a question.<sup>80</sup>

Beust's comments underpin the desire to return to some sort of normalcy in European political life and the need to have France retake its rightful place at the table of the great powers. In due time, Beust and his contemporary statesmen would eventually find themselves returning to the usual business of European politics, to a sense of routine, as it were. However, with the reality of a harsh peace and the memory of the Franco-Prussian War and the failure of moderation to prevail during the conflict, it would invariably be a different sort of normalcy.

In that sense, the words of the non-belligerent statesmen after the war were searching remarks of individuals who had been personally shocked at the events of the past few months and now found themselves attempting to feel their way through the context of the post-war period. From their perspective, equilibrium, moderation, consensus – those veritable tools of their trade – had been seriously tested during the war, conjuring a distinct uneasiness over the new status quo. Yet, at the same time, they had their own personal hopes for the future, as delicate as these hopes were. With the imperious statecraft of the German Empire as well as the unsavoury reality that France was now a power humiliated and in turmoil, it seemed difficult to imagine that Europe would be able to proceed soundly under the bonds of co-operation and dignity, or even still future peace, given such circumstances. Yet this was the reality of post-war European politics, which they would have to contend with.

This is not to say that what stemmed out of the Franco-Prussian War resulted in a radical rupture or a dramatic metamorphosis. European politics was no house of cards. The cursory nature of a singular event like the Franco-Prussian War was not enough to undo

the mentalities of statesmen as well as the engrained procedures and precedents that accumulated in the practice of nineteenth-century diplomacy. In many ways, these statesmen could not see the vitality of their own sentiments. After all, European politics would begin afresh after 1871 with a new normalcy for which they would proceed with the same sort of moderate sentiment as prior to the war. As Chabod so ably summarises, no one in the immediate post-war period 'could foresee that France would be able to recover from defeat with such miraculous speed, and that within a few years it would once again be a vital presence in the European concert'. Just as there was a 'parallel failure of prognostication' amongst contemporaries to see that once Bismarck had unified Germany and entrenched the political regime domestically, he 'would devote himself only to preserving the status quo and maintaining peace in Europe'.<sup>81</sup>

The key to understanding the events of 1870 and 1871 is the moderation employed by the non-belligerents. While the actions of France and Prussia defined the war itself, the non-belligerents defined the limit of the war's effect on the European political system. The fact that throughout the conflict, the statesmen of Austria-Hungary, Britain, Italy and Russia expressed alarm and disbelief at the conduct of the warring parties, as well as their regular endeavours to restrain them, testifies to the standard of diplomatic conduct expected of nineteenth-century European powers. Moderation here was this standard, guiding the policies of those powers that held no immediate state interest in the ephemeral nature of the conflict, while acting as a set of norms for which European contemporaries were able to assess the conduct of the belligerents against the wider interest of Europe.

### Acknowledgements

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### Notes

1. See, for example, [F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen](#) who argue that: "In the exercise of their dominance over the European state system the great powers showed remarkable restraint, particularly in the decades from 1815 to 1856. They rarely acted arbitrarily or capriciously." *The Great Powers and the European States System, 1815–1914*, 9. See also [C.J. Bartlett's](#) history of "peace and war" (as opposed to war and peace) which alludes to a type of moderation or restraint on a number of occasions, noting in one instance how statesmen were often guided by restraint more so than ideas of "ambition, honour or gallantry" for the wider goal of maintaining a balance in Europe in *Peace, War, and the European Powers, 1814–1914*, 23.
2. [Schroeder](#), *The Transformation of European Politics, 1768–1848*. Cf. [E. Kraehe](#), "A Bipolar Balance of Power;" and [H.M. Scott](#), "Paul W. Schroeder's International System: The View from Vienna," 663–80.
3. [Schroeder](#), "The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European Political System," 7.
4. As Schroeder points out: "Means make more difference than ends in international politics." *The Transformation of European Politics*, 244.
5. [Schroeder](#), "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?," *Review of International Studies* 15 (1989): 142.
6. [Chabod](#), *Italian Foreign Policy: The Statecraft of the Founders, 1870–1896*.
7. For more see [Soutou](#), *L'Europe de 1815 à nos jours*, 9–27.
8. [Fiore](#), *Nuovo dritto internazionale pubblico secondo i bisogni della civiltà moderna* (Milan, 1865), 279.
9. [Abbenhuis](#), *An Age of Neutrals: Neutrality and Great Power Politics, 1815–1914*, introduction.
10. As Metternich wrote in 1808: "Peace does not exist within a revolutionary situation, and whether Robespierre declares eternal war against the chateaux or Napoleon makes it against



- the Powers, the tyranny is the same, and the danger is only more general.” Quoted from Sofka, “Metternich’s Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for ‘Perpetual Peace,’” 122–3.
11. The liberal Viennese daily *Neue Freie Presse* for one saw it as a childish affair that need not endanger the peace of Europe. *Neue Freie Presse*, 6 July 1870, 1.
  12. See for example H[ouse of] C[ommons] P[arliamentary] P[apers], 1870, C.167, LXX. 17, p. 2.
  13. *Ibid.*, 3.
  14. For more, see Agatha Ramm’s biographical sketch of Granville as Foreign Secretary in “Granville,” in Wilson, *British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy from Crimean War to First World War*, 85–101.
  15. Oncken, ed., *Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons III von 1883 bis 1870 und der Ursprung des Krieges von 1870/71*, vol. 3, 394.
  16. See Schmitt, “Count Beust and Germany, 1866–1870: Reconquest, Realignment, or Resignation?”
  17. *Ibid.*, 26.
  18. Chodźko, *Recueil des Traités, conventions, actes, notes, capitulations et pièces diplomatiques concernant la Guerre Franco-Allemande*, vol. 1, 22.
  19. *Discussioni della Camera dei Deputati*, Seconda della Legislatura X, 2e, vol. 3, 3219.
  20. Oncken, *Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons III*, 418–19.
  21. *Ibid.*
  22. *Ibid.*, 396.
  23. *Ibid.*, 397.
  24. Carroll, “French Public Opinion on War with Prussia in 1870,” 684.
  25. Ministère des Affaires étrangères, *Les Origines diplomatiques de la guerre de 1870–71*, vol. 28 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1931), 64. Gramont expressed this sentiment further noting to his Berlin Ambassador, scarcely days after the declaration: “If the King does not want to counsel Prince Hohenzollern to renounce, *eh bien! C’est la guerre, tout de suite*, and in a few days we will be in the Rhine.” *Ibid.*, 193.
  26. See Wetzel, *A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War*, 37–62.
  27. Some historians claim that Ollivier did not push for war, instead allowing himself to be led by Gramont, which is not the case; see Houston, “Émile Ollivier and the Hohenzollern Candidacy,” 125–49. Thiers quoted from Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War*, 35.
  28. Lyons, a particularly astute observer of the Tuileries Court, noted to Granville how “the war has been forced upon the Emperor principally by his own party in the Chamber, the Right, and by his Ministers . . . the whole affair is a series of blunders which has culminated in an awful catastrophe.” Leigh, ed., *Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy*, vol. 1, 301–2. Earlier in May 1870, Lyons had noted to Granville: “There is danger in the influence of the Emperor’s old political friends, who want to regain their old position and in some of the influential military men who want a war for promotion and glory.” *Ibid.*, 291.
  29. von Bismarck, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 6b, 344–5.
  30. Ministère des Affaires étrangères, *Les Origines diplomatiques*, vol. 29, 140.
  31. “The Political Correspondence of Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1868–71,” 109.
  32. HCPP, C.167, LXX. 17, p. 12.
  33. Ministère des Affaires étrangères, *Les Origines diplomatiques*, vol. 28, 107–8.
  34. HCPP, C.167, LXX. 17, p. 49.
  35. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, series I, vol. 13, 37.
  36. There is a rich historiography on Bismarck’s role in the Hohenzollern Crisis. Recently, historians Josef Becker and David Wetzel engaged in a debate over whether or not Bismarck had premeditated the Franco-Prussian War through his intimate involvement with the Spanish candidature. See, in the following order, Wetzel, “Review: Bismarck’s spanische ‘Diversion’: 1870 und der preussischdeutsche Reichsgründungskrieg,” 606–12; Becker, “The Franco-Prussian Conflict of 1870 and Bismarck’s Concept of a ‘Provoked Defensive War,’” 93–109; and Wetzel, “A Reply to Josef Becker’s Response,” 111–24. Their positions reiterate the same historiographical points of order of past historians, demonstrating the enduring controversy of the debate.
  37. Halperin, “Bismarck and the Italian Envoy in Berlin on the Eve of the Franco-Prussian War,” 33.
  38. HCPP, C.167, LXX. 17, p. 35.

39. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *I Documenti Diplomatici*, series I, vol. 13, 257.
40. Quoted from Mosse, *The European Powers and the German Question, 1848–1871*, 308.
41. Quoted from *Ibid.*, 315.
42. Quoted from von Beust, *Memoirs of Friedrich Ferdinand Count von Beust*, vol. 2, 205.
43. Paraphrased from Mosse, *The European Powers and the German Question*, 323.
44. Fryer, “The War of 1870 in the Pattern of Franco-German Relations,” 80.
45. Quoted from HCPP, C.244, LXXI. 1, p. 179.
46. *Journal Officiel de la République française*, 21 Sep. 1870, 1.
47. *Ibid.*
48. In a diplomatic circular, Bismarck stated victory was not enough to secure a durable peace but rather a defensive bulwark through the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was needed. HCPP, C.244, LXXI. 1, pp. 90–1.
49. Beatrice Heuser notes that Bismarck was often shut out of the all-important war councils in *Reading Clausewitz*, 60. For more see Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, vol. 1, 462–8; and Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter: the Problem of Militarism in Germany*, vol. 1, 187–260.
50. *Ibid.*, 459.
51. See Foley, *German Strategy and the Path to Verdun*, 19–21.
52. Bismarck noted in St Petersburg in 1887 that the survival of France as a Great Power “was as necessary to Germany as the survival of any other great power”, offering an important balance to both Britain and Russia. Quoted from Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter*, 249.
53. Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals*, conclusion.
54. As Beust noted Metternich on 22 October, Austria-Hungary had “unceasingly signalled to London and St Petersburg the urgency of a European intervention.” Chodźko, *Recueil des Traités*, vol. 3, 836.
55. Quoted from Beust, *Memoirs*, 205.
56. *Ibid.*, 205.
57. See Chodźko, *Recueil des Traités*, vol. 3, 783.
58. *Ibid.*
59. In his memoir published in 1887, Beust was able to look back upon the Franco-Prussian War and rhetorically answer the question he fretfully raised in October 1870, writing: “It cannot be denied that a fairly successful intervention of the neutral powers would only have made the victors more moderate in their demands, but would have convinced the vanquished of the uselessness of continuing the struggle, and have placed Europe in a much more dignified position after the war was over . . . But the future is dark, however reassuring may be the guarantees afforded by those who now have the direction of German affairs; and it would have been a great security for Germany herself and for the peace of Europe, if the neutral powers had bound themselves not only to prevent excessive demands on the part of Germany, but also not to participate either actively or passively in any French enterprise of revenge.” Beust, *Memoirs*, 209.
60. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *I Documenti Diplomatici*, series II, vol. 2, 42.
61. *Ibid.*
62. *Ibid.*, 16–17.
63. *Ibid.*, series II, vol. 1, 158.
64. As Visconti emphasised to Nigra on 3 October that any assistance from Italy would not be able to “restore the odds of the war in favour of France.” *Ibid.*, 128.
65. Chabod, *Italian Foreign Policy*, 97.
66. Quoted from Millman, *British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War*, 216.
67. HCPP, C.244, LXXI. 1, p. 160.
68. *Ibid.*, 170.
69. *Ibid.*
70. *Ibid.*
71. Michael Pratt argues that Prussia became a “fallen idol” amongst British intellectuals once Napoleon was defeated at Sedan in “A Fallen Idol,” 543–75.
72. Chabod, *Italian Foreign Policy*, 29.
73. For a detailed account of the struggle between Gambetta and moderate politicians within the French government during the armistice negotiations, see Wetzel, *A Duel of Nations*, 180–212.

74. The fortress of Belfort was also part of the original peace terms. However, Bismarck prudently dropped this stipulation.
75. *A History of Modern Germany, 1840–1945*, vol. 3, 221.
76. HCPP, C.266, LXXI. 321, p. 1.
77. Legh, *Lord Lyons*, 373.
78. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *I Documenti Diplomatici*, series II, vol. 2, 246–7.
79. Chabod, *Italian Foreign Policy*, 101.
80. Chodźko, *Recueil des Traités*, vol. 5, 44.
81. Chabod, *Italian Foreign Policy*, 103.

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