

## THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

**P**ALESTINE has been a center of world interest since history began. In ancient times it was the meeting place of Hittite, Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Greek and Roman armies, empires and cultures. With these contacts it is not surprising that it should have given rise to two great religions, Judaism and Christianity. In the Middle Ages it was the meeting point of Christian and Moslem armies and at times passed under the political dominance of each. In modern times, as the holy land of Judaism and Christianity and second only to the Hedjaz in the reverence of Moslems, it has been the focus of religious interest and pilgrimage, while its position near the Suez Canal has given it strategic importance.

This history has left Palestine with a varied array of racial stocks, languages, religions and foreign entanglements. Outside Palestine the following political forces are chiefly concerned.

1. Great Britain has the mandate and is vitally interested in imperial communications at Suez.

2. World Zionism has been internationally organized for nearly thirty years and its mission to create in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people has been recognized by the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and confirmed by the mandate.

3. Arab nationalism is at present incompletely organized but has substantial nuclei in Iraq and Nejd and insists that the Allies promised during the war to include Palestine in a united Arab state.

4. The Roman Catholic Church is a powerful world organization with a permanent interest in the historic seat of Christianity where it maintains numerous monasteries, churches and schools. It has kept up a lively propaganda in the East and has been gaining predominance among eastern Christians since Russia withdrew protection from the Orthodox Church.

5. France as leader of the Crusades has long been recognized as protector of Christians in the East. She has a mandate over

the neighboring territory of Syria and aspires to be the leading power in the Mediterranean.

6. Italy also aspires to a leading position in the Mediterranean like that of ancient Rome, and is materially interested because of investments and immigrants in the East. The growing intimacy of Mussolini and the Vatican perhaps suggests the hope that Italy may succeed France as protector of Catholic interests.

7. The League of Nations supervises the administration of mandates. Though in most matters the League must be considered an instrument through which the policies of its members can seek adjustment, and not an entity with a political initiative of its own, in the matter of mandates it is a political force and the Council has authority to see that the policy embodied in the mandates is carried out. The Council is advised by an independent body, the Permanent Mandates Commission.

Turkey, before the war, was sovereign in Palestine. Germany posed as the first friend of Turkey and had very important military and economic interests, including the Bagdad Railway scheme. Russia was formerly the protector of Orthodox Christians, the most numerous Christian sect in the East. These states are not at present factors of political importance, though Bolshevik ideas are said to be attractive to some of the immigrant Jews (but apparently not many) and Bolshevik policy is undoubtedly dallying with Islam.

World Christianity, except as embodied in the Catholic Church; world Judaism, except as embodied in the Zionist organization, and world Mohammedanism, except as represented by Arab nationalism, are not sufficiently organized to be counted political forces, though the interests of non-Catholic Christians, of non-Zionist Jews, and of non-Arab Moslems are always present and constantly influence the attitudes of the political forces mentioned.

For the time being, these outside forces have achieved equilibrium in the carefully drawn terms of the mandate for Palestine which went into effect on September 29, 1923. This agreement between the League of Nations and Great Britain places the administration in British hands with the following stipulations:

1. She must secure the establishment of a national home for the Jews by recognizing the Zionist organization as competent to advise in this connection, by facilitating Jewish immigration and land settlement, by recognizing Hebrew as an official language on a par with Arabic and English, and by arranging with the Zionist organization for development of public services and natural resources.

2. She must foster the development of self-governing institutions, encourage local autonomy and safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race and religion.

3. She must recognize the rest days of each religious community as legal, assume sole responsibility for preserving and securing all holy places and leave the determination of rights and claims in connection with them to a commission representative of all religious interests. The constitution and functions of this commission are to be approved by the League of Nations Council, but because of difficulties in distributing the personnel among the different religious interests it has not yet been established.

4. She must assure adequate judicial protection to foreigners and maintain the open door for traders and archæologists of states members of the League. The United States has been accorded the same privileges by the treaty of December 3, 1924, ratified in December, 1925.

5. She must make an annual report and submit copies of all laws and regulations to the League of Nations, submit disputes with a League member on interpretation of the mandate to the Permanent Court of International Justice, and secure the Council's consent to any modification of the mandate.

Thus, it will be observed, partial satisfaction is given to British, Zionist, Arab, religious, foreign trade and League of Nations interests.

Within Palestine there are also political forces which, though less powerful than those outside, are more vitally interested. The doctrine of self-determination espoused by the Allies during the war is in essence merely a recognition that internal forces ought to have more influence on the government of an

area than external forces. This doctrine was recognized as at least partially applicable to the peoples liberated from Turkey by the League of Nations Covenant. According to Article 22 of that instrument, these communities "have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory."

Though in fact external forces were given major consideration in drawing up the mandate, the influence of internal forces will doubtless become increasingly important as war and peace-making recede into the past. Various political forces, stimulated to an exaggerated interest in distant lands by these upheavals, will tend, with the return to normalcy, to be absorbed by interests nearer home, leaving the distant lands more to themselves. In the case of Palestine, this will probably be less true than in any other part of the earth. External forces will continue to be important but relatively less important than they have been during the past decade.

The writer's impressions of the internal forces in Palestine were received during a visit to the mandated areas of the East in the fall of 1925. Conversations were held with some sixty persons, including native Moslems, Christians and Jews, and European and American residents. The point of view of leaders of the various Arab parties, of the Zionist leaders, of ecclesiastical dignitaries, and of British and Palestine government officials was obtained.

Palestine within the present mandate boundaries (exclusive of Trans-Jordan, which is under a wholly different régime) is about the shape and size of the state of New Hampshire, with about twice the population. In January, 1926, its population of 835,000 comprised about 615,000 Moslems, 135,000 Jews, and 75,000 Christians, the remaining 10,000 being principally Druses. The Christians and Moslems are of the same racial character, speak Arabic and are commonly called Arabs in distinction from the Jews. Whether the term Arab with this

broad usage has any but a linguistic significance is difficult to say. It comprises roving *bedouins* of the desert, settled peasants, laborers and city *effendi*. Doubtless among them is the blood of the pre-Israelitish inhabitants like the Phoenicians, Philistines and Canaanites, as well as conquerors and invaders like the Hittites, Egyptians, Israelites, Assyrians, Babylonians, Aramæans, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, and Western Europeans from the Crusading period on. Many of these strains, especially the Hittite, are probably represented in the modern Jew. They are all dominantly Semite and the Jews are doubtless right in saying that whatever may be their differences with the Arabs they can hardly flow from anti-Semitism.

The Jews are rather less than half native and pre-war immigrants and more than half immigrants since the war. Hebrew is their language, though the older settlers also speak Arabic and most of the immigrants speak some European tongue. The immigrant Jews are not for the most part religious though they generally have a strong sense of Jewish nationalism. The old Jews of various orthodox sects who are concentrated in Jerusalem are often shocked by the religious indifference of the modern Zionists, as indeed are some of the Arabs.

There is only one major political issue in Palestine and that is Zionism. The Zionists are endeavoring to reduce its importance by encouraging political discussion of economic, administrative, labor and other problems and have had some success, but still the Moslems and Christians are practically unanimously against Zionism while the government is trying to hold the balance. Thus political opinions divide naturally into Arab, Jewish and British.

#### The Arab Point of View

Arab opinion is mainly the opinion of the Arab leaders. The masses are illiterate, poor and inclined to follow the leader with most prestige. God was passing gifts around, according to a story told me, and came to stupidity. "Give me a lot of it," said the Arab peasant, "because I have a large family." Possibly, however, this want of intellectual initiative is not inherent, because the Arab who has had opportunities learns readily, espe-

cially languages, and is full of ideas. Even the illiterate peasants are showing an increasing interest in politics. It is not uncommon for them to form groups to have the newspaper read aloud. There are thirteen Arabic language newspapers in Palestine appearing weekly or oftener and although they are personal rather than party organs there is undoubtedly a tendency for political opinions to become crystallized into parties based on ideas and interests as in Western countries; but as yet the prestige of leaders is the dominant factor, and prestige flows mainly from family. Party differences are apt to represent family feuds rather than divergencies in interest or political principles. Purely traditional party loyalties, so important in America and England, have not had time to form in the immature state of Palestinian political life.

In 1919, after learning of the Balfour Declaration proclaimed in November 1917, the Arabs united against it in the so-called Moslem-Christian society. This movement was led by the Husseini family, descendents of the Prophet and the leading family of Jerusalem. It was at first supported by nearly all the Arabs of Palestine, both Moslem and Christian, as well as by most of the foreign Christian interests. Its head is now Mussa Kazim Pasha Husseini who had been an official in the Turkish régime and was at one time mayor of Jerusalem. It maintains an executive committee with Jamaal Husseini as secretary. The newspaper *Falestine*, published in Arabic at Jaffa with Issa Elissa, a Christian, as editor, is its publicity organ. It has sent several petitions to the League of Nations stating, among other things, irreconcilable hostility to the Zionist policy; but as this policy is expressly approved by the terms of the mandate and the League feels bound by that instrument, these parts of the petitions have not been considered.<sup>1</sup> The party refuses to cooperate with the government in any way and caused the failure of successive efforts to arrange an elected legislative body, a

<sup>1</sup> League of Nations, Permanent Mandate Commission, *Minutes*, 5th sess., pp. 99, 125, 196. Petitions dated Nov. 9, 1923, and Oct. 6, 1924, are printed, *ibid.*, pp. 166-174. See also *Minutes*, 7th sess., pp. 123-129, 133, 136-138, and petitions, dates April 8 and 12, 1925, printed on pp. 160-173. Another petition was presented to the new High Commissioner, Lord Plumer, on Oct. 13, 1925.

nominated legislative body and an advisory Arab agency similar to the Zionist Agency, on the ground that none of these plans gave the Arabs a political influence in proportion to their numbers.<sup>1</sup> The most recent statement of the party, presented to the High Commissioner on October 13, 1925, demanded "The establishment in Palestine of a National Constitutional Government in which the two communities, Arab and Jewish, will be represented in proportion to their numbers as they existed before the war." Achievement of this would of course put it in Arab power to end Zionism.

The Moslem-Christian society or, as it is now often called, the Executive Committee of the Palestine Arab Congress, is still the most representative and important of the Arab organizations, but rival groups have sprung up. One of these, the National party, is headed by Nashishibi, the present mayor of Jerusalem, and is supported also by the Khaldi, the second most important family of Jerusalem. Its basis seems to be mainly family rivalry with the Husseini and its opposition to Zionism is equally pronounced. It is, however, willing to cooperate with the government and to accept whatever measure of Arab representation may be given, although always hoping for more.

Somewhat similar is the attitude of the Democratic party, founded by Adel Zeitor at Nablus; though the latter is willing to go even farther in cooperation with the government and the Jews. For instance, its program does not call for absolute exclusion of Jews but only for restriction of immigration to such an amount as the country has the economic capacity to absorb.<sup>2</sup> In spite of its name, the constitution of the party makes the present incumbent permanent president, and its influence is confined to the vicinity of the Arab center of Nablus.

<sup>1</sup> Great Britain, *Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine, 1920-1925, Colonial No. 15 (1925)*, pp. 44-47.

<sup>2</sup> This policy with regard to immigration is supported by the Permanent Mandates Commission (*Minutes*, 5th sess., pp. 72-74, 188-189) and by the British Government. "The new immigration ordinance (Sept. 1925)," says the 1926 report to the League, "is framed on the basis of the principle that immigration must be regulated by the economic capacity of the country to absorb the settlers and to safeguard the position of the existing population."

Most favorable to the Jews is the Peasants' party, headed by Afif Abd-el-Hadi of Jenin. He was formerly connected with the Husseini organization but thinks now that politics should be subordinated to the development of the country. Thus he believes Arabs and Jews should cooperate, representative institutions be established, and a program of agricultural loans, reduction of land taxes, and peasant organization be pushed. The influence of this party is doubtful. The Moslem-Christian leaders say it does not exist except in the minds of a few Arabs who have been subsidized by the Zionist executive. Abd-el-Hadi admits that as yet it has no newspaper, no printed literature, and no organization. There is undoubtedly a tendency, however, whether stimulated by Jewish money or by a sense of expediency, and active in spite of the opposition of Arab leaders, for Arab peasants in some parts of the country to cooperate with Jewish settlers in agricultural development and for Arab laborers to participate in Jewish labor unions. The Zionists insist on the mutual advantage of such cooperation and point to such villages as Rashpina, which is half Jew and half Arab, to show its possibility. In this village there seemed to be a spirit of friendship between the two halves and there were indications of a desire on the part of the Arabs to get assistance from the Jews in matters of education and local improvement. In view of such facts, the Zionists claim that Arab opposition is merely a façade erected by a few leaders who have profited by the corruption, the feudal land system, the illiteracy, and the family prestige which, it is rightly suspected, will pass away with the more equitable administration and the more scientific methods introduced by the British and the Zionists. More impartial observers, however, think that the Arab peasant and laborer has a deep-seated conviction that Zionism means his gradual displacement by, or servitude to, the Jew; and though he may cooperate for the sake of temporary expediency, he resents it with all the force of his love of homeland and of the civilization to which he is accustomed. This civilization may not have the efficiency and sanitation of the West, but it has tranquillity. The Arab wants time to smoke his hookah and play dominoes while he watches the donkeys and camels and



variously garbed people go leisurely by. For the time, the Arab leaders probably have the support of the masses of the Arab people, and they are against the existing régime.

What are their grievances?

They regard the Balfour Declaration and the whole policy of Zionism as a gross violation of the principle of self-determination proclaimed by the Allies, on the faith of which the Arabs assisted the Allies in the war. The hostility to Zionism of the people, seven-eighths of whom were Arabs, was amply demonstrated, they point out, by the report of the King-Crane Commission sent over by President Wilson during the Peace Conference.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, they think the Balfour Declaration violates specific pledges made to the Arabs during the war. Thus they refer to an alleged agreement made by the British Government through Sir Henry MacMahon with Sherif Hussein of the Hedjaz in October, 1915, that "Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arab countries proposed by the Sherif," viz., "the Arab countries bounded on the North by Adana, and Mersina up to the 37th degree of latitude, on the East by the frontiers of Persia up to the Persian Gulf, on the South by the Indian Ocean with the exception of Aden, and on the West by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean," thus including Palestine.<sup>2</sup> They also point to the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918, from which the following passage is quoted: <sup>3</sup>

The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.

<sup>1</sup> Of 260 petitions from Palestine, 222 (over 85%) were against Zionism. King-Crane Report, *Editor and Publisher*, vol. 55, no. 27, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Arab petition to League of Nations, April 12, 1925, *supra*, note 1. The Mandates Commission thought discussion of the significance of this pledge was beyond its competence.—*Minutes*, 5th sess., p. 68. Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. 6, p. 174.

<sup>3</sup> Temperley, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 140.

In order to give effect to these intentions France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognize such governments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function which the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to insure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and to put an end to the division too long exploited by Turkish policy.

Syria, they say, was understood to include Palestine as it did in Turkish times, and as it always has in Arab nomenclature. Finally, they point out that Article 22 of the League Covenant declared that the "communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." They consider the Balfour Declaration, even when modified by the interpretation of 1922, irreconcilable with these pledges. If the Jews are allowed to establish a cultural home in Palestine, as there contemplated, the Arabs are convinced that they will soon insist on political authority also. In fact, the Arabs conceive the moderate aims professed by Zionist leaders to be mere camouflage and recall Dr. Weizmann's alleged statement at the Peace Conference in 1919, that the object of Zionism is to make Palestine "as Jewish as England is English and America is American."

As for historic claims, the Arabs point out that in all history the Jews were politically dominant during only 250 years from the time of David to the Assyrian Captivity in the 8th century B. C. Even then they did not constitute a majority of the

population. The Arabs have been the dominant element for over a thousand years and before that their ancestors formed the majority of the population of Palestine.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the Arabs deny all moral foundation for the Balfour Declaration, but in addition they point out specific abuses which have developed from the effort to apply it. A legislative assembly based on representation in proportion to population is denied, although such institutions are found in both Syria and Iraq and the mandate expressly requires the mandatory to secure "the development of self-governing institutions." At present, legislative measures are first drawn up by the Attorney General, who has been a Zionist. They are then considered by the Executive Council consisting of the High Commissioner, the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General and the Treasurer; then by the Advisory Council consisting of these four, five department heads and a district governor. They are not published in the official gazette until approved by the Colonial Secretary in England. Ordinarily, a month for criticism by the public, which has occasionally led to alterations, is allowed before they become effective. The entire process is thus in the hands of British officials. It is true the British have offered the Arabs representation on several plans, but never in proportion to their numbers. Thus one plan allowed the Moslems to elect eight representatives, the Christians two, and the Jews two, but to these were added the High Commissioner and the ten officials on the Advisory Council, who, being committed by the mandate to the Zionist policy, would on matters affecting that policy presumably vote with the Jews, thus putting the Arabs in a minority of ten to thirteen. Another suggestion offered the same proportion in a nominated council. A third proposal invited the Arabs to establish an agency with the same capacity to advise as the Zionist executive. All of these proposals were defeated through efforts of the Moslem-Christian society which gave as their reason that participation in such councils in which they would have lacked controlling

<sup>1</sup> The Arabs' position in 1919, which has remained essentially unchanged, is outlined in the King-Crane Report, *supra*, p. 392, note 1.

power might be held to commit them morally to policies of which they disapproved.<sup>1</sup>

Apart from their objection to Jewish immigration on the political ground that it may eventually make Palestine Jewish, the Arabs object to it on economic and moral grounds. They believe the large immigration raises the cost of living, lowers wages and creates unemployment. These results are hardly demonstrable by statistics, but the Arabs are convinced the tendency will eventually be felt. They also contend that many of the immigrants are immoral and unscrupulous though few specific instances have been cited. The Arabs call attention especially to the concern expressed by the Mandate Commission in 1924<sup>2</sup> as regards Jewish immigration. Yet immigration increased from 500 to 4000 a month in 1925. The Jews, on the other hand, point out that while there were some 2000 unemployed in the winter of 1924, conditions have so improved that the labor market was understocked in the fall of 1925.

The Arabs charge that the Zionist policy has made government very expensive. The Arab peasant has to pay the taxes. There are more officials than in Turkish days, they say. Apparently they ignore the cost of baksheesh which was universal then; and, in fact, among native officials in the lower ranks, it is not eliminated yet. Whole new departments of immigration and labor have been created, the Arabs complain, and the staffs consist of well-paid Jewish officials. The use of Hebrew as an official language means delay and many interpreters in the courts and administration and enlarges the cost of official printing.

But, they say, not only does the Arab taxpayer have to support a policy he disapproves; he is discriminated against in spite of the express requirement of the mandate<sup>3</sup> that "the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine shall be safeguarded irrespective of race and religion" and that there

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 390, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, p. 390, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> The text of the mandate is printed in *League of Nations Official Journal*, Aug. 1922, p. 1007; *Am. Journ. Int. Law*, Supp., vol. 17, p. 164.

be "no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any state member of the League of Nations [including companies incorporated under its laws] as compared with those of the mandatory or of any foreign state in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation of merchant vessels and civil aircraft." Arabs believe that legislative prohibition of grain export in 1921, foreclosure of mortgages held by the Ottoman Bank and enforcement of an old Turkish law escheating estates uncultivated for three years were all parts of a plan to drive down the price of land and compel the Arabs to sell to the Jews. It is true that the government gave explanations of these acts as necessary to prevent a famine, but the Arabs say there would have been no danger of famine had it not been for the Zionist immigration. Whatever may have been the motive, in fact real estate prices have steadily mounted. The Arabs also charge insufficient care for the rights of tenants, whose land has been sold to Zionists by absentee landlords. They believe, and government officials admit, that taxes are unduly heavy for peasants, who are mainly Arabs, and unduly light for merchants and industrialists, who are mainly Jews. They also charge that tariffs and taxes are arranged to protect wine and other products, made mainly by Jews, but injure wheat and olive production, engaged in mainly by Arabs. They also charge that Jews have an unfair proportion of administrative posts. Statistics indicate that the proportion of Jews in the administration has declined.<sup>1</sup>

The Jews and especially Mr. Rutenberg, they say, have been favored in the granting of concessions for power development, irrigation, and contracts for public work. It should be noted in this connection that the mandate does not seem to require the open door with respect to concessions and contracts for public work, but expressly provides that: "The administration may arrange with the Zionist Agency to construct or operate upon fair and equitable terms any public works, services and utilities and to develop any of the natural resources of the

<sup>1</sup> On these points see, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes*, 5th sess., pp. 76, 94.

country in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the administration" and must "encourage, with cooperation with the Zionist Agency, a close settlement by Jews on the land, including state lands and waste lands not required for public purposes." This discrimination favorable to the Jews cannot encroach upon vested rights, and the Permanent Court of International Justice has decided that the right of Mr. Mavrommatis, a Greek concessionaire from Turkish times, must be respected by Rutenberg in his later concession of water-power privileges in the Jordan.<sup>1</sup> In the matter of Jewish settlement on waste lands, the administration has been inclined to protect fully the interests of Arab tenants to the disappointment of Jewish expectations.

Two cases of alleged discrimination contrary to the mandate have come before the courts. In the Urtaz Springs case the Palestine government had passed an ordinance which requisitioned water from this spring used for agricultural purposes by Arabs to supply a shortage in Jerusalem where much Jewish building was going on. The Supreme Court of Palestine held the ordinance void because it failed to respect Arab rights guaranteed by the mandate, which it was obliged to apply as law, according to the British Order in Council under which it acted. The case was reversed on appeal to the British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, though the principle that courts are bound to ignore Palestine legislation contrary to the mandate was sustained.<sup>2</sup>

In the other case the Arabs alleged favoritism to the Hebrew language on the postage stamps contrary to the mandate provision: "Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic." The word Palestine appeared on the stamps in the three official languages, but after the Hebrew text appeared the letters "E. I." signifying *Eretz Israel* or the Land of Israel. This aroused great feeling among the Arabs, who saw in this super-

<sup>1</sup> Permanent Court of International Justice, *Ser. A, No. 5*.

<sup>2</sup> *Jerusalem Jaffa Dist. Governor v. Murra*, L. R. (1926), A. C. 321. See comment by Wright, *Am. Journ. Int. Law*, Oct. 1926.

ficially trivial incident a veiled recognition of the most extreme Zionist aspirations; but their effort to enjoin the use of these two letters failed in the Supreme Court, which held that the form of the word Palestine in each language was a matter of administrative discretion.

The Arabs, as also many foreign Christians, especially the Latin Catholics, fear for the safety of sacred places. They realize the express responsibility in this respect placed on the mandatory, but they fear a Jewish majority would find means to interfere with pilgrimages and Christian and Moslem religious establishments. The Moslems fear especially for the Temple area which contains the Dome of the Rock and Al Aqsa Mosque, second in importance only to the Mosque at Mecca. A Jewish majority would doubtless be under strong pressure to reacquire this site of Solomon's temple, for the loss of which orthodox Jews have wept at the wailing wall for thousands of years.

The Arabs seldom accuse the British of actual corruption; in fact they say they have no objection to Great Britain as the mandatory power but merely to the Balfour Declaration, which, in their opinion, is incompatible with the spirit of mandates and with sound administration.

#### The Jewish Point of View

Jewish opinion in Palestine is more completely organized than Arab opinion. The great mass of Jews there support the Zionist agency in Palestine, which is officially recognized as adviser to the government by the mandate and is a branch of the world Zionist organization with Chaim Weizmann as president and headquarters in London. The five important Jewish papers in Palestine, two in English and three in Hebrew, while receiving no financial aid from the Zionist organization, generally support its policies.<sup>1</sup> The extreme right and extreme left

<sup>1</sup> *Palestine Bulletin*, published in Jerusalem and New York by Jewish Telegraphic Agency; *Palestine Weekly*, Jerusalem, published by same management as *Doar Hozam* (Daily Mail), Jerusalem, supported by outside capital and conservative; *Hoa Ritz* (The Earth), published in Tel Aviv; *Davar* (The Word), published in Tel Aviv by organized labor. The Zionist organization published the *New Judea* and *Hoalin* (The World) in London.

each have small weekly papers which are more critical. The Jews are for the most part literate and follow politics closely.

As the Jews are engaged in an effort to change the *status quo*, which would obviously be impossible but for the political and financial support of the organization, it is only natural that dissent should not appear in Palestine. The Jews in Palestine have got to hang together. Otherwise they would starve or migrate, if not hang separately.

The policy of the Zionist organization is determined, not mainly by Palestine Jews, but by the 15,000,000 Jews throughout the world, or at least that part of them (which seems to be a majority) interested in Zionism and represented at the fourteen Zionist World Conferences which have been held since 1897.<sup>1</sup> At these meetings two conceptions of Zionism have grown up, the political and cultural. At present the official aims of the organization are only cultural. It has formally accepted the British White Paper of June 1922<sup>2</sup> interpreting the Jewish national home contemplated by the Balfour Declaration as "not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and pride." This has been said to mean a Jewish national home *in* Palestine, not *of* Palestine. Probably the majority of Zionists in and out of Palestine, like Hertzl, the originator of modern Zionism, conceive the Jewish state as their ultimate aim, but a majority of them are content to limit the immediate objective to a cultural home, leaving the situation to develop when that is achieved.

The representatives in the World Zionist Congresses are not

<sup>1</sup> The history and aims of Zionism are well set forth by Leonard Stein, *Zionism* (London, 1925). See also statement by Sir Herbert Samuel, former High Commissioner, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes*, 5th sess., pp. 63-64.

<sup>2</sup> *Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization*, June 17, 1922, Cmd. 1700, 1922. See also *Report on Palestine, 1920-1925*, *supra*, note 1, p. 390; Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes*, 5th sess., p. 63; Stein, *Zionism*, p. 129.



under the same restraints as Palestinian Jews, and a vigorous left wing minority has attacked the executive for compromising too much. Such talk is, of course, seized upon by the Arabs as a ground for alarm. In Palestine itself what opposition there is to the executive comes more from the right wing, the extremely orthodox Jews who care little about Jewish national and political aspirations but much about the ancient religion. Zionism is a national, not a religious movement, and the orthodox fear that Judaism will be forgotten in its success. The Ashkenasic community in Jerusalem has even gone to the extent of petitioning the League of Nations against alleged violations of their religious liberties in the control given to the Zionist organization over Jewish religious observances, especially the slaughtering of animals.<sup>1</sup> Impartial observers in Palestine say there is an economic as well as a religious background for this attitude of the conservative Jews. They have lived in Palestine to study and practice religion supported by funds from their communities abroad which they could distribute at will. They were a small minority and had established friendly relations with the Arabs. Zionism has meant the centralization of all Jewish Palestine contributions in the Zionist organization; consequently the old Palestine Jews find their source of living gone—furthermore, they have shared in the general Arab hostility to Jews stimulated by Zionism.

In the main, the Jews of Palestine are behind the organization though their appearance and background are most various. There are the *Halutzim* or pioneers in the agricultural settlements, and the bourgeois in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, some with considerable means. Poland has contributed the largest number of immigrants, but they also come from Russia, Rumania, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Latin America, Turkey, Asia and Africa. The writer had an interesting talk in Petah Tikva with a beautiful but dark-faced Jewess recently from Yemen, who gracefully balanced a small jug on her head as she told of her enthusiasm for Zionism in the Yemenite dialect which was translated into Hebrew by her husband and then into

<sup>1</sup> Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes*, 6th sess., pp. 51, 150; 7th sess., p. 181.

French by the guide. Hebrew is the living language of these settlers, though some do not learn it until after their arrival.

The policy of the Zionist agency seems to be directed along five lines :

1. They wish to find an economic opportunity for as many Jewish settlers in Palestine as possible. Whether the ultimate intention is political or cultural, the establishment of a considerable body of Jews in Palestine is the essential aim of Zionism, and all recognize that the opportunity is never likely to be more favorable than it is to-day. During 1920 some 10,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine. This figure fell during 1921, 1922 and 1923, but during 1924 the number was nearly 13,000 and during 1925 nearly 34,000. In the summer of 1925 the monthly increment reached 4,000. Since the war some 75,000 Jews have settled in Palestine. While the first comers were mainly *Halutzim* who either went to the agricultural colonies or labored on public works, about half the recent immigrants have been bourgeois of independent means who have settled in the cities, mainly Tel Aviv, a suburb of Jaffa which has grown from practically nothing to a city of 60,000 since the war.

The Zionist organization realizes the importance of selecting the immigrants. They say that only about one of ten applicants gets in, the selection being based on the trade, labor or agricultural qualifications of the candidate and the opportunities available in Palestine estimated for six-month periods. A member of the agency told the writer in the fall of 1925 that just then he needed no shoemakers or barbers, but 117 tailors. He said there was no sentimental consideration for the hardships suffered by candidates—no one gets in without definite prospect for employment. The system is controlled from Jerusalem by an elaborate *visa* system administered abroad by the British consular service. These restrictions formerly did not apply to immigrants of independent means (interpreted as over 500 pounds per family), those whose care is guaranteed by residents, and those of liberal professions or religious occupation. The ordinance of September, 1925, however, provided more rigorous control over these classes of immigrants.

For facilitating immigration and settlement, the Zionist or-

ganization established in 1920 a fund known as the Keren Hayesod. It is subscribed to by Jews all over the world. In the administration of immigration laws the government seems to follow the advice of the Zionist Agency and in fact the immigration department is controlled by Zionists.

2. The Zionist organization is especially anxious to settle immigrants on the land and to this end to purchase agricultural lands. It has established the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kajemeth Lejisrael, Ltd.) which has purchased some sixty square miles (150,000 dunam) to be held permanently by the Zionist organization. It also supports the Palestine Land Development Company, which has purchased considerable areas of land for lease or sale to settlers. About half of Palestine's area of 10,000 square miles is thought to be arable, and of this the Jews owned 177 square miles before the war, and twice as much, 319 square miles (six per cent of the arable) at the end of 1925. As yet nothing has been done toward turning public or waste lands over to Jewish settlement as suggested by the mandate. At present about a quarter of the Palestine Jews may be found in agricultural settlements. These are considered the backbone of Zionism. Industrial development has not been rapid and Tel Aviv, which has lived mainly on the money brought in by new immigrants, is causing concern to many Zionists. Its people cannot live indefinitely by taking in each other's washing.

3. Zionists insist that Jewish culture must be kept permanently distinct from that of the Arabs. Gradual amalgamation of the Jewish and Arab population, they say, would inevitably lower Jewish standards, which are somewhat higher at present. It would also destroy the *raison d'être* of Zionism. They therefore use and mainly support their own schools, and keep their communities distinct, though some of these are adjacent to Arab colonies. There is a tendency for Jewish settlements to concentrate in geographical blocks, especially in the plain of Esdraelon, and in the vicinities of Jaffa, Caesarea and Tiberias. Some look with concern on this tendency, which may create hostile Arab and Jewish areas and promote a spirit of competition. Contrary to the situation in the days of Solomon, the

Jews are now in the fertile valleys while the hill tops which they then occupied are in the hands of the Arabs. As a center of Jewish culture a university has been established on Mount Scopus, overlooking Jerusalem.

4. While insisting on the integrity of Jewish culture, the Zionist organization favors a policy of Jewish-Arab cooperation. They do not apparently contemplate evacuation of the Arab population but emphasize the mutual benefit to be gained in agriculture and industry through cooperation, the Jew giving capital and knowledge of Western agriculture and industrial methods, the Arab contributing his knowledge and experience of local conditions. Gradual elevation of Arab standards in sanitation, health, education, etc., the Zionists say, will result from these contacts, and there is no doubt that the Arabs have been stimulated to improvement in these directions.

5. Development of the economic possibilities of the country is generally put as a leading Zionist objective. For agricultural improvement they promote road-building, irrigation, afforestation and drainage. While the first two demand governmental initiative, the Jews themselves have done much of the last two in their colonies. For industrial development they have high hopes of the hydro-electric possibilities of the Jordan, and have already started several coal power stations and received concessions for water power. The mandate seems to allow preference to Jewish enterprise in such concessions.

How do the Zionists seek to justify their peaceful penetration of Palestine in the face of Arab opposition? Apart from the general recognition of the Balfour Declaration, the historic claim of the Jews and the deep interest of the fifteen million Jews in the world, they urge mainly the Jew's superior capacity to utilize the land and resources of Palestine. The world, they say, is so crowded that land can not be left to those who cannot use it to its utmost. The Arabs, they believe, have not made the most of their heritage. A land capable of supporting three millions can not be left to 800,000. As Englishmen occupied the lands of the American Indian through their superior ability to utilize them, so some one is going to occupy Palestine. If the Jews did not, the Italians would. They do not admit,

however, that this peaceful penetration will be detrimental to the Arab. Quite the contrary. Swamps will be drained, deserts irrigated, industries started, commerce stimulated, and as a result space will be made for the Jewish immigrant, and the Arabs, far from being ousted, will share in the general prosperity. As examples, they call attention to Tel Aviv, which stands on what was a rolling sand-dune in 1908, and the numerous colonies in the plain of Esdraelon, which was inhabited for the most part by mosquitoes before the war.<sup>1</sup>

That some Arabs will suffer, they do not deny. The rich landowners who profit by the feudal land system and the political leaders who live on baksheesh and family prestige will find their positions undermined in the more modern conditions which will prevail. Such people, who have lived by exploiting the common man, the Jews say, are alone responsible for the opposition to Zionism. When the average Arab finds himself prospering in cooperation with the Jew he will desert these false prophets.

The Jews in Palestine look upon Great Britain and the mandate as their main protection against the Arabs; consequently they are not inclined to criticize the government. They are satisfied with its organization and with the recognition given to the Zionist Agency, and they say that it is loyally carrying out the Zionist policy as embodied in the mandate.

Of the administration of Sir Herbert Samuel, himself a Jew, they were laudatory, but they have expressed no complaint that his successor, Lord Plumer, is a Christian. In the Zionist Congresses the British government and the Zionist executive have been criticized for too much timidity in dealing with the Arabs, but the Zionist executive itself has generally approved of British action.

The Zionist organization sends a memorandum every year to the Mandates Commission through the British government. These are not in the main critical, as have been the various Arab petitions; but they have complained of the delay in carrying out Article 6 of the mandate which contemplates Jewish

<sup>1</sup> See remarks of M. Rappard, member of the Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes*, 7th sess., p. 104.

settlement on waste and public lands, and of the meagre grants in aid to Jewish schools. Since the Jews use these schools almost entirely, they get little benefit from the public schools, to which, however, they contribute taxes.<sup>1</sup>

The Zionists appreciate the League of Nations supervision as an additional guarantee of the policy embodied in the mandate. They have noted with especial pleasure the refusal of the Commission and the Council to consider Arab petitions which attack the terms of the mandate itself.

### *The British Point of View*

The British policy is formally based on the terms of the mandate. The government thinks that this demands, first, good administration. Sir Herbert Samuel in his retiring report, 1920–1925,<sup>2</sup> deals first with public security, then with justice, finance, communications, public health and education. Colonel Symes, the Chief Secretary, told the writer that he considered good administration of justice as of first importance, then maintenance of order and security, then road-building. These are the matters with which the administration is primarily concerned, and they benefit all inhabitants alike. Some of the officials regret that Palestine is a mandate rather than a colony, because they are afraid the mandate will terminate before long-time plans for improvement can mature, and that the continuous publicity given administration measures will keep purely political opposition alive. “Successful administration”, said one official, “is possible only when no one is looking.” This somewhat undemocratic attitude was continued by the remark that direct administration, as in Palestine, was more efficient and hence preferable to the indirect system of Iraq. “With the former,” I was told by an official who had been in the India Civil Service, “one can really accomplish something toward building up the country.” Administrators seem to like what

<sup>1</sup> See letter from Zionist Organization, Sept. 1, 1925, printed in Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes*, 7th sess., p. 183, and *Report on Palestine, 1920–1925*, *supra*, note 1, p. 390.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, *loc. cit.*, and statement of Sir Herbert Samuel, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes*, 5th sess., p. 56.

they have; in Iraq, British officials were more laudatory of the indirect system of advice to a native government, there in effect. According to their reports and figures, the British have improved security and justice, have built roads and somewhat increased prosperity in spite of unfavorable world conditions. The Arabs are more skeptical.

Next to good administration the British put the Balfour Declaration, which is incorporated in the mandate. This policy is recognized by the terms of the mandate itself as requiring some discriminations favoring the Jews—and others have grown up by practical necessity. Among such discriminations are recognition of Hebrew as an official language, though Jews constitute as yet but a small fraction of the population; the favoritism toward Jews in the grant of public service concessions; and (according to the mandate terms but not in practice) the preference to Jews in settling waste and public lands. The British have also recognized the advisory capacity of the Zionist Agency, put Zionists in charge of the labor and immigration departments, and refused to constitute a legislative assembly really representative of the population. With regard to civil and property rights, however, the British claim to treat Jew and Arab with impartial justice, as indeed the mandate requires.

With the justifiability of the Balfour Declaration the officials do not deal, nor do they discuss its compatibility with agreements and declarations made to the Hedjaz and the Arabs before its enunciation. It has been accepted, they say, by the fifty-five nations of the League in approving the mandate, by the Zionist organization and by the United States through congressional resolution.<sup>1</sup> Consequently it is a *fait accompli*. Neither Great Britain nor the League of Nations has given the Arabs any reason to think it will ever be revoked.<sup>2</sup>

The reasons which induced the British to make this Declaration on November 2, 1917, are an interesting speculation and

<sup>1</sup> Joint Resolution, 67th Cong., adopted by Senate, May 3; House of Rep., June 30; and approved by President Harding, Sept. 21, 1922. See also Stein, *Zionism*, chap. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, note 1, p. 389.



one to which the Arabs attach much moral importance. Most of them believe it was forced by Jewish financial pressure during the war. The more diplomatically minded point out the strategic interest of Great Britain in Suez, the advantage of having a foothold other than Egypt in its vicinity, the certainty that the Zionist Declaration would give Great Britain a better claim than France to Palestine, since France could hardly be protector of both Christians and Jews in the East, and the probability that, in view of the large Arab population, an administration protecting Jews in Palestine would have to remain there for a very long time.

Those who know Mr. Balfour say that the policy was his own and he was motivated less by either of these considerations than by the conviction that the Jewish problem needed solution and this was its solution. Zionism, he thought, would change the psychology of the Ghetto Jew by giving him an alternative to persecution. It would prevent international Judaism from becoming a menace to national states by giving the Jews a normal political objective, and would remove an important cause of international friction by eliminating pogroms which have followed Jewish economic pressure in certain regions. These advantages to 15,000,000 Jews and to the world in general he considered to outweigh any possible objection of the 700,000 Arabs in Palestine.<sup>1</sup>

Whatever may have been the reason for its original suggestion, it is now a *fait accompli* and the British consider themselves bound by it. They are, however, gradually interpreting and applying it in a sense less unfavorable to the Arabs. Thus the mandate itself makes the second half of the Balfour Declaration, "safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race or religion," an independent duty, not merely a qualification of the duty of facilitating the national home for the Jews as in the original Declaration. Then the White Paper of 1922 declared that the national

<sup>1</sup> The history of negotiations leading up to this declaration is given in Stein, *Zionism*, chap. 4. See also Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. 6, pp. 170-174.



home meant a cultural home *in* Palestine not a Jewish state *of* Palestine.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the courts and the administration have emphasized to an ever-increasing extent the duty of protecting Arab rights. The Urtaz Springs decision is in point, as is also the administration's backwardness in settling Jews on waste and public lands because of anxiety to protect Arab squatters.<sup>2</sup> In a tract near Beisan, particularly, Arab squatters were allowed to buy public land on very easy terms. Finally the number of Jews in the administration has been steadily reduced and a Christian High Commissioner has been substituted for a Jew.

Next to good administration and the Balfour Declaration, the program of the British includes a determination to build up gradually institutions of self-government as required by the mandate, so that provisional independence can be recognized as contemplated by Article 22 of the League Covenant. Though some administrators favor direct administration, official enunciations of policy have always looked forward to representative institutions, and, as has been noted, proposals in this direction have been made, though they did not prove satisfactory to the Arabs.<sup>3</sup> Whether other plans can be devised for more self-government and put into effect remains to be seen.

### *Conclusion*

Through much of history, Palestine has been in a state of political transition. So many political forces have always borne upon it that its equilibrium has seldom been stable. This is its situation to-day. Is it moving toward a more stable equilibrium? If so, what satisfaction will the various political interests receive?

It seems probable that Jewish immigration will continue and that the Jews will establish a cultural home in Palestine. They already have this to a limited degree. The men controlling the policy of the Zionist organization have more ability than the

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, note 2, p. 399.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, note 2, p. 397; note 1, p. 405.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*, note 2, p. 390.

Arab leaders, In agriculture, engineering and commerce they have the best technical experts that western civilization can afford. They have the Balfour Declaration and the mandate which assures them the protection of the British Empire. For the time being they have money subscribed by Jews all over the world and immigrants ready to work hard in Palestine with little hope of immediate gain.

At present Zionism would end if based only on economic motives. Very few of the agricultural colonies, even those founded in the 1880's by Baron Rothschild, have made sufficient profit to repay the loans made at their foundation. Many of them require continuous subsidies to keep going. The Jews have higher standards of living than the Arabs and, for the most part, are not used to agriculture. The policy of subsidization may sap the sense of individual responsibility so necessary to success in agriculture. Some observers think pauperization, whether of religious workers or agricultural colonies, has been the bane of Palestine. Thus many of the Arabs think the Jewish colonies will never be economically successful and that with their keen commercial sense Jews will soon refuse to give either their money or their labor to a losing venture. Some Arabs insist that many of the Jewish immigrants are already discouraged and anxious to return—there has in fact been some emigration of Jews. The Arabs are even more pessimistic as to the possibilities of industrial development. They point out the lack of raw materials in Palestine and the impossibility of profitably producing by factory methods embroideries, brass and other art work for which the East is famous. These things are now made in the home by women who do not count their time. Factory workers could not compete if they received over a cent or two an hour.

A visit to the Jewish colonies and industries hardly bears out this pessimistic outlook. Furthermore, if the Arabs really believe Zionism is going to collapse because of its economic failure, why should they be so agitated about it? The Zionist communities generally look more sanitary and prosperous and the people more cheerful than the Arab communities. Some colonies, notably the Templar colonies, founded in the 1880's

by experienced German farmers with a religious enthusiasm, were self-supporting from the start. Experts seem to believe the land has great possibilities with irrigation, afforestation, drainage and better communications.<sup>1</sup>

The Zionist colonies have experimented with various systems of communism, cooperation and individual ownership. The success of these ideas seems to depend much on the type of men and the conditions. It is interesting to recall that Plymouth, Jamestown and other early American colonies began with communistic ownership of land and goods. There seems to be a tendency in Palestine, as there was in America, for colonies to abandon communism when property begins to accumulate and men begin to think of old age and family responsibilities. Possibly when a pioneering colony starts with all able workers and no property, communism has advantages. This is the impression of some of the Jewish colonists who had had experience with both systems.

With a proper adaptation of advanced agricultural technique and of forms of organization which will permit of cooperation without destroying the incentive to effort, it seems probable that the colonies can be economically successful. While the prospects for industry and commerce are more doubtful, water power development and better communications will probably open opportunities.

Thus it does not seem improbable that Palestine can support two or three times its present population. Even if great profits are not to be looked for, the Jews believe Zionist enthusiasm is such that money can always be found outside and immigrants will be glad to come with the assurance only of a moderate living.

But though the Jews will probably establish a cultural home in Palestine, it seems doubtful whether they can establish a Jewish state. The Arabs would have tremendous Moslem support outside if the Temple area were jeopardized. The British are always affected by the Moslem populations of the empire,

<sup>1</sup> See Elwood Mead, Professor of Rural Institutions, University of California, *Agricultural Development in Palestine*, Report to Zionist Executive, July 23, 1924.

and various other members of the League of Nations are affected by Christian and especially Roman Catholic influence. These powers would offer an insuperable political obstacle if, indeed, the economic capacity of the country to absorb immigrants were not reached before the Jews were numerically equal to the Arabs. Some Arabs, mostly absentees, are selling land to Jews, but it seems probable that the bulk of the Arab landholders will refuse to do so. There has not been much Arab emigration, and the Arab population has been increasing by the natural birth rate.

Apparently Arab hostility to Zionism has become less violent. The riots of 1920 and 1921 have not been repeated. This is doubtless partly due to assurances that the British administration will prevent a Jewish political control and partly to increasing prosperity. Arabs as well as Jews are profiting by the increased production of Palestine due to better administration, more capital and more technical skill.

One wonders whether Arab-Jewish antagonism would not largely disappear if the idea of the national home in Palestine were extended to other religions. A prominent Jew in Palestine said he thought intelligent Jews would not object if the mandate were modified so as to require expressly a national home for Christians and a national home for Moslems as well as a national home for Jews in Palestine. With this discrimination eliminated, Palestine might be conceived as a sort of religious preserve in which each of the three religious communities might be assured its sacred shrines and an opportunity to maintain a community of its own religion and culture. To maintain such a system there should be a certain balance of power within Palestine as well as the guarantees of the League of Nations without. Thus conditions should be such that the Jews and Christians, who have been in a minority compared with the Moslems, might increase their numbers.

With this conception of a religious preserve the idea of self-determination would frankly be inapplicable to Palestine. The religious interests outside would frankly be recognized as more important than the wishes of the present inhabitants. The idea of international preserves, for commercial and strategic reasons,

as exemplified in Danzig, the Saar Valley, neutralized Switzerland, internationalized rivers, etc., is not unknown and would seem peculiarly applicable to Palestine. The Jews are singularly fond of making an analogy with Switzerland with its three races and languages and different religions, living in harmony under a guaranteed international status which has become all the more important since Geneva became the seat of the League of Nations. Switzerland, however, has developed a distinct nationality of its own. Such a development seems improbable for the three religious communities in Palestine. Thus in the latter a parliamentary government based on numerical majorities would not be applicable. Each of the three religious groups should be entitled to form an advisory body of equal weight irrespective of numerical strength in Palestine. Doubtless an impartial mandatory under the League of Nations would always be necessary to keep peace between the three groups. Great Britain, apart from her own strategic interest, is a leading Christian, Moslem and Jewish power and perhaps is best calculated to perform this service. Doubtless, however, she should be assisted by the Commission on Holy Places representative of the three religions, as contemplated by the mandate.

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