3 The Ottomans and Diversity[1]

Ayşe Zarakol

Since its demise in 1922, the Ottoman Empire has had a curious posthumous identity, remembered in widely divergent ways. This is especially true when it comes to the 'memories' of the empire's treatment of cultural diversity: Ottomans are vilified as oppressive Islamists by some[2] and touted as a model of toleration by others.[3] If the former characterisation is correct, there is nothing the Ottoman Empire can teach us about managing 'diversity'[4] in 'international orders'; if the latter is correct, perhaps we need to look no further than Ottoman history to deal with the challenges of the present. Neither characterisation captures the full picture of the Ottoman Empire's evolving diversity regimes, however. This chapter starts from the observation that widely different interpretations of Ottoman attitudes to diversity are possible because the empire was not static in this regard over the course of its more than six-hundred-year-old history. Ottoman history thus provides plenty of ammunition for both the modern-day vilifiers and the idealisers. A measured study of Ottoman history demonstrates, by contrast, that while the Ottoman state was generally rather latitudinarian in its

[1] I would like to thank Chris Reus-Smit and Andrew Phillips, as well as the other participants in the Cultural Diversity workshops (Barcelona 2017 and San Francisco 2018), many of whom are also contributors to this volume, for their comments. Earlier versions were also presented at the Dynamic of Religious Interaction Conference (Cambridge 2017), the Millennium Conference (LSE 2017) and the POLIS Departmental Seminar (Cambridge 2018). I am grateful to comments from those occasions, especially from Daniel Barbu, George Lawson and Lerna Yanık.

[2] For example, Balkan nationalists and certain versions of Kemalism.

[3] For example, present-day Islamists, especially those who are more liberal-leaning. The academic case for Ottoman multiculturalism also exists and has even seeped into IR. See, for example, Kupchan 2012.

[4] Because use of the term 'diversity' to reference identity-based differences originates from a twentieth-century US (or Anglo-liberal) context of multicultural policies and builds into the question of difference a positive connotation, it must be used with caution when applied to historical cases such as the Ottomans. Following the editors' discussion in Chapter 2, I thus use 'diversity' to refer simply to cultural heterogeneity, and 'diversity regimes' when referring to institutional attempts to order and rule that heterogeneity.

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dealings with cultural diversity (at least in comparison to other polities of the time), it too was capable of repressive cultural interference if a *combination* of conditions that push such an outcome was present: (1) institutional trends towards state centralisation, (2) interpolity competition involving external actors with ties to internal groups and (3) a governing (or legitimating) ideology viewing heterogeneity as a threat (and vice versa), likely, but not necessarily, for reasons having to do with (1) and (2).[5]

The aforementioned criteria are derived from the two most volatile periods in the history of the Ottoman Empire in terms of the state's (deliberate) treatment of cultural diversity: the (long) sixteenth century, during which period the empire was thoroughly 'Sunnitised', and the (long) nineteenth century, a period that opened with the empire facing new nationalisms in Europe and closed with the Armenian massacres of 1895–1896, subsequently followed by the Armenian genocide of 1915. In the sixteenth century, the primary targets of the Ottoman state were heterodox Muslim communities: non-Sunni denominations were especially targeted, but Sunni groups were also disciplined. In the nineteenth century, it was the non-Muslim communities' turn to be seen as a problem or a threat by the Ottoman state. This is not to say that other communities were not affected by state policies within these periods, but they were not the primary targets. Nor were the problems of targeted communities restricted solely to these centuries: the seventeenth and twentieth centuries especially are also marked by episodes that suggest that the Ottoman state (and its successors) continued to see some forms of diversity as a problem.[6] There are also episodic outbursts of violence towards various local communities throughout the history of the empire – episodes that may be explainable on a case-by-case basis but do not seem to fit any grand pattern, at least from this level of analysis. These reservations notwithstanding, the (long) sixteenth and nineteenth centuries nevertheless stand out for the systematic and sustained attempts overseen

[5] As with any order, bottom-up pressures for change were also present in the Ottoman Empire, such as those created by the hierarchies supported by the diversity regime of any given period. For the purposes of this essay, however, my focus is more on state actions and less on societal response.

[6] For example, in the seventeenth century, certain members of the 'puritan' Kadızadeli movement reached the upper echelons of power and targeted both heterodoxy in Islam and the lifestyles of non-Muslim groups (e.g. banning coffee houses or the sale of alcohol within city limits). In the twentieth century (in 1942), the Turkish state levied a tax on non-Muslim citizens and sent those unable to pay to labour camps. There are many other such episodes that could be recounted here. Other post-Ottoman states in the Balkans and the Middle East (hence successor*s* in plural) have had their own problematic episodes.

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by the Ottoman state to deal with the problem of heterogeneity, and thus give us an opening into understanding how the Ottoman 'order' dealt with cultural diversity.

From a diversity management angle, the pressing question for the Ottoman Empire (or for any political order) is why some types of heterogeneity were problematized over similar types of heterogeneity that were not, and why in some periods and yet not others.[7] Politicisation of difference is a historically contingent phenomenon, and cultural difference needs to be understood relationally and contextually, without the temptation to impose today's salient categories anachronistically on the past. This is why it is productive to compare the treatment of Muslim minorities in the sixteenth century and the treatment of non-Muslim groups in the nineteenth century. Focusing only on how non-Muslim groups were treated in the Ottoman Empire as a proof of Ottoman multiculturalism reads back into history a particular relationship dynamic that may not always have existed. In other words, the Muslim–non-Muslim divide, while always present in a legal sense in the empire, may not always have been the most politically salient cultural demarcation as far as the state was concerned. To treat such divisions as static would thus impose a particular conclusion on the study before it has even started.

This brings us to the question of how the Ottoman Empire should be conceptualised within this project. As explained in Chapter 2, our editors follow Reus-Smit in defining international orders as 'systemic configurations of political authority, comprising multiple units of authority, arranged according to some principle of differentiation.'[8] The extent of state centralisation and the reach of political authority varied greatly over the duration of the Ottoman polity; in other words, there were periods where the Ottoman Empire approximated a centralised polity or proto-state more than an international order. The Ottoman 'diversity regime' evolved over time, though there were some recurring referents that made it recognisable as 'Ottoman' throughout. The famous *millet* system became properly institutionalised only in the eighteenth century, at which point it was legitimised by the construction of a narrative of a traditional pedigree supposedly extending back to the fifteenth century. Furthermore, the *millet* system, even in its most evolved form, never captured (nor was intended to capture) the complex cultural-religious make-up of the empire. Superficial references to the *millet* system mislead

[7] And the same could be asked of other diversity regimes as well. See, for instance, Millward's discussion of the People's Republic of China in this volume.
[8] Reus-Smit 2017, 859.

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us into thinking of Ottoman communities as easily divisible into Muslims or non-Muslims, or Muslims, Christians and Jews. As late as the eighteenth century, the area that is now called the Middle East was home to (excluding Muslim communities) the Maronites, the Jacobites, Nestorians, the Melkite, Orthodox Christian Arabic speakers, Catholic Arabic speakers, the Copts, Armenians, Greeks, the Druze, Arabic-speaking Rabbinical and Qaraite Jews, Jews of Kurdistan, Sephardic Jews, and so forth.[9] North Africa, the Balkans and Anatolia were similarly diverse. There were further divisions (and homogenisations)[10] among these groups based on location, especially in terms of urban versus rural communities. The same person may have been seen as member of a group (as defined by religion, sect, ethnicity, language or location) or not depending on the activity they were engaged in and who they were engaging with. We should thus not imagine that groups in the Ottoman Empire, even the formally institutionalised ones, had much internal coherence or firm boundaries. In fact, it was frequently the Ottoman state's attempts to manage cultural diversity that created or reinforced such boundaries, and not the other way around.[11]

This chapter proceeds in three sections. First, I consider whether the diversity regime of the Ottoman Empire can be characterised as any *one* thing over the six hundred years of the empire's existence. Reus-Smit defines 'diversity regime' as 'systems of norms and practices that simultaneously configure authority and construct diversity' in order to meet legitimation challenges.[12] As already noted, the Ottoman diversity regime was a continuously evolving system, so in that sense there was not *one* Ottoman diversity regime but multiple versions over time. The overarching ethos connecting various Ottoman diversity regimes was a mixture of cultural laissez-faire and pragmatism. However, there were also 'exceptional' periods where the Ottoman polity took a very heavy-handed approach to managing cultural diversity and in fact conceived of certain types of diversity as a problem to be sorted out.[13] The chapter contextualises the thus exceptional sixteenth and nineteenth centuries against the general context of Ottoman pragmatism. The second section focuses on the long sixteenth century, in the middle of which the

[9] Masters 2001, chapter 2.
[10] 'European visitors to the region, whether Christians or Jews, frequently noted with disgust and alarm that their erstwhile coreligionists were "Turks" in all but name' (Ibid., 43).
[11] This observation is very much in line with the arguments in the Introduction to this volume. See also Reus-Smit 2017.
[12] Ibid., 876.
[13] For a critique of the narrative of 'Ottoman pragmatism', see also Dagli 2013.

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Ottoman state pursued an aggressive campaign of Sunnitisation towards its Muslim population, with smaller follow-up bursts afterwards. The sixteenth century is often overlooked by modern accounts of the empire's model of tolerance, probably because it was heterodox Muslim communities that bore the brunt of the state's force, rather than non-Muslims. The third section then focuses on the demise of the lax Ottoman diversity regime at the end of the nineteenth century, culminating in the Armenian genocide in 1915. In both the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries we find a polity previously relatively relaxed about cultural diversity manifesting starkly opposite attitudes. Comparing these exceptional periods of state impatience towards cultural differences with the more laissez-faire periods in the empire's history can give us important clues as to what type of stressors cause diversity regimes to become restrictive as opposed to relaxed. The chapter therefore concludes with a discussion of the lessons that can be drawn from the Ottoman case for cultural diversity in future international orders.

A Syncretic, Islamic Empire

It is not easy to characterise a polity that lasted for more than six hundred years as just one thing, but on balance, it may be fair to say that for most of its history the Ottoman order was one where the state took a relatively relaxed stance towards the management of cultural diversity, while maintaining an Islamic identity itself. The cultural syncretism was built into the empire's DNA from its beginnings, and notwithstanding the gradual homogenisation of the population over centuries, it lasted until its bitter end.

Both the overarching Islamic identity of the polity and the cultural diversity of its demographics were present from the moment of origin. The Ottoman polity grew in the fourteenth century from a small *beylik*,[14] one of many created by the ruin of the Seljuk sultanate of Rum, which had collapsed in the early thirteenth century after many years of onslaughts by the Crusades coming from the West and the Mongols from the East. Early Ottoman armies were very heterogeneous, 'mixing Christians with Muslims and often directed against coreligionists, [with a] focus on booty and territorial expansion rather than conversion.'[15] Early Ottoman warrior bands even included pagan Tatars. Osman I, the founder, incorporated Byzantine warriors into his army and gave them land titles (*tımar*), as well as administrative positions. In fact, Osman's

[14] Often translated as 'principality', 'petty kingdom' or 'statelet'.
[15] Darling 2000, 135; see also Wittek 1938.

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closest companion, Köse Mihal (Mikhalis the Beardless), was Greek and took part in Ottoman raids as a Christian.[16] There was also intermarriage – for example, Osman's son Orhan married a Byzantine princess.

Despite the religious heterogeneity of their bands, the early Ottomans justified their conquests by a legitimating ideology of *ghaza* (Islamic holy conquest). However, the Ottoman rulers seem to have had a practical relationship with their Islamic identity from the beginning. The adoption of the *ghazi* title by the Ottomans was driven by their competition with other Turkish *beyliks*, especially the Aydin *beylik*, who used this title to recruit warriors against the Venetians.[17] The *ghazi* identity of the Ottomans became more pronounced in the second half of the fourteenth century, when the Ottomans stopped acting as mercenaries and started making conquests for themselves. It was in this period that they expanded into the Balkans, facing 'new opponents who were generally not prepared to accept Turkish conquest gracefully … [having] not lived side by side with Turks for decades or centuries like the Byzantines of Anatolia.'[18] This was also the period when the Ottoman rulers stopped being able to lead all of the raids and started having to delegate at least some authority to other frontier *beys*, 'some of whom were not of Ottoman origin and did not identify strongly as Ottomans.'[19] The Ottomans cast Turkish offensives against themselves as 'treason against the *ghaza*,'[20] hurting the fight against the infidel.[21]

This interplay between an ostensibly Islamic identity for the state and the syncretic nature of its institutions and demographics was thus established well within the first century – if not the first decades – of the Ottoman reign and would go on to set the tone of the empire's diversity regimes for centuries to come. Depending on the preferences of a particular sultan on the throne, the empire might have leaned to one side or the other at times, but the majority of the time the balance was kept. The overarching theme was thus pragmatism and flexibility, and though it sounds peculiar to our modern ears, the empire can be described as *both* Islamic in its identity *and* religiously syncretic (or pluralist). As Barkey observes: 'The resulting Ottoman form of political legitimacy was much

[16] Deringil 2000, 554. Mihal converted later in life.
[17] Darling 2000. The fact that the Turkish *beyliks* were fighting against Christian enemies using the *ghazi* title did not stop them from also hiring themselves out as mercenaries to various Christian kingdoms.
[18] Ibid., 35. [19] Ibid., 36.
[20] Ibid., 37. Another factor was the Black Death, which wreaked havoc in the more urbanized Byzantine communities but left the Ottomans relatively unscathed, giving credence to the divine mission narrative.
[21] Ibid., 38. Kafadar 1995 suggests that much of the *ghaza* narrative was in fact constructed in later centuries.

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more expansive; it appealed as much to the Muslim as the non-Muslim peoples of the empire, refraining from the imposition of an absolute creed or understanding of religion, one completely unified and cohesive system.'[22] Diversity regimes cannot be evaluated in a vacuum. Any institutional choice for managing culture, however well-intentioned, will create its own normative hierarchy, with particular winners and losers, and those in between.[23] As Reus-Smit notes, 'like all hierarchies, those produced by diversity regimes are stabilized by a combination of material inducements and intersubjective understandings about the order's legitimacy … Such hierarchies also generate grievances, however.'[24] If all diversity regimes thus inevitably create grievances, we can make sense of them only by comparing and contrasting them to their alternatives at a given point in time. Comparing the Ottoman diversity regime to those of its contemporaries over the six hundred years of its existence suggests that the Ottoman rulers *in general* were less likely to pursue systematic policies of cultural or religious assimilation. Unlike the Spanish Empire, for instance, the Ottoman state did not see itself as responsible for salvation,[25] and with the exception of the *janissaries*,[26] state institutions did not pursue forced conversions on a mass scale. Furthermore, 'Ottomans were never inquisitional' and 'there were no dark sentinels constantly on the alert to catch someone out in heresy.'[27] Conversion, when it took place, was pushed by non-state actors, such as the *derviş* lodges, but even their preferred method was 'convert[ing] more by example rather than prostelyzing.'[28] There were indeed incentives to convert – such as *cizye*, the non-Muslim tax – but they were not too heavy-handed.[29] Even the more devout Ottoman rulers focused on utility and results over sincerity of belief.

However, this pragmatism should not be necessarily taken as evidence of a well-articulated policy of tolerance (as it is sometimes made out to be). There were, in fact, some rulers who attempted to institutionalise toleration as part of the legitimating narrative, but they were not the norm. For example, Bayezid I (1389–1402), who used his Christian vassals not only to conquer Turkish *beyliks* in Anatolia but also in the siege of Constantinople,[30] considered 'himself to be descended from

[22] Barkey 2014, 472. [23] Zarakol 2011; Bially Mattern and Zarakol 2016.
[24] Reus-Smit 2018a, 217. [25] Deringil 2012, 15.
[26] The *janissary* corps were initially constituted via a child levy, whereby one son from Christian families in the Balkans would be taken and raised by the state. This is an example of forced conversion, but it was not motivated by a desire to save the child's soul. On the *janissaries*, see Inalcik 1973 and Kafadar 1991.
[27] Deringil 2012, 14. [28] Ibid., 15. [29] Ibid. See also Masters 2001.
[30] Darling 2011, 41.

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Alexander the Great, the hero of Christians and Muslims alike' and encouraged 'attempts to reconcile Islam and Christianity.'[31] When Bayezid I was defeated in the Battle of Ankara (1402) and taken captive, resulting in the Ottoman Interregnum (1402–1413), his ultra-cosmopolitan vision was defeated with him: following the reconstitution of the state in 1413, many chroniclers cast Bayezid's Byzantine-inspired attempts as moral corruption, contrasting it with the (assumed) purity of the nomadic *ghazi* ethos.

Bayezid I's vision of official 'multiculturalism' may have been defeated, but the many multicultural practices of the polity survived under the cover of Islamic identity. Christians were recruited into the army (without conversion) until the end of the fifteenth century and continued to be *timar* (land title) holders.[32] In the broad culture there was a general attitude of 'live and let live', accommodated not uncomfortably under the banner of holy war. *Saltukname*, a heroic epic dated to 1480, presents Sari Saltuk as both fighting the Byzantines but also 'bring [ing] tears to their eyes by reciting the Bible at the altar.'[33] After the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmed II (1451–1481) followed inclusive policies with regard to urban development, and invoked both Byzantine and Islamic (as well as Timurid) symbols to legitimise his rule: 'He built himself one palace in the Byzantine style and one in the Timurid style, issued a law code in imitation of Justinian's, and employed Byzantine and Anatolian writers as well as artists working in the Italian, Greek, Persian and Turkish traditions.'[34] Furthermore, 'he gave Christians and Jews corporate recognition in the empire, and his land and tax policies disadvantaged the old-time *gazis* and frontier Sufi orders in favor of ex-Christian military recruits.'[35] Mehmed II's corporate recognition of Christians and Jews would, over centuries, evolve into the now well-remembered *millet* system,[36] and in fact, some scholars still date the creation of the *millet* system to this period.[37] It is also sometimes argued that 'Ottoman sultans did not innovatively introduce the millet system into their empire at the capture of Constantinople, but even prior to this point they had already been applying its principles to the non-Muslim communities under their rule,'[38] based on the assumption that Muslim rulers replicate 'the attitude of the Prophet to the other religions.'[39]

[31] Ibid. [32] Darling 2000. [33] Deringil 2000, 555. [34] Darling 2011, 48.
[35] Ibid. [36] See, for example, Barkey and Gavrilis 2016. [37] Ibid.
[38] Khan 2016, 4, discussing Gibb and Bowen 1950, 214.
[39] Gibb and Bowen 1950, 209, as cited in Khan 2016, 4.

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This view has come under quite a bit of criticism in recent decades,[40] given that there is no documentary evidence for it, despite the fact that the Ottomans were meticulous record keepers. A study of Ottoman records by Braude[41] has demonstrated that, prior to the nineteenth century, *millet* did not have the meaning we now attribute to it:[42] 'Ottomans variably used the term millet for themselves — i.e. the community of Muslims in contradistinction to *dhimmis*—, foreign Christian heads-of-state in diplomatic correspondences, and for rare Jewish favourites.'[43] Sects were referred to instead as *ta'ifa* (group), a term 'liberally assigned to almost any collective social or economic group: craft organization, merchants, tribals, residents of a particular quarter, or even foreigners.'[44] A *ta'ifa* had a degree of autonomy: it 'established its own rules for inclusion, chose its leadership, and promulgated its internal regulations.'[45] Then it would be registered and receive official sanction, following which the *ta'ifa* members could seek recourse in the Ottoman (Muslim) courts, if needed. This was both a more complex and a more flexible (or ad hoc) system than the *millet* system of the nineteenth century. Scholars who see the origins of the *millet* system in the fifteenth century have read nineteenth-century understandings back in time, also misled by first communal and later nationalist historiographies who wanted to have their *millet* institutionally recognised as early as possible, because earlier dating made arguing for new rights and privileges more justifiable.[46]

Examination of the available historical documents demonstrates that in the fifteenth century, Mehmed II did not follow a particular or uniform legal paradigm for dealing with non-Muslim communities. In some cases, existing religious leaders and institutions of a community were recognised: the Greek ecumenical patriarchy seems to fit this model. In other cases, such as the Armenians, Mehmed II did push for the establishment of a patriarchate: 'the motivation behind this policy could be the fact that the spiritual capital of Armenians, Ejmiacin, lied outside Ottoman borders where the original chief patriarch resided and the Ottomans intended to build a de facto patriarchate in Constantinople as a focus of loyalty for Armenians within the empire.'[47] These two patriarchate communities more closely resembled the *millet* model of the later period, in that the patriarchs, once elected by their communities

[40] Khan 2016 notes that Ursunius 1993 is one exception to this revisionist trend.
[41] Braude 1982. [42] Masters 2001, 61. [43] Khan 2016, 5. [44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid., 62.
[46] Though the practice of exaggerating the longevity of the practice dates back to the Ottoman times. See Masters 2001, 61.
[47] Khan 2016, 7; see also Braude 1982.

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and recognised by an official Ottoman *berat* (imperial decree), did fulfil communal responsibilities, not dissimilar to guild wardens or revenue farmers. The Jewish community, on the other hand, did not have (nor did it later develop) any leadership commensurate with the powers and privileges of the patriarchate; the chief rabbi was not that significant. Taxes from the Jewish community were collected by another, lay, appointee and 'individual congregations within Jewish communities had a great degree of autonomy.'[48] Rather than the Ottoman state pushing a leadership structure on them, it was the Jewish congregations who appointed their local chief rabbis themselves, 'in order to pool their resources more effectively.'[49] Jewish communities of the empire were also organised not as one large group, but rather with 'each kehilla living in its own quarter grouped around its own synagogue and subject to its own haham or rabbi.'[50] Finally, Catholics did not have any communal recognition or leadership until centuries later, when the Ottoman state became concerned that they might be recruited by foreign powers.[51]

In sum, the early Ottoman state did not have a standard way of dealing with non-Muslim communities, and came to arrangements with each group on a rather ad hoc basis, depending on what was deemed to be needed at any given moment. The general ethos of the state, especially in this early period, was one of 'latitudinarianism and syncretism.'[52] Kafadar has in fact characterised the diversity regime of the empire in the period up to the fifteenth century as 'a "metadoxy", a state of being beyond doxies, a combination of being doxy-naïve and not being doxy-minded, as well as the absence of a state that was interested in rigorously defining and strictly enforcing an orthodoxy.'[53] This is not to say that the state treated each religious community equally; even in its most latitudinarian moments, the Ottoman state had a pronounced Islamic identity, and encouraged conversion to Islam via various incentives. As noted previously, non-Muslims in general paid more taxes.[54] Though there were Christian *tımar* holders well into the sixteenth century, the first two centuries of the empire also witnessed considerable 'voluntary' conversion, especially among the remaining Balkan ruling families, who were thus able to maintain some of their stature under Ottoman rule. Nevertheless, we can observe that in terms of cultural or religious coercion, the Ottomans fared better (at least from a modern vantage point)

[48] Khan 2016, 8; see also Levy 2010. [49] Khan 2016, 8. [50] Ibid., 9.
[51] Goffman 1994 suggests that the entirety of the *millet* system evolved in response to pressure from Catholic and Protestant communities.
[52] Deringil 2000, 555. [53] Kafadar 1995, 76.
[54] Deringil 2012 suggests that these taxes were not always collected.

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than comparable empires of the time. Spain, for instance, 'had come to conquer, colonize, and evangelize the recently discovered continent, [and] felt that it was elected by Providence for this mission.'[55] Later, in the eighteenth century, Russia created the Agency of Convert Affairs, targeting both pagans and Muslims.[56] There was never any such comparable agency in the Ottoman Empire, which makes the Sunnitisation campaign of the sixteenth century especially interesting.

State of Exception: Sunnitisation in the Long Sixteenth Century

Though there were many small violations of the broader laissez-faire attitude to cultural diversity throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire, one period stands out starkly as being particularly exceptional in its brutal treatment of culturally heterodox elements. In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman administration targeted and ruthlessly eliminated heterodox Islamic elements in a broad campaign of Sunnitisation that lasted well into the early seventeenth century.[57] This campaign ranged from the active and bloody persecution of various communities, such as the Kızılbaş,[58] to various measures intended to enforce proper belief, understood as being Sunni Islam, as it was interpreted at the time. This latter goal was achieved through different processes of social disciplining, such as the promulgation of a new criminal law code that policed the boundaries of orthodoxy and public morality, the promotion of mosque worship through the imposition of new fines for irregular attendance, and the construction of an unprecedented number of mosques in order to stabilise mosque congregations and monitor them easily.[59] There were also attempts to educate the general Muslim population via public lectures and manuals of religious instruction.[60] This section reviews the context that led the sixteenth-century Ottoman state away from its laissez-faire attitudes towards such a systematic policy of cultural-religious discipline (where Muslims were concerned).

Centralisation efforts were underway in the Ottoman Empire well before the sixteenth century,[61] and they continued at full speed well into

[55] Ibid., 551. [56] Ibid., 552. [57] Terzioğlu 2012–2013.
[58] A derogatory term that 'the Ottomans applied to the Turkoman tribesmen who followed Shah Ismail I (r. 1501–24) in a revolt against Ottoman control in eastern Anatolia at the end of the 15th century' (Agoston and Masters 2009, 313).
[59] Krstic 2011, 107; see also Terzioğlu 2012–2013, 314.
[60] Terzioğlu 2012–2013, 316–317.
[61] I argue in Zarakol 2018 that these trends towards centralisation may have been driven by systemic dynamics, spreading westward from Asia towards Asia Minor. There is a

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the sixteenth century. A significant development was the creation of the standing army of *janissaries* instead of the *ghazi* warriors, and a centralised bureaucracy out of the same *janissary* framework. Mehmed II recreated the traditional Islamic practice of the *mamluk* (slave soldiers)[62] in a rather 'innovative' manner: he 'developed a new *army* and *bureaucracy*, based on recruitment of non-Muslim youths as loyal servants of the Sultan without social connections … These provided the Sultan's personal troops … *Janissaries*; and they staffed the central bureaucracy' (italics added).[63] The slave-servants of the sultan thus became the new 'nobility' of the land, but without the ability to produce heirs, thereby making it impossible (for the time being) for them to build strong bases of opposition to dynastic authority. *Ghazi* vassals came to be replaced with governors, moving from a feudal arrangement to a patrimonial one.[64]

Mehmed II's grandson, Selim I, conquered Mecca and Medina and with it earned additional support for the Ottoman claim to the caliphate.[65] Selim I then used the title of the caliphate to establish his political authority over the *ulama* (religious jurists) hierarchy – a radical move for the Islamic context. When, for instance, the Şeyhülislam (the head of *ulama*) 'protested against the decision by Selim to have 150 treasury officials executed, the Sultan replied that this was "a violation of the Sultan's authority … No-one [has] the right or competence to question what the Sultan commands or forbids." The men were executed.'[66] Selim's son Süleyman I (the Magnificent), further extended the sultan's law-making authority; hence his Turkish title *Kanuni* (lawgiver.)[67] The Ottoman sultans of the sixteenth century thus circumvented the Islamic

growing body of literature in history that studies the legacy of Mongolian invasion of Eurasian states – see Zarakol 2018 for an overview. By contrast, nineteenth-century trends were helped along by developments in Europe spreading eastward.

[62] Tezcan 2010, 90. [63] Black 2011, 200. [64] Tezcan 2010.

[65] The Abbasid dynasty had ended in 1295. After that point, the claim to the caliphate was contested by several parties, including the Mamluks in Egypt. When they lost control of the holy lands to the Ottomans, they also lost whatever legitimacy they had to this claim. Ottomans had first laid claim to this title in the early part of the fourteenth century.

[66] Black 2011, 204, citing İnalcık 1973, 94.

[67] The Ottomans also continued their tradition of using many titles to prove their claim to sovereignty: 'The Ottomans were quick to take up the Persian titles "emperor (*hüdavendigar*)" and "the universal ruler who protects the world (*padisah-i alempanah*)"; foreign rulers frequently addressed the Ottoman Sultan as "emperor" … The rhetoric of world-conquering empire reached a climax under Mehmed II and Süleyman I. Mehmed called himself "the sovereign of the two lands and the two seas" (sc. Rumelia and Anatolia, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea) … Süleyman I boasted: "In Baghdad I am Shah, in Rum Caesar, in Egypt Sultan, who sends his fleets to the seas of Europe, the Maghrib and India"' (Black 2011, 538; see also İnalcık 1973, 41).

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tradition of political authority, merely enforcing but neither making nor interpreting law by, first, actively adapting a particular school of jurisprudence (*Hanafi*) and, second, developing an 'imperial learned hierarchy with fairly standardized career and training tracks.'[68] In 1556 Süleyman I took the unprecedented step of specifying which texts the students of the imperial education system were to study.[69] In sum, in the sixteenth century the Ottoman state brought Islamic religious institutions under its own authority, a centralising move on a par with developments that would soon unfold in Europe.[70] However, this move put it in direct tension with Muslim groups within the empire that did not recognise the *Hanafi* approach or the *ulama* hierarchy. Such heterodox groups now posed a threat to the centralising project of the state.

The Ottomans themselves did not have a particularly distinguished pedigree within the Islamic tradition.[71] Therefore, the legitimacy of their centralising project was always in question within a traditional Islamic framework, even after they conquered the holy lands. From the fifteenth century onwards, history writing came to be a primary site for the expressions of criticisms against centralisation. Numerous history texts bemoaned the corrupting effects of civilisation (as represented by sophisticated state institutions and their administrators) and held up the puritan ethos of the early *ghazi* warriors of the fourteenth century (and a period where there were few state institutions to speak of) as the proper model for Ottomans to emulate. Earlier Ottomans were remembered as simple but brave *ghazis* who knew nothing of taxation or other bureaucratic practices, and were contrasted to evil administrators who introduced such measures and whose moral failings were evidenced by their sexual and other lifestyle failings. By the sixteenth century, however, there were no *ghazi* warriors left to speak of, long since replaced by a standing army of *janissary* corps, cavalry and other provincial troops. What did remain from the early period of the empire, however, were Sufi dervish lodges. These lodges had legitimised Ottoman *ghaza* and fulfilled various religious functions for the warriors until the Ottoman state was properly constituted and developed its own *ulama* hierarchy in the fifteenth century. Thus, the lodges became a vector for resistance to centralisation, which rendered them increasingly problematic from the perspective of the Ottoman polity.

There was also an 'international' angle to these dynamics. In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire became engaged in simultaneous

[68] Black 2011, 584. [69] Ibid., 586. [70] Zarakol 2018.
[71] We know little about the Ottomans before their arrival on the historical stage in the thirteenth century, but we know that they could not claim prophetic lineage.

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rivalries with the Habsburg to the west and the Safavids to the southeast, with transformational effects for all involved. One consequence of the interimperial rivalry was the magnification of various millenarian expectations about the 'end of days'. Whereas in Europe millenarianism drew its original impetus from the fall of Constantinople, 'in the context of the Ottoman and Safavid empires, as well as Mughal India, millenarianism drew force from the fact that the last century of the Muslim millennium started in 1495 C.E. (901 H) and was to end in 1591/92 C.E.'[72] The millenarian trend made questions of faith more existential, even for a non-inquisitional empire such as the Ottoman Empire – if the end of days was near, it was important to be on the right side of faith.

During this rivalry, various heterodox Muslim groups in the Ottoman Empire came to be seen as Safavid sympathisers and this is what marked them for persecution. Heterodox Muslim beliefs were persecuted and many of the dervish lodges systematically destroyed in this period, seen as Safavid or Shi'ite traitors. There was even a boom in heresy trials in this period – a very unusual development for the Ottomans. Ironically, it could be argued that the experience of persecution itself is what made 'Shi'ites' out of such groups as the Kızılbaş:[73] until they were targeted for persecution, 'unlike Jews and Christians, non-Sunni Muslims living in the Ottoman realms did not enjoy official recognition as distinct communities; rather, the Ottoman officials accommodated them (when they so choose) simply by treating them *as if* they were Sunnis.'[74] Deliberately targeting them as Safavid sympathisers spoiled this fiction and forced various heterodox communities (at least those that survived), who may not have previously considered themselves as kin (or as Shi'ites for that matter), into the same camp.

Despite the rivalry with the Habsburg to the west, however, Christian communities escaped this period relatively unscathed. In 1616, partly in response to Habsburg measures, the Ottoman sultan briefly toyed with (but ultimately rejected) the idea of imposing a levy on foreign residents of Constantinople, who were also in increasing competition in their neighbourhoods with the newly settled Morisco refugees from the Habsburg Empire.[75] We may speculate that this was because the Ottomans did not take the Habsburgs as seriously as rivals as they did the Safavids, so they were not concerned about the Habsburg sponsorship of Christian *ta'ifa* in the empire (or at least not to the same extent). Yet another reason may be that as relative 'outsiders' to the Ottoman order, the non-Muslim *ta'ifa* did not have the standing to mount a legitimacy

[72] Krstic 2009, 39. [73] Terzioğlu 2012–2013, 313. [74] Ibid. [75] Krstic 2009.

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critique of the centralising project of the Ottoman state. Hence, they could be safely ignored.

In sum, we can point to three overlapping dynamics from the long sixteenth century that made the Ottoman state's Sunnitisation campaign possible: state centralisation, ideological conflict about the state's legitimating ideology and interimperial competition. None of these factors was enough by itself, and each contributed to others. There are good reasons to believe that state centralisation is part of a cyclical trend in the longue durée of human history, but it was also aided in this case by the arrival of Mongolian-Turkic conceptions of sovereignty[76] and pushed along further by interimperial competition. The presence of interimperial competition also made ideological conflicts about sovereignty and legitimacy more acute and urgent, putting in the line of fire especially those groups that could legitimately present alternative interpretations of the ideology the state was using to justify its centralisation efforts, as well as groups that could more easily find external sponsors. This particular triad of confluence was also present at the end of the nineteenth century.

State of Exception Redux: Nationalisation in the Long Nineteenth Century

Ottoman absolutism was dismantled in the seventeenth century, and as a consequence both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were periods of considerable decentralisation.[77] Furthermore, interimperial competition decreased in the seventeenth century, and the Ottomans became more inward looking as territorial expansion slowed down and then reversed. In this period, the Ottoman bureaucracy pursued a hands-off approach in many matters, including the management of cultural diversity. However, by the second half of the nineteenth century, the intolerant face of the Ottoman state had made a comeback, this time targeting especially non-Muslim groups. This section focuses on the context preceding the massacres of the late nineteenth century.

The period leading up to the nineteenth century had witnessed the rise of local notables (*a'yan*) who benefited from the growth of commercial agriculture. Local communities developed mechanisms of self-government, such as communal corporations and neighbourhood cash *wakfs*.[78] The social world of the Ottoman Empire was also

[76] Zarakol 2018.
[77] For a more comprehensive account of this period, see Tezcan 2010. See also Findley 2010, Heper 1976 and Barkey 2008.
[78] Tezcan 2010, 198.

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transformed: there were major innovations in Ottoman music; first-person narratives emerged in the Ottoman literature; the coffee house emerged as an urban secular public space. Arts and culture were supported not by the court but by new patrons: 'the expansion of markets and investment opportunities in the sixteenth century led to the formation of social groups whose members not only bought their way into the politically privileged classes of society but also spent their money on arts and culture.'[79] External military defeats notwithstanding, the eighteenth century could be characterised as 'one of the most peaceful periods of Ottoman history in terms of political protests.'[80] As a result of these social and economic changes, for the first time there emerged a collective political identity in the Ottoman Empire that encompassed both the rulers and the Muslim subjects:[81] in the eighteenth century, 'the connotation of the term *re'aya,* which literally means herd or flock, shifted from subjects in general to non-Muslim subjects in particular.'[82] This meant that any free Muslim male could become a part of the governing bureaucracy; they had become 'citizens' in a manner. Yet this also had the consequence of separating non-Muslim subjects in a manner they had not been before. It was after this development that the fault line between the Muslim and the non-Muslim population of the empire properly activated.

The shift is difficult to describe from a modern vantage point. It is not as if before this juncture the non-Muslim communities were treated equally by the Ottoman state. Religious identity determined legal and political status, with different 'laws' governing Muslims and the various non-Muslim communities.[83] Yet, though non-Muslims faced certain taxes or other burdens that Muslims did not face, they also had certain freedoms Muslims did not have. Furthermore, non-Muslims, especially Greeks, were involved in the creation of the Ottoman polity from the very beginning. Throughout much of the history of the empire, 'the majority of the imperial elite were Muslims, but it also included Christians. Greek Phanariots, members of the old Greek families of Istanbul, some with roots dating back to the Byzantine Empire, belonged to the administrative elite and enjoyed special ranks and statuses.'[84] Jewish families also took part in the administration of the empire.[85] Finally, there was the *janissary* system, which at least in its inception forced the conversion of non-Muslim boys from the empire's European territories. The smartest

[79] Ibid., 230. [80] Ibid., 225. Yaycıoğlu 2016 disagrees to some extent.
[81] The Sunnitisation processes discussed in the previous section had also contributed to this outcome by homogenising the Muslim population.
[82] Tezcan 2010, 235. [83] Deringil 2012. [84] See, for example, Yaycıoğlu 2016.
[85] Deringil 2012.

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of the boys selected for *janissary* service were trained as imperial administrators.[86] Through such military or administrative service, one could gain the favour of the sultan and be awarded in retirement with land titles. This is how many influential Ottoman families got their start, finding ways to transmit their wealth across generations despite the fact that hereditary nobility was not recognised. Until the seventeenth century, Muslim-born men were not allowed to join the *janissary* corps, which shut off one possible avenue of social and political advancement to low-status Muslims. The opening of the administrative ranks to Muslim-born men in the seventeenth century changed this dynamic and contributed to the rise of the Muslim proto-nation.

To reiterate, the emergence of a Muslim proto-nation in the eighteenth century irreversibly changed the relationship of the Ottoman state to its non-Muslim subjects. Previously the Ottoman sultan had stood more or less equidistant from all of the ruled, regardless of their religion: 'A Muslim peasant belonged just as much to the *re'aya,* or the flock of the sultan, as the non-Muslim one; they were both outsiders … as far as the ruling class was concerned.'[87] Once the Muslims came to be included in the nascent 'political nation', non-Muslim subjects developed justifiable resentments that intersected both with nineteenth-century notions of self-determination and European realpolitik vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, contributing to the territorial losses in the Balkans and adding urgency to the centralisation project. At the same time, non-Muslim subjects themselves were nationalising, and 'with the advent of nationalism, "Religion became a marker of national identity in ways not known in the past, and therefore more sharply marked off from neighboring religions".'[88] As a result of these developments, conversion (whether from Islam to Christianity or vice versa) became a much more significant act, taking on political meanings it did not have before. Religious identity became linked to emergent national identities.

The long nineteenth century thus initially witnessed various attempts by the Ottoman state to address the growing grievances of non-Muslim communities and found itself outrun by the multiplication of schisms around nationalising demarcations. The first section argued that that the institutionalisation of the *millet* system was a relatively late development in the history of the empire. Yet the *millet* system started coming apart at the seams almost as soon as it was introduced, as more and more

[86] Forced conversion is a barbaric practice to our eyes. The historic justification for the practice is that it creates a group of servants to the sovereign who have no loyalties to anyone but the sultan; having converted, they are cut off from their families of origin.
[87] Tezcan 2010. [88] Deringil 2012, 4, citing Mazower 2001, 76.

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communities demanded recognition.[89] The citizenship reforms the Ottomans implemented throughout the nineteenth century – to prevent the potential deployment of non-Muslim communities by foreign powers against the Ottomans – were yet another attempt. The Gülhane edict of 1839, which commenced the *Tanzimat* period, declared the equality before the law of both Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans. The 1856 Reform edict, which followed on the heels of the Crimean War (1853–1856) – during which the empire had been rescued from humiliating defeat by France and Britain, and was therefore designed under outside pressure – declared 'equality in military service (which nobody liked), justice, schools … abolished the head tax, and provided for equality of employment in government … called for establishment of banks, the codification of penal and commercial laws, strict observance of annual budgets, and for the reform of prisons.'[90] This was followed by the constitutional and parliamentary experiment of 1876 that guaranteed religious freedom. This was once again justified primarily in reference to upsetting 'Russian efforts to intervene with Western approval in order to "liberalize" the Ottoman regime,'[91] though some effort was also made to find Islamic referents in the concepts of *shura* (the council electing the caliph in the early period) and *mesveret* (consultation).[92]

It needs to be underlined that all of these developments were happening against a backdrop of the Ottoman state's recentralisation in the face of international pressures. Territorial losses in the eighteenth century helped to revive Ottoman absolutism with new justifications. The promulgator of the 'New Order', Selim III, acknowledged the military superiority of the West for the first time in 1797.[93] From then on this 'fact' would become one of the primary mechanisms for the justification of centralised rule and growth of state power, and this time (unlike in the sixteenth century) the Ottomans would follow more closely along the European trajectory vis-à-vis the management of diversity.

Mahmud II, who came to the throne in 1808, moved in the name of modernisation to eliminate the power of local notables (*a'yan*), the *ulama* and the *janissaries* alike, destroying all traditional obstacles to centralised sovereignty. A much more centralist administration modelled on the West was instituted in the *Tanzimat* period (1839–1876), with the ranks of bureaucracy expanding considerably and new obligations being imposed on now-citizens in terms of taxes and military service.[94] New secular schools were established for the bureaucracy and the military,

[89] The Armenian Protestants split from the Orthodox, etc. See Deringil 2012.
[90] Karpat 1972, 259. [91] Ibid., 267. [92] Ibid., 270. [93] Heper 1976, 510.
[94] Mardin 1973, 178.

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who came to perceive themselves as being tasked with the modernisation of the empire.[95] These measures did face some resistance, both from intellectual circles, such as the Young Ottomans (who were formulating arguments in favour of limiting the powers of the monarchy, though not necessarily of the bureaucracy), as well as from an emerging middle class. It was the demands from these groups that made the aforementioned constitutional experiment possible, but the experiment did not last long.

Sultan Abdülhamid II suspended the constitution in 1878, blaming war with Russia. He also justified his increasingly absolutist rule by reanimating the caliphate title (held but rarely invoked by the Ottoman sultans since the sixteenth century), which he attempted to use as a rallying symbol of Pan-Islamism in an attempt to hold the empire together. Abdülhamid II's reign (1876–1908) witnessed the further extension of the Ottoman state apparatus.[96] Society was also transformed as levels of urbanisation and education increased sharply, giving rise to a new group of intellectuals (often with Balkan roots), who took up the cause of Turkish nationalism (Young Turks)[97] and who viewed earlier experiments with Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism as failures, as the empire continued to lose territory to nationalist-secessionist movements, especially in the Balkans. Nationalism was equated with modernisation, which was equated with state centralisation. Such efforts resulted in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, and the Second Constitutional Era, which lasted until World War I, following which the Turkish Republic came into existence, officially ending Ottoman monarchy in 1923 and the caliphate in 1924.[98]

On the cultural diversity front, the story of the Ottoman Empire ends rather tragically with the Armenian genocide (which claimed more than a million lives, according to most estimates) and wide-scale ethnic cleansing of Greeks from Anatolia (involving hundreds of thousands of deportations, as well as casualties).[99] From that point on, the syncretic heritage of the empire was hopelessly lost, with the battle lines drawn between modernising Turkish nationalists on the one hand and Islamist reactionaries on the other, both with their own assimilation projects, a pattern that has lasted into the present-day reality of the Republic of Turkey. The tragedies that capped the Ottoman long nineteenth century thus present a puzzle: how is it that a state that was for centuries a

[95] Heper 1976, 510–511. [96] Ibid., 271. [97] Ibid., 280.
[98] I cover this period extensively in *After Defeat* 2011, chapter 3. Also see works by Cemil Aydın for a discussion of the ideological trends of this period.
[99] See Rae 2002, Chapter 4, for a detailed account of this period and a complementary explanation of these developments as 'pathological homogenisation.'

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remarkably laissez-faire polity in terms of its management of cultural diversity (at least for its time) was also capable of committing some of the worst examples of crimes against humanity in modern memory? The next section attempts to answer this question by casting the nineteenth century in a comparative light with the sixteenth and then draws lessons from the Ottoman case for future international orders.

The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde: Ottoman Lessons for International Order

As noted in the introduction, the Ottoman Empire is lauded by many for its toleration of cultural diversity, and yet condemned by others for its crimes against various cultural-religious groups. Both reputations are earned. When it was tolerant, the Ottoman polity was generally better at the management of cultural diversity than its contemporaries; when it was intolerant, the opposite was true. What factors activated the Ottoman 'Mr Hyde' in the long sixteenth and nineteenth centuries?

In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman state did not tolerate heterodoxy among Muslims, but it was not similarly bothered by the heterodoxy of the non-Muslim communities. Three factors seem to have played a role in their systemic targeting of heterodox Muslim sects. First, political centralisation on the scale attempted by the Ottomans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was almost unheard of in the Islamic tradition,[100] so the legitimation of Ottoman moves towards absolutism rested on precarious ground to begin with. The heterodox Muslim sects, and especially the dervish lodges, stood in the way of state centralisation efforts and were one of the sources of resistance narratives based on an idealised *ghazi* history that harkened back to an early Ottoman period, where the Ottoman sultan was essentially *primus inter pares* among warriors and had no law-making authority independent of religious figures. Second, the Ottoman polity at the time was engaged in high-stakes imperial competition, and these heterodox groups were, for many reasons, seen to be sympathising with the enemy (i.e. the Safavids). Furthermore, the millenarian frenzy about the end of days increased the urgency of being on the right side of religious belief and thus made intrafaith toleration less likely. Finally, these heterodox groups were legitimately articulating criticisms (from within Islam) that undermined the centralising ideology of the state. None of these factors was a sufficient motivator by itself. The competition with the Habsburgs, for

[100] But the Safavids and Mughals were undergoing similar trends around the same time.

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instance, was not enough for the Ottoman state to cast its non-Muslim communities as potentially treacherous, perhaps because the Ottomans were not as bothered by their rivalry with Habsburg as they were about the Safavids, but also likely because the non-Muslim communities did not stand in the way of state centralisation (yet). Non-Muslim communities could not (yet) generate delegitimising myths for the state (or at least ones that could be appealing to the broader population).

In the nineteenth century, there was a similar confluence of factors undermining Ottomans' usual attitudes towards pluralism. State centralisation efforts were once again under way, this time justified with reference to modernisation and catching up with Europe (and thus preventing territorial losses). Following developments in Western Europe, the legitimating ideology for centralisation this time was nationalism, and the previously Sunnitised Muslim population of the empire was becoming increasingly nationalised. Non-Muslim groups, though now declared to be equal citizens in theory, posed a challenge to nationalisation because of the way nationalism had become tangled up in religious markers in the nineteenth century, and especially so in Ottoman lands due to the legacy of the short-lived *millet* system. Non-Muslim groups within the empire were increasingly nationalised along *millet* lines, and they used nationalism to resist state centralisation even when they were not trying to secede from the empire. The competing nationalisation narratives of these groups undercut state efforts to organise the population around the notion of equal Ottoman citizenship (just as heterodox interpretations of Islam had undercut sixteenth-century claims to power by the Ottoman throne). Finally, non-Muslim groups increasingly came to be seen as tools of foreign powers, just as the Shia communities had been cast as Safavid sympathisers in the sixteenth century. As it was in the sixteenth century, it was a confluence of all of these factors that led to the tragic outcome of the nineteenth century.

What lessons are to be drawn from the Ottoman case for the management of cultural diversity in future international orders? Our ability to draw lessons from this case is limited by two factors. First, the Ottoman case spans back to a time period that pre-dates the concepts of culture and diversity, as well as the notion that these things can or should be deliberately managed or cultivated by the state. Just as individuals have become more reflexive throughout the modern period about 'self-fashioning,'[101] so have states (and, by implication, international orders). Second, as varied as the Ottoman Empire was over time, it is still one

[101] Greenblatt 1980.

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case and thus is *sui generis* in some ways. We need more points of comparison to draw proper lessons about diversity regimes.[102] Having said that, the Ottoman case gestures towards three lessons about diversity regimes, which I will gently raise here for future debate.

First, on balance, political centralisation (especially when coupled with external competition) seems not to be good news for cultural diversity. The state as Leviathan is a jealous god. This lesson is also borne out by mid-twentieth century experiments with the extreme versions of modern sovereignty, so this is a rather banal observation to make. I nevertheless make this observation specifically in regards to the Ottoman case because there is a misunderstanding that permeates much of the historical sovereignty literature that assumes political centralisation to be a uniquely European development. Nothing could be further from the truth.[103]

Second, when political centralisation is under way, from the perspective of cultural 'minorities' it is more dangerous to be on the margins of the inside group than it is to be a proper outsider. Groups that have enough moral standing (e.g. religious authority, citizenship rights) to mount a critique of the efforts under way are more threatening to decision makers than those who are deemed inferior or marginal at the outset.

Finally, the Ottoman case should at least make us ponder whether there is something especially dangerous about laissez-faire (or multicultural, or liberal) orders when they become threatening. When such systems work they may be preferable to other regimes if the primary goal is toleration, but such systems may be especially ill-equipped to deal with crises and to handle challenges of diversity during crisis. A cursory survey backs up this hunch – the American diversity regime, for instance, whose overarching arc is easily classified as one of the more inclusive and tolerant of minority rights of any modern state, has also shown itself to be capable of some of the most racially intolerant policies when under pressure. This is something it has in common with the Ottoman order.[104] To the extent that the contemporary international liberal order is also a projection of such laissez-faire values, we have good reason to be wary of the consequences of the current stress test on the global management of cultural diversity.

[102] See Hui, Millward and Barnett in this volume, as well Reus-Smit 2018a.
[103] Zarakol 2018.
[104] For parallels between the United States and China, see Millward's chapter in this volume.

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