Arthur H. Stanmore, ed., Sidney Herbert, Lord Herbert of Lea: A Memoir, Volume 2 (London: John Murray, 1906)
CHAPTER VII. THE CHINESE WAR 1859-61
THE war with China, which resulted from the seizure of the lorcha Arrow, commenced early in 1857, and received the approval of the country at the General Election of that year. But its active prosecution was temporarily suspended in consequence of the outbreak of the great Indian Mutiny, and the imperative necessity for the employment of all available forces in its suppression. Operations were, however, resumed before the end of the year. They were attended with uniform success, and a Treaty, by which several additional ports were thrown open to trade and increased facilities for European enterprise secured, was signed at Tientsin before the close of 1858. That Treaty was described by Sidney Herbert, in a speech on the Navy Estimates on February 25th, 1859, as “a Treaty of Peace with a casus belli in every clause.” The accuracy of this description was shown sooner than he had anticipated. For on September 11th, 1859, telegraphic news reached the English Government that the English and French Ministers in China, having been refused access to the Peiho River, on their way to Pekin -a right claimed by them under the Treaty -the British naval force had endeavoured to force a passage, and had been repulsed with a [p. 294] loss of three gunboats, and nearly 400 killed and wounded, the British Admiral himself being among the number of the latter. The strength of the barriers in the river had been underrated, as had also that of the forts, an attempt to storm which ended in utter failure.
On the receipt of this intelligence, Mr. Herbert wrote to Lord Palmerston as follows :
WAR OFFICE, September 12th, 1859.
MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,
This is very bad news from China, and the renewal of the war has come sooner than I expected. We have at Hong Kong 789 infantry, 321 artillery, and 198 engineers; total, 1,308, all ranks. But from this the officers and non-commissioned officers must be deducted, and a large further allowance must be made in that climate for ineffectives in hospital. This is a poor force. On the other hand, we have very large stores ammunition of all sorts, siege guns, ships’ guns in great plenty, and camp equipage for 10,000 men. I am having a list made out and printed for circulation in the Cabinet. Whatever is sent in the way of force must be sent from India. In the present state of feeling in France it would be unwise to send a man from here. The sepoys are even more unhealthy at Hong Kong than the Europeans. The latter die annually at the rate of 80 per 1,000. The sepoys, by the last return, 120 per 1,000. This is attributed to the low diet of the Hindoos. A Sikh regiment of Mussulmen, which come on from the Punjab, might make part of the forces to be sent (as it must be) from India.
Meanwhile, Lord Palmerston, who had received the news simultaneously with Mr. Herbert, had written to him that:
This is very disagreeable from China. It is useless to conjecture whether sufficient precautions were or were not taken to ascertain the state of the defences before the attempt to ascend the river was made. But the question now is, What is to be done? [p. 295] I should like to know what you consider the military force in China to be, and what reinforcements from India, England, or elsewhere could easily be sent thither. There seems to me three things we might do. First, we might attack and occupy Pekin, but that would require a pretty strong military force to accompany the ships, and we do not well know how far up the river any sea-going vessels would go, nor what force we should be likely to meet with when we got to Pekin, or on our way up to it. Upon these points Elgin and those who went with him might give information, but this would be an enterprise of some magnitude, and in which we should have to take care not to fail. Secondly, we might take possession of Chusan, which the Chinese would greatly dislike, but then unluckily we are embarked in these affairs with the French, and we should be obliged to have them with us in Chusan, and the Emperor would be very liberal in sending plenty of his Italian campaigners thither. We should soon be in a minority there, and that might in the end be inconvenient. Thirdly, we might take up a position in the Yangtse Kiang at the point where the Grand Canal opens into it, and we might there, and in the Gulf of Pechelee, establish a blockade of Pekin, which, after a time, would bring John Chinaman to his bearings. This would require the least amount of force, and, indeed, would chiefly be done by a small Naval force. We should require possession of an island in the middle of the river, which we should make our depot or headquarters.
The general impression that the disaster had been rashly invited increased as its details were better known, and Lord Palmerston (September ?th) wrote:
I suppose our officers were piqued to do something desperate in the presence of France and America, but the whole operation seems, by the account in The Times, to have been ill managed.
A Cabinet was held on the following Saturday, at [p. 296] which the opinion that the enterprise which had ended so unfortunately should not have been undertaken seems to have prevailed, but this, of course, did not remove the necessity for taking immediate steps to reverse the effect of so serious a check from so unexpected a quarter. It was determined that an expedition on a considerable scale should be sent to China in the spring, and that Lord Elgin should be asked to resume the position of Ambassador and High Commissioner in China. Viewed in the light of subsequent events, it may be regretted that the course was not adopted which, judging from Lord Palmerston’s letter of September 12th, most commended itself to him. The blockade of the Grand Canal undertaken it once would probably have effected its purpose as thoroughly as the more extended operations of the following year, and that without the expenditure of treasure, the loss of valuable lives, and the vandalic revenge taken for them which actually occurred.
Though on every ground a lover of peace, it can hardly have been without a certain degree of satisfaction that Sidney Herbert found himself engaged in directing a war of some magnitude at an even greater distance from home than the Crimea. He had now an opportunity of showing how misfortunes, similar to those of that campaign, might be avoided; and how well, and with what complete success, he used that opportunity the result proved. But in justice to those engaged in the Crimean war it must be observed that it is easy to be wise after the event, and that mistakes made and detected so recently were hardly likely to be repeated; that the operations, if undertaken at greater distance from home, were on a far smaller scale, while the forces employed consisted largely of Indian troops, not so given to complaint, or [p. 297] so able to make their complaints heard at home, as British soldiers. Above all, the risks of campaigning during a severe winter in a hostile country were in this case carefully shunned.
This, however, does not detract from the merit of the excellent foresight displayed in securing the health and comfort of the troops engaged, and in providing for every contingency likely to affect the success of the campaign.
The character of the expedition having been resolved on, it was in the next place necessary to determine its strength. Considerations of economy made it desirable that it should be as small as possible; and not considerations of economy alone, for the suspicions entertained as to the attitude and intentions of Louis Napoleon rendered it unsafe, in the opinion of Mr. Herbert and many others, to diminish the strength of the forces maintained at home. At the same time it was necessary that the force should not be of inferior proportions to that sent by the French Emperor, who offered to the British Government a co-operation more embarrassing than welcome. His ships had not been engaged at Taku, but the honour of France was, he declared, wounded by the refusal of admission to his Ambassador, who was on board one of the English vessels.
Lord Palmerston wrote on October 5th that he had had a
letter from Persigny, telling me that the Emperor is preparing for his China expedition twelve battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, eight batteries of artillery, and twenty gunboats drawing only three feet water. I conceive that it would be very injurious to our reputation and position in Asia if our force was inferior to that of the French; but have we the means [p. 298] of sending from India the same number and description of troops? I should think we have. Some native cavalry would probably be a good match for the Mongols, but half of what we send might be British. How could we do about artillery, which would certainly be wanted ? I forget how many guns go to a battery; but eight batteries at all events must include a good number. We could send all we want more easily and cheaply from India than the French can from France; but may it not be necessary to supply the place of some part of the force sent from India by troops sent to India from hence? The French guns will, of course, all be rifled we have none such in India; but ours will probably do well enough for the Chinese. The question is whether, if we send Armstrong guns out for this conjoint operation, the French would be able to learn anything about them which we wish or can be able to keep from their knowledge. If not, it might be well to send some Armstrongs both for land and for sea service.
Mr. Herbert replied:
WILTON, October 7th, 1859.
MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,
Our Ally is inconveniently liberal in the amount of his assistance; not but that by great effort we may maintain an equality in numbers, if native troops can count against French. But it is a drain which weakens us, and if he sent 50,000 men instead of 15,000, we should have almost to denude ourselves here, if the rule be laid down that our force is in any event to equal his. We can take one regiment from the Cape, possibly two. We could send two batteries, one with Armstrong guns and one with ordinary field pieces, or if going by the Red Sea, both with Armstrong’s guns. I have suggested to Wood to get two battalions of infantry from Bombay, two from Madras, and one, perhaps, from Bengal. This, with what we have at Canton, would exceed the French proposal. But these preparations imply a plan of campaign which I think it is scarcely our interest to promote. The feeling among the English in China is very [p. 200] different from what it was in the Canton business. They have no wish to humiliate the Chinese. On the contrary, their fear is lest we upset the whole concern by still further destroying the prestige of the present dynasty, and so plunging the country into a state of anarchy which would be fatal to our trade, the prosecution of which is the object of all our proceedings. Nor do I like sending even a couple of batteries away from home in the present precarious state of European politics. We have bad weather ahead, and must keep all our resources against danger ready. But even if we get all the force we hope for from India, if it is to be on the scale now talked of, we shall greatly have exceeded our Votes and the number of men authorised by the Mutiny Act. We must consider whether we must not have an autumn session. The Opposition will attack on this Chinese question, and the extreme Radical party say they must go with them. They cannot help themselves. In the present state of public feeling it will not do to appear to be dragged on beyond our opinion and intentions by France. Had we not better have a Cabinet next week? Say on Thursday or Friday, by which day all could be got together, and a clear exposition of policy as regards China ought to be made to the French Government.
Mr. Herbert did not at all relish the large amount of French aid proffered, and was glad to find that it was as little agreeable to Lord John Russell, who wrote to him from Haddo House on October ?th that there had now been
some correspondence with France, as Palmerston will have informed you, about troops for China. The French propose sending 15,000 men, and they kindly suggest that if we do not send so many, we might furnish transport for them, as in the case of the Crimea. Now, I decidedly object to being again beasts of burden for the French. I think it absolutely essential that we should send, of European troops, an equal number with that of the French of infantry, and as many cavalry, if not more. I confess the size of the expedition seems to me [p. 300] too large, but there is no chance, I suppose, that the French would diminish their numbers.
Mr. Herbert was not only disposed to share Sir James Graham’s opinion that the expedition would act as “a decoy”; he foresaw that the expenditure involved would excite grievous opposition within the Cabinet itself, and he dreaded the results to the stability of the Chinese Empire of a march on Pekin, which he did his utmost to discourage. Such a march had in the first instance been advocated by the French Government, but they had seen the dangers involved, and had in the end given an opinion against going to Pekin at all. It was ultimately left to the discretion of the Commanders of the allied forces.
The selection of a Commander also presented some difficulties. The choice finally lay between Sir William Mansfield, afterwards Lord Sandhurst, and Sir Hope Grant. The Viceroy and the India Office were in favour of the former. The military authorities preferred the latter, and the appointment was conferred upon him. How amply he justified the choice the event showed, but at the time there were not ranting, even among good and competent judges, murmurs of apprehension at his selection, and regrets that he had been preferred to his more brilliant rival, who was offered, but declined, the command a Division. Sidney Herbert at once commenced his correspondence with Sir Hope Grant as follows:
WAR OFFICE, November 26th, 1859.
DEAR SIR J. HOPE GRANT,
I trust that an early mail will bring your acceptance of the appointment to the command of the expedition to China. In that case our relations will henceforth be of such an intimate character that [p. 301] I feel I may, without scruple, address you as I have done in this letter.
After giving numerous details as to the composition of the expedition, he proceeds:
The command which has been offered to you is one requiring, from the peculiar circumstances which surround it, both temper and judgment, and I do not think the Queen could have chosen an officer more likely than yourself to discharge its duties successfully. There are two difficulties which beset our course one as regards our enemy, the other as regards our Ally. As regards the Chinese, the deplorable mishap at the mouth of the Peiho makes retaliation unavoidable, unless we could in the interim receive, which I fear is very unlikely, a disavowal of the act, and some offer of reparation. But our quarrel is not with the people, but with the Government. At the ports where we trade our peaceful relations have remained unimpaired. Our object in going to China is to trade, and they trade with us uninterruptedly, though the Central Government fires on our ships and arrests the progress of our Ambassador. It is important to maintain, if possible, this good understanding with the Chinese people at the trading ports. The pressure, therefore, whatever it be, should be as far as is possible confined to the Central Government. They can be approached by the Grulf of Pecheli and the Peiho. I trust that the reduction of the forts at the mouth of the river, and if that, though successful as an operation, should fail to bring them to terms an advance up the Peiho to Tientsin, would enable us to dictate a peace to the Chinese Emperor. Our object is to get our peace ratified without being obliged to have recourse to an advance on Pekin itself. With the numbers which the Chinese Government have at their command, the advance of what after all is but a handful of men into an enormous capital is hazardous, and the operation, if successful, might possibly, in the present disorganised state of the Chinese Empire, end in upsetting the existing dynasty and throwing the whole country [p. 302] into a state of anarchy, fatal to the interests of commerce, because destructive of all production. Again, the Chinese capital is so situated that it is, first, from ice, and secondly, from the N.E. monsoon, almost unattackable till the beginning of May, and the great heats of June and July are almost as powerful for its defence. Should this season be missed, as I trust it will not be, an equally short season intervenes after the diminution of the August heat and the recommencement of the cold. An expedition, therefore, requiring time may involve us in a campaign at a time of year when the temperature may tell with fearful severity on European constitutions, and it is important to get our terms and finish our business as soon as possible. Add to this that the Government are most anxious, whether from China or from India, to effect a greater concentration of our troops in England as soon as possible. An early termination of our Chinese “difficulty” is, therefore, most desirable. Our Allies probably have different views. They have no great commercial interests at stake. The good-will of the Chinese, or the stability of the Chinese Empire, is not important to them; but the prestige of a bulletin dated from Pekin would give great satisfaction to the French people. Our plenipotentiary, Mr. Bruce, may therefore have difficult cards to play. I need scarcely impress on you the necessity of a ost open, cordial, and conciliatory bearing towards the commanders of the French forces. Although the two Governments are on perfectly friendly terms, it is impossible to deny that there exists between the two nations a jealous and uneasy feeling. A perfectly frank and unreserved course of conduct is, as in all such cases, the best and safest.
It was resolved that the expedition should consist of such European regiments in India as would in the natural course of events have been sent back to England that year, and of a considerable contingent of native troops. The consequent arrangements formed the subject of correspondence between Mr. Herbert and the Viceroy, Mr. Herbert’s old and intimate friend, Lord Canning. [p. 303]
MR. HERBERT TO VISCOUNT CANNING. WAR OFFICE, November 10th, 1859.
MY DEAR CANNING, It is difficult steering with our French friends. They have not been so seriously hurt as we, but they want to date a bulletin from Pekin, and have no end of glory for nothing, and to secure the latter by levying a large contribution from the Chinese. We wish for neither. We don’t want to upset the dynasty nor to ruin the Government, as on their stability and prosperity depends all our trade, which, after all, though of late years we have rather forgotten it, is the sole, or at least the first, object for which we go to China at all.
11 November 26th, 1859.
It will be a very delicate and disagreeable affair. We don’t want to upset the Chinese dynasty, and, therefore, we don’t want to go to Pekin. The French don’t care about the dynasty because they do not care about trade, and they want to date a bulletin from Pekin. Then, above all, we want a quick operation, because we want every available man home here as soon as he can be got. I trust you will be able to send us some battalions home soon. Nothing can be more suspicious than the enormous preparations of every kind making by France. We are going to raise our home force by 25,000 men, but we shall get them slowly, and when got they are but raw recruits. What we really want is twenty good battalions from India; we should then have some sense of security in the country, and I earnestly hope that you will make every effort, and even run risks, to send us as much as you possibly can. We have some doubt here whether you can find tonnage enough for the force we have asked for China. Whatever steam tonnage can be got should be used, as a quick blow is everything. But pray keep in mind our great want, which is troops at home.
Sidney Herbert submitted to Lord Palmerston the formal instructions he had drafted for Sir Hope Grant, and received the following reply :
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO MR. HERBERT
November 27th, 1859.
DEAR SIDNEY HERBERT I return you your Instructions, which seem very good, and provide for everything. I would, however, suggest a substitute for the passage I have marked A in page 13. I am myself entirely incredulous as to the supposed overthrow of the Imperial authority and dynasty by our occupation of Pekin, and if we really thought such a result inevitable, it would be a graver question whether we ought to meditate an attack on Pekin, and whether we ought not rather to have recourse to blockade of the capital and occupation of Chusan or some other place. I know that Elgin entertains the opinion that such might be the effect of our occupation of Pekin, but it is not always true that those who have been nearest to an object have seen it best; at all events I think it would be better to leave out of our Instruction the contemplation of the overthrow of dynasty and order by our getting to the points we are aiming at. Query instead of paragraph A, page 13, say:
It is possible that the occupation of Tientsin, by so large a European force as that which the British and French Governments are about to send to China, may of itself induce the Emperor of China to yield to our demands; but if that occupation should not produce this effect, an advance on Pekin may, in the opinion of the diplomatic agents and of the military commanders, become necessary or expedient. It is impossible for Her Majesty’s Government, at this distance of time and place, to give any definite instructions upon a point the decision of which must be left to the discretion of those who may have the direction of these matters at the time, and who will best be able to judge what course it will, under the circumstances of the moment, be fittest to pursue. But there are some considerations of a general [p. 305] nature to which Her Majesty’s Government think it right to advert.
It may reasonably be expected that the allied forces would overcome every obstacle or resistance that might oppose their march upon Pekin, and it may well be supposed that the near approach of such a force to the capital of China, or the actual occupation of that capital by such a force, would induce the Chinese Emperor to submit. In such case, the objects of the expedition having been accomplished, there would be no difficulty in making such ulterior arrangements as might be agreed upon by the diplomatic agents and by the military and naval commanders. But it is possible that the Emperor might retire from Pekin and take refuge in his northern provinces rather than yield to our demands. In such case the occupation of Pekin might become a serious embarrassment to the allied forces. Arrangements might, indeed, be made to preserve order in the town, as has been done at Canton since it has been occupied by the allied troops, and during the summer months there might be no material difficulty in securing quarters and provisions at Pekin, and in keeping up communication with the coast. But the winter sets in at Pekin with great severity in the month of October, and if the Emperor had quitted his capital on the approach of the allied Army, and had not yielded to our demands before the winter was setting in, the allied diplomatists and commanders would have to consider whether the troops should or could pass the winter at Pekin, or whether they should, before the weather became too inclement for a march, retire to the south to some other winter quarter. The decision on that question would, of course, depend upon many considerations turning upon knowledge only to be acquired on the spot and at the time, and it must, therefore, be left to the discretion of the allied commanders.
Mr. Herbert sent this suggestion to Mr. Gladstone, saying that
Lord P. proposes to add a paragraph half desiring a march on Pekin, but at the end suggesting dangers and difficulties which ought to involve a contrary [p. 306] advice. We can’t winter at Tientsin any more than at Pekin, for we should be shut in there by the ice. Neither ought we to winter anywhere except in England. We ought to avoid all operations requiring time, or likely to lead us, or force us, to stay in the country. Tell me what you think.”
MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.
11 November 29th, 1859.
My DEAR HERBERT, I agree with the letter and spirit of your Instructions. I have made one or two very slight notes in pencil, initialled. As respects Lord Palmerston’s query on p. 13, I cannot doubt the evidence (to say nothing of Elgin) supplied by the Taeping rebellion as to the perilous disorganisation of the Chinese Empire. But it occurs to me that Lord P.’s Mem. well states some of the military considerations affecting, rather in an adverse sense, the question of an advance upon Pekin. To occupy it, and then retreat re infecta apparently no improbable contingency would of itself be a great discredit to us, and at the same time a great blow would have been dealt to the dynasty. The Duke of Somerset’s letter seems to suggest supplemental matter for comment. I should think that, as a general rule, where in an operation very distant from the centre of authority there is such difference among agents on the spot as to raise a difficulty, the doubt ought to rule, coeteris paribus, in favour of inaction, or of the course which risks the least at the moment.
To the proposed instructions the French raised some objections, which were dealt with by Herbert in the following Memorandum:
The French object to our proposed instructions on three points:
- On the first, apparently, they so clearly saw the danger of an advance on Pekin, that they proposed to leave no discretion to the commanders on that subject, but to insist on a reference home first, which, looking at the distance, makes the advance impossible. We have since heard, however, that the French Govern-[p. 307] ment have withdrawn their objection on this head. Feeling the force of all that may be urged against an advance on Pekin, I am still glad to find that the French have come round to our opinion as to the necessity of leaving to the authorities of the two countries on the spot a discretion on that point.
- The Military Commander should, in the opinion of the French Government, be at all times supreme over the Naval. I confess I still think our proposal the right one by which the Admirals are supreme on the sea, and the Generals on the land. The attention of the French Government should, I think, be called to the fact that the operation about to be undertaken must, at any rate, begin by being naval; and the Navy must not only carry the force thither and cooperate with them, even when landed, but must be there to support, to supply, and, lastly, to carry them away. Even the inland advance to Tientsin will probably be partly, if not principally, effected by water, and the operations of the Fleet and Army must necessarily be so interwoven that it is difficult to say where the one will cease and the other commence. Clearly, however, the men on the spot, who have passed the whole winter in examining and surveying the coast, are the most capable of directing the commencement of the operations. In the last Chinese hostilities we are informed that the French concurred in and acted on the system we now propose, and placed the Admiral, in case of division of opinion, over the General. We have hitherto done so in our previous expeditions, and our experience is in favour of a continuation of the same course. Captain Bourgeois in his late conferences with the Admiralty always assumed that such would now, as before, be the case.
- As regards the Generals and the Plenipotentiaries, we do not intend, by our instructions, to make the latter supreme over the Generals, nor to give them any authority whatever in military operations. All we propose is that the diplomatists should be judges of peace, as the naval and military commanders will be of hostilities. The whole object of these hostilities being the attainment of peace, if the Plenipotentiaries can obtain the latter, it would be absurd, and worse than absurd, to continue the former for the sake of [p. 308] barren military successes, which can bring no prestige to our Armies, and which might materially impede the peace we seek.
But we should clearly state to the French Government that while hostilities continue, and no offer of peace is made, although the Plenipotentiaries should be instructed to accompany the force, we do not contemplate the exercise of any authority by them over the Admirals or Generals, except in the case already specified; and, as the instructions do not appear to the French Government to be sufficiently explicit upon this head, we will gladly insert words to remedy the defect. But all this hypothetical conferring of authority of Generals over Admirals, and Admirals over Generals, and Plenipotentiaries over both under certain specified conditions, are merely rules laid down in the last resort for the settlement of possible disputes. Success must depend upon cordial co-operation and mutual deference and forbearance. All should concert together and act together, and if the occasion should arise when any party appeals to the Instructions, and stands upon his right as defined by them, we may feel pretty confident that the risk of failure will be imminent. Both Governments should, therefore, impress on their Plenipotentiaries and on their naval and military Commanders the necessity of acting in the most cordial and conciliatory spirit, and with the one desire to promote the common object which the allied nations hope to obtain.
That part of the expedition which was to proceed from India was organised with great celerity and thoroughness by Lord Canning and Lord Clyde, and a larger force detailed for it than had in the first instance been asked for, or contemplated, by the Government at Home. The increased expenditure involved was by no means regarded with complacency by the Treasury, and it appears to have been feared that every augmentation of force would or might furnish additional opportunities for friction with the French Army. [p. 309]
MR. HERBERT TO VISCOUNT CANNING.
WAR OFFICE, December 10th, 1859.
MY DEAR CANNING, Your letter has had rather a disturbing effect. You will see by Wood’s letter that the French force is not to exceed 8,000 men, including five batteries of artillery. For some reason (they say on account of the impossibility of repair), they take a double set of guns for their batteries. We have done the same, lest our Armstrong guns, about to be practically tried for the first time, should fail. When our business is happily over, if it should ever be happily over, the French talk of a great impression to be made on Cochin-China. The French, I hear, are very nervous as to the terms the two Armies may be on, fearing that the feeling among Englishmen at this moment may be such as to make it difficult to keep the peace. I am not sorry that they have this fear, as it may make them careful. We cannot make any serious additions to the force now without an appearance of deception to the French; but as your battalions turn out much weaker than we had assumed them to be, the two additional battalions now ordered will be useful, and enable us to strengthen Hong Kong and Canton without weakening the expeditionary force. We will communicate the change to the French Government. As regards the Commanders. We must not, because we fear the French may try to jockey us, attempt on our side to jockey them. Between the two men proposed I take Grant to be the best soldier, but Mansfield to be a much abler and more powerful man. But his reliance on his own opinion is not, I suspect, unaccompanied by a contempt for those of others, which last peculiarity it is, I suppose, that makes him so many enemies. If he did not quarrel with the French I agree with you that he would very probably rule them. Bruce is present, and would do much diplomacy with our allies as well as our enemy, and he has no want of will if even he has not some to spare. We have had to-day a conference with the Duke of Cambridge (by we, meaning Wood and I), and have decided that Grant had best remain [p. 310] in chief command, but Mansfield be put second in command with the rank of Lieutenant-General and the command of the infantry division. This gives two strings to one bow, and in that climate the appointment of a successor is a necessary precaution. Wood will have told you that this arrangement need not deprive Mansfield of his reversion to Bombay or to Madras so he will be no loser by it.
VISCOUNT CANNING TO MR. HERBERT.
CAMP PHILLOUR, January 30th, 1860.
MY DEAR HERBERT, I regret the decision about Mansfield, more than if you had negatived my proposal altogether, seeing how it has ended. You will see Mansfield’s letter giving the reasons of his request to be allowed to decline the Divisional command in China. I don’t know how this will be taken; but so far as the public grounds upon which he bases it are concerned, I agree with him. It would not be to the advantage of the public service that he should go. I have no doubt that Mansfield has, as you say, many enemies. No man could have discharged thoroughly the duties of a Chief of the Staff in this country, during the past two years and with two armies to deal with, without that result to himself. He is supercilious too. But his temper is not bad, or, if it be so, it is under complete control. It is, however, no longer necessary to discuss his pros and cons. Of the two Generals who have been appointed, Lord Clyde thinks highly of Sir J. Michel. I know nothing of him except that his work in Central India was well done. Sir R. Napier I know well. He is quite first rate in everything that he sets his hand to, and certainly the ablest military man of the local Army on this side of India. His only fault is inexperience of regimental discipline in European regiments, but this, in the position which he will hold, is not of much importance. It has not prevented his turning the Gwalior Brigade to the best advantage during the last eighteen months, and winning the good opinion of all under him and above him. [p. 311] Your reasons for not allowing a greater increase of the force for China, are conclusive, and I am glad to hear that the French are so moderate in their intentions. Of the regiments which will not now be wanted for China, two shall be sent to England immediately (the 53rd and ist battalion, 6oth), and two shall be kept under hand, ready for any call from China. One of these last will be stationed close to Calcutta for embarkation at the shortest notice. The two then kept in readiness shall go to England also, as soon as we can feel pretty sure that they will not be required in China, and probably two more. I admire you for asking for twenty, and 1 knew that Mansfield had given his opinion that twelve could be spared. But he and other soldiers are fond of assuming that when the chief military stations are occupied everything has been accomplished. This is a mistake, as yet. I must still keep some disposable regiments to be moved in any direction in which disturbance may arise, without taking away the garrisons of the chief stations. I do not expect disturbance. It is as certain as anything can be in this country that nothing of the kind will happen in Bengal, at all events; but with new taxes impending, and amongst this inscrutable people, appearances must not be trusted too far, and any delay in showing a European force, if the need should arise, would be most injurious to us now. I wish too to avoid ostentatious reduction, such as the sending home of many regiments at once. I think that if in the course of the summer I can despatch six regiments to England (as I have indicated), besides providing those that you have required for China, you ought to be content. If the state of things at home really requires that risk should be run in India, the six shall be sent at short notice; but, unless you are pressed, let the reduction be gradual. I have no desire to keep a single regiment longer than necessary. They are costing us at the rate of £60,000 a year apiece, and more. As to China, steam transport is the only serious difficulty. The dates which you have prescribed Feburary ist for arrival at Singapore, and so on are impracticable for the cavalry and artillery, although a great part of the infantry will not be much in arrear. Whatever your naval authorities may say, all here, [p. 312] without exception, are against the early passage up the China Sea. Admiral Hope (who is impatient for the arrival of the force), General v. Straubenzee, Admiral Wellesley at Bombay, the officers of the Indian Navy in Calcutta, and Captain Lacy, who came down with one of the steam transports from Hong Kong, the China merchants, the Superintendent of Marine at Madras -all urge the imprudence of sending the vessels to meet the N.E. monsoon. I told Wood that this shall not interfere with the despatch of the infantry; and I hope that the presence of our infantry in force will keep us from being at a disadvantage, even if the French expedition, or part of it, should arrive before pur cavalry and artillery. But of what earthly use is it to send horses in transports plunging against a heavy head sea in half a gale of wind for 1,700 miles that is, from Singapore to Hong Kong ? The length of the whole sea voyage from India to the Peiho will be quite crippling enough to our animals under the most favourable conditions. Why should we make sure of losing many, and of landing the rest in a hopeless condition? Two of our steamers are quite incapable of towing a ship against the monsoon, and will have enough to do to make their own way. Oude is going on swimmingly. I want Granville to take a model farm there.
The discussion as to the march on Pekin had resulted in the omission of all mention of it in the official instructions. In Mr. Herbert’s private letters any such enterprise had been discouraged, though not forbidden, and Sir Hope Grant, with a soldier’s straightforward bluntness, begged to be informed distinctly whether he was or was not prohibited from going there.
You stated, he wrote from Calcutta, on February, 15th, 1860, in a former private letter that the Government did not think it advisable that troops should advance above Tientsin, the head of the Grand Canal. I beg you will inform me if I am to consider this as a positive order of Her Majesty’s Government, and that, should the French General wish to proceed [p. 313] with a force to Pekin, I am to withhold my troops from going there? This, of course, does not refer to any guard of honour which the Ambassadors might wish to accompany them to Pekin for the ratification of the treaty, but only to a force proceeding there with hostile intentions.
This raised the question in a manner which could not be evaded, and Mr. Herbert sent on the letter to Lord Palmerston, observing (April 4th, 1866) that he had marked the passage which requires an answer. In a letter to him [Sir H. Grant] I put before him all the dangers and difficulties which make an advance on Pekin a very undesirable proceeding. He asks, is he to withhold his troops from going there should the French General wish to proceed there? I think he should use every effort to dissuade the French from such a course; but I do not know whether the French General is also warned against proceeding to Pekin by his Government. We clearly cannot winter there, and if we advance to Pekin, occupy it, and then withdraw, it will be looked upon as a defeat by the Chinese. I should like to know your opinion and that of Lord John on this matter, which is important.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO MR. HERBERT.
94, PICCADILLY, April 20th, 1860.
MY DEAR SIDNEY HERBERT, I should be for leaving to the military commanders (who should, of course, consult with the diplomatists as to the diplomatic bearing of the question) full latitude of discretion as to advancing on Pekin. I have never thought such an advance as formidable and hazardous as many consider it, and most of the reasons against it apply equally to an advance on Tientsin, or on any inland operation beyond the destruction of the forts at the mouth of the Peiho; and, in fact, would go against our expedition altogether, or, at least, against the amount of land force we and the French are sending. It is said that if we go to Pekin, and the Emperor flies and does not [p. 314] yield, we shall have to go away before the winter, and shall be deemed to have retreated in failure. But that would be equally the case, or rather much more so, if we took Tientsin and stopped, because if the Emperor did not yield we could not stay at Tientsin, but must go away before the winter, and then it would be said by the Chinese war party that we had not only retreated from being baffled, but that we had been afraid to encounter the Chinese army drawn up at Pekin; and the damage to our prestige would be great and irretrievable. Our occupation of Pekin would be a manifest triumph, and in all human probability would bring the Emperor to our terms, and perhaps even before we had got to the town. The occupation by a barbarian army of a capital into which even a barbarian diplomatist is not to be admitted, would go further to proclaim our power, and therefore to accomplish our ends, than any other military success, and I must own I have no belief whatever in the supposition that such an occupation would overthrow the Chinese Empire. Depend upon it, that occupation would bring the Emperor to reason. Besides, we might do many things and carry off many trophies and leave behind us many records of our having been there which would have a lasting effect. Besides, if we were only to winter where Elgin recommends, we could pay another visit to Pekin the next spring, and the Emperor would by no means fancy a second visit.
Mr. Herbert accordingly informed Sir Hope Grant that, subject to consultation with the diplomatists as to the political expediency of such a move, full latitude of discretion as to advancing on Pekin was left to the military commanders. He added:
You will, however, on the spot judge far better than we can here of the prudence of the advance. I doubt now whether the French are much bent upon it. They have apparently some other designs in the way of settlement in some part of the China seas.
But while making every preparation to ensure the success of the campaign, Mr. Herbert eagerly desired [p. 315] to see the return to England itself of the European force engaged in it, and the officers who had gained experience and earned distinction in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny. This is evidenced by the following extract from a letter to the Duke of Cambridge:
I apprehend Your Royal Highness is apprehensive of disturbing the order of the reliefs, else the sending regiments back to India and others from India home will be a complicated, if not an expensive, arrangement, and I would suggest that this matter be kept open until Sir C. Wood returns, when a final arrangement can be made. There is no fear of its being too late; on the contrary, we are reckoning our chickens rather early. As regards Sir John Michel, Your Royal Highness is the best judge, but you know my hankering after these tried Indian officers for home employment, kidia ceases to be a school for our officers if we do not bring home the men who distinguish themselves, and when the Headquarter Staff is to be renewed at home, I should look to some of these Indian officers, who, if given another spell in India, will be used up. We have more necessity, too, for men of tried ability at home at this moment than in India, where there is a calm after a great storm. Hope Grant would do excellently for Inspector of Cavalry, and Mansfield, I believe, would, under your eye and hand, make himself very useful to you at Head Quarters. I went all over the projected line of defence at Portsmouth. The three centre forts on the Alverstoke side are fine works. I wish we had had Jervois to plan the two flank ones. But looking at the smallness of our regular force, I should hope that some reduction will, or might, be made in size on Portsdown Hill, where Nature has already given great strength, and Hilsea forms a second line.
On the arrival of the expedition at Hong Kong, in the middle of March, Sir H. Grant found, to his great disappointment, that the French forces had not yet [p. 316] arrived. General de Montauban, their Commander, had, however, done so, and with him Sir Hope Grant at once entered into communication. The bulk of the force General Montauban was to command did not arrive until two months later a delay which involved a great waste of time. Meanwhile, Sir Hope Grant made preparations for occupying Chusan or some similar locality. The story of the campaign, as told in Sir Hope Grant’s own unpublished letters to Mr. Herbert, is so interesting, that I venture to quote from them more largely than the space at my command would perhaps otherwise warrant.
SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT.
GOVERNMENT HOUSE, HONG KONG, March 27, 1860.
MY DEAR MR. HERBERT, Everything here is going on very satisfactorily, I visited Canton last week and inspected the positions held by the troops, the barracks, etc. They seemed good and well chosen, and the Governor General, “Lun,” appears willing and ready to do anything that is required of him, so much so that he has given a lease of the Kowlung promontory to the British Government as long as we please to retain it, for the small rent of £160 per annum. This, in my opinion, is indispensably necessary for the security of Hong Kong, as the nearest part of the promontory only lies three-quarters of a mile distant from the town, which it commands with the harbour. It is a decidedly healthy situation, being open to the south-west monsoon, and with much water. I strongly advised Sir Hercules to have, if possible, a lease made out with “Lun’s” signature it. “Lun” at once agreed to sign the paper, and I occupied the promontory with the wings of the 31st and 44th regiments. This ground holds out great advantage to our troops, as, besides being healthy, there is ample room for drill and artillery practice, and the men are kept from many of the temptations of [p. 317] Hong Kong. By this lease we prevent any other Power from locating on the ground; and, should afterwards a cession of it be effected, it would be most desirable for building barracks and store-houses, etc. The climate at present is most enjoyable. Warm clothing is worn, and a fire all day long is really an indispensable comfort. It surprises me to find such cold weather in a latitude the same as Calcutta, as a month ago there I found it very hot.
MR. HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT.
LONDON, May 10th, 1860.
We have been surprised here at the large amount of native force despatched from India to China, making the whole force 18,000 or 19,000 men; our agreement with France included no more than 10,000 altogether, exclusive of the then garrison at Canton and Hong Kong. We were of opinion that in a country in which the climate will not permit military operations by Europeans for much more than three months, and that period intersected by a spell of intolerable hot weather, a small force, compact but well appointed, would have been more effective. Almost the whole operation will be on the coast or up rivers. We, therefore, spoke of a small proportion of cavalry and a reduced number of followers. In fact, I fear that you will find that you have not steamers enough to move rapidly so large a force. I trust you will not find difficulties as to feeding them, but we know very little of the country, nor of the possibility of drawing supplies from Japan or the neighbouring localities. Lord Elgin will be with you before this. He is, I think, too sanguine as to the probability of the Chinese yielding to mere demonstration. But his arrival, not having been mixed up with the Peiho affair, and having successfully negotiated before, may have a good effect on the policy of the Chinese. We have been advised here: first, that it is difficult to send furs or skins by the long sea route without great risk of injury; secondly, that they are very difficult to get good here where such things are little worn, and the mode of preparing them, therefore, not understood. But excellent sheepskin [p. 318] clothing can be obtained at Bombay in great quantities, at low rates, and with a comparatively short voyage. But I should think the intense cold in China itself would cause the use of garments fitted to resist it, and that a supply of some description of warm clothing could be found there. Sir E. Lugard mentions that the military train make excellent cavalry in India when not wanted for train purposes. You will have been aware of that, and may possibly find them again useful in the former capacity. We shall soon be looking for the first indications of the effect of your preparations on the Chinese Government. Though the war is not popular here, every one sympathises with the men who compose and the officer who commands the expedition.
The ” surprise ” expressed in the above letter at the amount of force despatched from India was intimated to Lord Canning in terms which made it synonymous with displeasure.
MR. HERBERT TO EARL CANNING.
WAR OFFICE, May 3rd, 1860.
MY DEAR CANNING, I wrote for the last mail a letter which will only go by this one in answer to yours as to an increased force for China. Our intention was that the whole force, exclusive of what was in China before the affair of the Peiho, or should consist, between natives and Europeans, of 10,000 men. We have to make war in a country very distant, in which the means of transport by sea are not abundant, and the means of feeding an army not well ascertained. The climate gives at the outside only three months suitable to active operations, those three months intersected by a period of intolerably hot weather. All, therefore, leads us to feel that a compact force that could be easily and quickly moved, that could strike its blow and be off again (for we cannot occupy in the north), was the force most available for what we wanted. But instead of 10,000 men we have something like 20,000 men in China; that is, you have sent 13,255 instead of 8,000, [p. 319] exclusive of the 3,221 natives sent to relieve the three native regiments in garrison at Canton and Hong Kong. These, with the 1,235 Europeans already there, make up 4,456, and 1,578 since sent, being a total of 19,289. I say nothing of camp followers, baggage animals, etc., etc. But as our operations will in all probability be confined to the destruction of the forts at Taku, and an advance or seizure of Tientsin, where there is a water communication the whole way, our China advisers here think we shall be greatly embarrassed with this immense number of people and animals to transport. Lastly, the cost is, of course, double that for which any provision has been made, and altogether we are greatly scared at the magnitude of the dimensions which the expedition has assumed. Large armies are expected to do large things, and in this case there are no large things to be done unless great risks are run for the attainment of objects which are far from advantageous in themselves, such as the capture of Pekin, which I trust they will not attempt. I enter into these details that you may see what are the reasons which make us here very averse to any increase of force, which seems to us to be already too large for the purpose for which it is meant.
EARL CANNING TO MR. HERBERT.
CALCUTTA, June loth, 1860.
MY DEAR HERBERT, The last mail brought your letters of April 25th and of May 3rd, chiefly about China. I think the last is a little hard upon me. A despatch which I wrote to Wood from Simla, on April i6th, and its inclosures, will have shown you how the numbers of the China force really stand. I send you in another cover copies of these papers for convenient reference. If I have construed my instructions too liberally (and I acknowledge that I have felt greatly tempted to overstep them) I am of course open to censure in proportion to the excess committed, but I have not exceeded them to the extent you describe. In any case, however, I demur to your using on your side arguments which belong to mine. [p. 320] The great distance of the scene of action, and the short and broken spell of weather suitable for active operations, are, I contend, reasons for making the force a large one from the first not for skimping it. The means of transport by sea in China, are, as you say, not abundant and what is the consequence? Admiral Hope is at this moment reaping the benefit of using for transport to the northward, and of thereby conveying the troops thither almost en masse, those vessels which carried out some of the surplus troops (as you consider them), which will be retained at or near to Hong Kong. I do not mean that this particular advantage was before my mind when the force was despatched, but it shows the usefulness of making a force which is to operate at an immense distance from extra resources as large as circumstances will allow, and as self-sufficient as possible. You say that you wanted a compact force that should be able to strike its blow and be off again. Are you really going to buccaneer in this fashion? I cannot believe it. Again, you say large armies are expected to do large things, and there are no large things to be done unless great risks are run for objects which are not advantageous, such as the capture of Pekin. I trust, with you, that the capture of Pekin will not be attempted; but let me add that a large army is likely to prove, even for our small purposes, better and cheaper than one calculated at a minimum. If we hope to succeed by intimidation -and I see you are clinging to this hope at home –the larger the force the better our chance. And if intimidation fails, and we attempt coercion by moderate measures, or, failing those again, are content with small retribution, a large force makes this all the easier. With a large force there may be some hope that even the Chinese will understand forbearance to be mercy; and, at all events, we can forbear with dignity; but if we have barely force enough to do the little at which we wish to stop, forbearance is sure to be attributed, by our enemy at least, to exhaustion and impotency. As to cheapness, it is certain that a force which could make success pretty sure in one campaign would cost less than the very smallest force which, hostilities [p. 321] lasting, we could prudently maintain there to the close of a second series of operations. There are those who, as usual, denounce this China war as wicked. I do not; but I am sure that if anything can make it so, it is to undertake it with a scanty force in a lingering, dallying way. From the beginning I have longed to see it entered into in such a manner as to bring it to the speediest possible close. The bargain with the French interfered with this; but still I think we ought to take all the liberty we can under that bargain, to have on or near to the scene of operations an abundant force -for instance, by making our garrisons at Canton and Hong Kong stronger than strictly necessary. And this is all I have done. At least, the stoppage of one Sikh regiment at Singapore reduced my excesses to this, as the papers sent on April i6th show. I want to see a close of this war for India’s sake, as well as for humanity and general policy’s sake. The sending away of the regiments is a relief to our finances at the moment; but, if we are to be liable to further calls, reductions must be suspended. Opium may take a bad turn any day, indeed, it is beginning to do so; and the knowledge that our Indian armies are engaged in distant hostilities keeps the native mind, where there is a disposition to settlement, from settling down, and is a constant theme in native newspapers. Rest is what we want in India, and we shall not have it so long as your China war goes simmering on. After adding up the force, as you suppose it to stand, you say, “I say nothing of camp followers, baggage animals, etc.,” and then, that we shall be greatly embarrassed with the immense number of people and animals to transport. Pray remember that the camp followers from India have been increased by about one-half at the special demand of your officers in China, and that the strong coolie corps has been entirely created in China. Of baggage animals India has sent less than were called for by General Straubenzee and the Admiral, by some hundreds, and this on account of exorbitant freight. Bear in mind, too, when you speak of our operations being confined to the destruction of the Taku [p. 322] forts, and the seizure of Tientsin, and of there being water communication the whole way, that it is by your own orders that a cavalry force has been sent. I had contemplated no more than, at most, 100 irregulars to act as orderlies in case of need. Now we have a fighting force of cavalry; and, unless they are meant to be horse marines, I suppose they must be prepared to land and to move on shore, and if they move the infantry must move, and neither can move without carriage. I really do not know what you expected. Upon the whole, I cannot help thinking, with reverence be it said, that you gentlemen in England have not looked this China affair in the face. More than once your letters and Wood’s have spoken of good hopes of avoiding a contest, and of symptoms of a concession to our demands. I don’t know how these good signs get to you. They certainly pass India by. I have seen no shadow of them from the beginning, except six weeks ago, when it was said (quite untruly) that the ultimatum was favourably received at rekin. I do not think that Bruce has furnished them to you. And really, except Lord Clyde, I do not know any experienced authority who has given an opinion that the Chinese Government will be easily brought to terms. From your letter, and from Gladstone’s modest demand for 800,000! (though he may have reasons for beginning mildly, of which I am not aware), I judge that you expect to get a short, sharp, and decisive campaign done at a low price. It is the old story : Blood, bone, and action, speed, bottom, and fencing, all for fifty pounds; and I only hope we may not get a rattling fall for our money. That, indeed, is not much to be feared. The material of the force is too good, and the commanders are too prudent to make a disaster likely. But I do greatly fear that the end of this season will come and will find us sitting down at Tientsin, perhaps, but not much nearer to gaining our point than when we started. I have no wish to see the troops entangled on land, but I do regret that we have not the means of occupying more points on the coast, and of holding them in strength as long as necessary. You will have seen Sir Hope Grant’s despatch [p. 323] of May 1 2th before this reaches you, but pray read a letter (“private”) from him, of the same date, which I enclose. I think it ought to persuade you that his force is not such an overgrown or over-equipped one after all. I shall be curious to see what Elgin does with the regiment which I have stopped at Singapore, whether he will wish to be rid of it or to take it on with him. I have a letter from him from Galle of June 4th, just starting for Hong Kong. It is not written in good spirits. The sending back to India the Bengal commissariat officers is no doubt right, so far as the working of that department goes, but I am a little anxious as to what may come of it in the management of the native troops. All will go smoothly at headquarters under Hope Grant’s eye; but with detachments unaccompanied by any officer of Indian experience, and high in authority, I shall not be surprised if the usages of the men get little attention. Already I have heard of killed meat being given to the Mahomedans, which is an abomination to them. Hope Grant has been cautioned in this.
Ever yours sincerely, CANNING.
Most people, I imagine, will consider Lord Canning to have had the best of this argument. To judge by his rejoinder, Sidney Herbert seems to have been rather of that opinion himself.
MR. HERBERT TO EARL CANNING.
WAR OFFICE, July 21st, 1860.
MY DEAR CANNING, I am afraid you were vexed at my letter as to the amount of China force. I don’t at all deny that for the purposes of demonstration you are quite right, and tiope Grant has very wisely, I think, detained the additional force which, as the expense has been incurred, had best be made the greatest use of. You call my notion of a rapid blow and a [p. 324] withdrawal “buccaneering”; but I do not see why a short operation is more buccaneering than a long one. If we attempt to winter in the north we shall lose our Army, and, whatever may be done or not done, I hope the allied commanders will not risk a winter in the ice. Grant still writes that he has hopes, not now as at first, of a bloodless termination, but of the Chinese yielding if we take the forts at Taku. It is altogether a bad prospect. I confess I do not see the value of a Treaty which is sure to be broken, and every infraction of which will be the source of a new quarrel. We shall spend an enormous sum of money, and get nothing but the seeds of fresh difficulty in return. We began by taking £2,500,000 -i.e. £850,000 vote of credit immediately, £500,000 to follow, and the rest on the ordinary Estimates. Now, instead of £500,000 we have taken £3,300,000 as an instalment. The fact is, that Pekin is so placed that no European power can do much against it. We have lost the first half of the practicable season, and the rest is too short to do anything which shall have a very permanent effect. But I do not at all deny that your policy of a large force has its great advantages. The gros bataillon is the true thing in war; but I heartily wish we were out of this business. I do not think that after the misadventure in the Peiho we, or any other Government, could have done otherwise than we have done. But, if it lasts, the public here will leave us and our war in the lurch. When we were in the wrong in the lorcha affair, they were all for blood and fury. Now they are weary of the whole thing, and are as tame as sucking doves. Lord Clyde is come, and looks younger than when he went. It did one’s heart good to hear him talk of you. Poor Elphinstone’s death is too melancholy. Poor fellow! I did not see him, but heard that he was dreadfully altered. I will write about the cavalry separately.
Sir Hope Grant took advantage of the enforced delay caused by the non-arrival of the French troops, [p. 325] to proceed to Shanghai, and there confer with Mr. Bruce and the French Generals and Admiral who were there assembled. He was there when the reply of the Chinese Government to the ultimatum of the Allies arrived. It contained an absolute refusal of all the demands made, and a Conference was held to decide on the course of action to be pursued. The French General objected to the plans proposed by Sir Hope Grant, and it was finally determined that the two Armies should act separately, though with a common object; the French landing to the south, and the English to the north of the Taku Forts. In all these discussions the tact, temper, and diplomatic ability of the English Commander-in-Chief were conspicuously shown.
MR. HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT.
LONDON, June 10th, 1860.
DEAR SIR HOPE, The Chinese are certainly the strangest people on the face of the earth, and your excellent arrangement with regard to the peninsula of Kewlong certainly would prove it, had we no other evidence on the subject. The commissariat speak of readiness to provide supplies, but I fear, as you get further north, you will meet with a more patriotic but less convenient spirit on the part of the Chinese population. I have read with the greatest interest your account of the meeting and discussion with the French officers, and the Government entirely approves of the arrangement you have made. By it you seem to have secured what is best for both; each will act on the plan they themselves advocate. There will be complete cooperation, but each Army will act under the sole direction of its own General in the particular operation. There will be a common object separately attained, and no collision or jealousies on the road to it. Last, but not least, you seem to have the best plans and the least hazard. I trust you may prove right in the hopes you [p. 326] entertain of a bloodless termination to all our preparations, and that the Chinese who have rejected rather contumeliously the ultimatum of a distant enemy, will yield to a visible force appearing off Taku. But I fear that their success last year, and their numbers this year, may encourage them to hold out. I should be very glad to have some of your battalions home in the winter, but it is too good to hope for. We are building hospital huts here to send out to the Cape; they will leave in August. Their plan is excellent, and you have no healthier place to which you could send your sick for recovery.
MR. HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT.
WAR OFFICE, July 21st, 1860.
DEAR SIR HOPE, I am very glad you have retained the additional force which Lord Canning proposed to stop and send back. Once the expense has been incurred of their transport to your seas, it is well to get all the good out of them which is possible, and you have exercised a sound discretion in keeping them and turning them to the best account. Clearly, by your account of the French, we shall have to do the work, and the more we have to do it with now the better. I regret very much the loss of the Indian commissariat. I fear that our people will make blunders as to native caste prejudices and so on, which would be serious. It is another instance of the great inconvenience of having two separate rival and jealous services in lieu of one with a common interest and object. We got our China vote, not without the display of a good deal of dissatisfaction from all parties in the House of Commons. We have now taken on the ordinary Estimates about £4,200,000; -by a vote of credit at the commencement £850,000, -and £3,300,000 now. The war was, in my opinion, after the Peiho affair, inevitable, but though the country was keen for war on the miserable lorcha affair, in which we were in the wrong, it is now weary of the expense and [p. 327] unsatisfactory results, and ready for any means escaping from the difficulty. There is no fear, however, but that the good conduct of the forces engaged will meet with all the approbation and reward they deserve.
On the conclusion of the Conferences at Shanghai Sir Hope Grant returned to Hong Kong to expedite the departure of the troops, and await the arrival of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, who had been shipwrecked on their outward passage. After much vexatious delay he again went north, arriving at Ta-lien-Whan on June 26th, where he found that the whole of the English force, except about 120 of the King’s Dragoon Guards, had already arrived. Writing to Mr. Herbert on July 4th, he said:
We are, however, tied by the leg, and, of course -according to the instructions received from home -cannot proceed to attack the forts till the French are ready. On my way to this place I visited Chefoo, where the French have established themselves and mean to form a depot. General Jasmin, who was in command, stated that it would be impossible for them to commence active operations even by July isth. Their infantry had all disembarked, amounting, I understand from him, to about 5,600, but that only 114 ponies had arrived for their artillery; that the artillerymen had not yet come, and that they had not yet commenced to land their guns. General Montauban was not expected to sail from Shanghai until the 2nd or 3rd instant at the soonest. These ponies appeared to me strong and serviceable, but till they have been put into harness and taught to draw they will be of little use, and at least 500 or 600 more will be required before they can horse their batteries. Their infantry is at present in good health, and at Chefoo they appear to get a fair quantity of goats, pigs, and fowls, as well as vegetables, but the supply of water is small. By digging wells they only get sufficient for drinking purposes, and are obliged to wash their clothes in sea water. Wei-hi-wei, which I visited on my way to Chefoo, [p. 328] I found would not do for a depot. There Was a great scarcity of fresh water, and the harbour was too small and exposed. There is a small town near the beach, containing about 2,000 inhabitants, who appeared very poor. The houses were, however, substantially and well built, and they have apparently a wise mode of keeping themselves warm in winter viz. by lighting a fire underneath their beds, which are built of clay. In consequence of this delay I have been obliged to land the whole force at Ta-lien-Whan, at three different places in the bay the cavalry, artillery, and ponies to the east of the entrance, where there are some very small running streams, and the two divisions, one to the north, and the other to the west, where they can get water easily by digging. The population are very civil, and apparently well disposed towards us, but are in great dread of their mandarins, who say they would chop their heads off if they were discovered selling provisions to the Europeans. Goats, pigs, fowls, and vegetables are, however, brought in, and, after confidence is established, the supply will, no doubt, increase. I forward you a plan of the bay of Ta-lien-Whan. It ought to feel proud of having 170 vessels in its waters composed of transports and ships belonging to Her Majesty. The bay is about twelve miles long by ten wide, and there is scarcely a rock in any part of it. On the 1 3th instant General Montauban and General Charnier came over to Ta-lien-Whan to pay a visit of ceremony to Lord Elgin, and, after it, I took them over to Adin Bay, to show them our force of cavalry and artillery. We had about 1,000 men on parade, and the turn-out they made was really beautiful. The men, both European and Sikh, were fine, handsome, stalwart fellows, well dressed, very clean, and their horses all in rare condition, and with shining coats. It really was a sight worth seeing, and I felt proud in being the commander of such a force. General Montauban said it was a sight to see in Hyde Park or Paris, but one he never expected to see so far away from home. The infantry force is also very fine, and their behaviour excellent. [p. 329] Admiral Hope is the best colleague I could possibly have had. He has a first-rate head, and his zeal and energy are untiring. His arrangements are all first-rate, but he does everything himself, which I think is an error.”
SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT.
PEH-TANG FORTS, August 4th, 1860.
MY DEAR Mr. HERBERT, We have effected a landing at Peh-tang, which, I am happy to say, was made out without much difficulty and without firing a shot. The fleet arrived at an anchorage about twenty miles from the forts on the 26th and 2/th, and within ten miles on the 3Oth ultimo. The weather proved very rough till the morning of August ist, on which day we crossed the bar and anchored about 2,000 yards from the forts, which looked sufficiently formidable. The bar had only twelve feet of water over it, and at high tide it appeared on both sides a great sea. We had, however, ascertained that the water was quite shallow, and the ground not very muddy. I landed a brigade on the south side, and the French an equal force, and we proceeded to a raised causeway which leads to the Pei-ho, on which we bivouacked for the night, about two miles from the river, securing a bridge which lay near the town. It was arranged by the two Admirals that they were to proceed up the river at night with their gunboats, and get above the forts, and at 4 o’clock on the morning of the 2nd we were to form a combined attack upon them -the Navy firing into the north and we into the south fort. I, however, ascertained that there would be no resistance, and in the morning of the 2nd we marched into the town. In the fort it was discovered that there were two large mines which were intended to explode on walking across them by means of a trigger and match. Since our occupation of the town we have been landing troops here, and no easy matter it has been; the ships lying out at least 10 miles from the town, and small vessels only being able to cross the bar at full tide. I regret much the change the French made in coming to this side. There is barely enough room [p. 330] in the town for one force, and the robbery and plunder that has been carried on in the part of the town occupied by them is very bad, and a dreadful example to our men. The French troops -here at least -appear to me the worst I have ever seen, and I fear are not much to be depended upon. The country about is very wretched looking, and there is not a spot where you could encamp a force upon. There is not a drop of fresh water to be got in the town, and all there is is brought from a distance of some seven or eight miles, and kept in large earthenware vessels. The only road out of the town is the raised one on which we bivouacked, and two days ago I sent out a party in company with a French force to reconnoitre the road. At five miles’ distance they found a strong force of the enemy, principally Tartar cavalry, in an entrenched position. We had three men struck with spent gingal balls. Everything, I expect, will be ready by Wednesday or Thursday, the 8tn or 9th, when I trust we shall make a good account of the Tartars; but I must say it is a most difficult country to march a force in, and it must be done with great caution. I fear it will not be in my power to write you an account by this mail of our attack on their entrenched camp, as the mail leaves on the 7th.
MR. HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT.
WILTON, October 24th, 1860.
DEAR SIR HOPE, Your last mail was very tantalising, and we are in a state of anxious suspense, only knowing that your attack on the Taku forts was about to be made. God grant that the next may bring us good news. Your accounts of the loose conduct of our allies is serious, for it may, and indeed must, endanger greatly our relations with the Chinese people. One thing has made me rather anxious namely, the postponement of sending for warm winter clothing, I think for the purpose of ascertaining whether it can be got in China. I trust you may winter south, but if not you will have a fearful climate to contend with. At Bombay a great supply of sheepskin clothing can, [p. 331] I understand, be obtained. No doubt in China the same skins and furs can be got, but can they be got by an enemy? However, I have no doubt you will have thought of all this. I earnestly trust that your operations may have a good and speedy result. Every one speaks in the highest terms of the admirable discipline of your Army, of its perfect efficiency, and admirable arrangement as regards supplies. You deserve success, but your difficulties are great, and will require all your skill and tact to surmount.
SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT.
SlNHO, August 18th, 1860.
MY DEAR MR. HERBERT, The last letter I wrote told you of our having secured Peh-tang. I commenced landing everything, and, having divided the town with the French, we were enabled to get our men though crowded under cover. The horses were picqueted in the narrow lanes and streets. Shortly after our arrival it commenced to rain very heavily, and I don’t think it is possible to conceive anything more wretched than the state of the town. The narrow streets became almost impassable from mud, filth, and dead animals, which there was no [p. 332] place to bury, and when thrown into the river the tide was sure to return them to us and leave them on some muddy bank, where the stink they made was most offensive. The weather cleared up, and, having ascertained that a cart track went up to the right of the causeway about 800 yards from the town, I sent a cavalry reconnoitring party on the morning of the Qth to ascertain the way it took, and if it was practicable for artillery. The officer in command, Colonel Wolseley, D.A.Q.M. -General, made his way along it to the right of the enemy’s entrenchments, and reported to me that it was possible to move guns along it, and after the first two miles the ground became more sound. The same afternoon it again commenced to rain very heavily, and the town and country became in a worse state than ever. It appeared to me that remaining in such a position might seriously injure the health of the men, and I accordingly determined, at any risk, as soon as it was possible, to get the troops out and attack the enemy. On the 11th I accordingly went to General Montauban and told him my intention of moving out the following morning, but the French General did not seem disposed to think the move wise or necessary, stating an advance to be impracticable on account of the nature of the ground. I was, however, determined to go, and told him that he might come or not, as he pleased. He said if I went he must go, but that he would only take a portion of his force. I reconnoitred the two miles reported to be bad myself. I found that, though muddy, guns could be got through with the help of fascines, which I directed to be laid down immediately, and at 4 o’clock on the morning of August i2th (grouse-shooting day) I started off the 2nd Division under Major-General Sir Robert Napier, the cavalry brigade, an Armstrongbattery, three 6-lb. guns, and a rocket battery, along the road to the right. The guns were dragged through every difficulty, but the wagons stuck, and it was necessary to take the timber off and leave the remainder under charge of a party behind. This force at last got over the difficulties of the two miles of bad ground, and I left it and went with Sir John Michel’s Division along the causeway. As soon as I got within about 2,000 yards of the enemy’s [p. 333] position I managed to deploy a regiment to the right across the swampy ground, and the French were enabled to do the same to the left, a battery of Armstrong guns being placed in the centre. We advanced to within 600 yards of the enemy’s entrenchments without a shot being fired, when they opened, and which we returned with great effect. I brought up as soon as possible another battery of 9-prs. and a French battery, and we opened a fire from these eighteen guns at such close range upon the crenellated walls of the entrenchment that the enemy could not remain, and after half an hour’s firing the place was evacuated. Sir Robert Napier’s force on the right was attacked by a large body of Tartar cavalry, some 3,000, who in the most daring way came up close to the guns. Our cavalry were let loose upon the Tartars, and they had a hand-to-hand fight, cutting down about seventy or eighty. The enemy behaved very gallantly, and under better rulers would make excellent troops. They completely surrounded Sir Robert’s division in skirmishing order, and remained about it like a flock of hornets. Our whole loss with both divisions was two men killed, three officers and eleven men wounded. It was a beautiful field day, the two divisions coming up at the same time, one on the enemy’s left and the other on his front, doubling him up and taking all his camp. Major Probyn and Captain Fane, of the irregular Sikh horse, did their work admirably. General Montauban tried to follow up the enemy after we had driven them through the town (or rather village) of Sinho, but he was obliged to return after having fired some few shots at long ranges at another large entrenched camp which lay on the Peiho some three miles distant. There was only one narrow causeway which led up to this position, and on which the enemy had guns bearing. I deemed it more advisable to reconnoitre the country before attempting to attack the entrenchment. The country to the right of the road appeared in parts marshy, but round the edge of the Peiho the ground was higher and looked much firmer. I had two bridges placed across the canal at the side of the causeway, and found after a reconnaissance that it was perfectly practicable for guns. Having arranged with General Montauban, we [p. 334] attacked the enemy’s position on the 14th, and after a heavy fire of six batteries of artillery and three rocket batteries, two of the former French and one of the latter, within 500 yards, we knocked their bastions to pieces and dismounted their guns. We got up so close to them with our artillery that they could not take aim, and I am happy to say in the whole attack we had only three men wounded, and the French one man killed and about twenty-nine wounded. As the fire of the enemy began to slack I passed the 6oth Rifles down the side of the river, through the reeds, at a part of the wall and ditch which the enemy had not made so strong, and they were enabled to get into the fort without much difficulty. I then sent to the French and told them what we had done, and they advanced and also got in. Sixteen excellent brass guns were taken in the fort, besides a number of iron ones. But, with exception of one gun, they were of small calibre. We are now in rear of the Peiho forts, n the banks of the river, but the nature of the ground bout there is anything but favourable to an advance, hey are surrounded by great salt marshes intersected with numerous large canals in every direction. We re now forming a bridge across the Peiho, and trust o find the country there more adapted for the movements of an army. We have succeeded in procuring a sufficient number of junks, but I fear it will be several days before it can be got ready for crossing. The Commander-General of Pecheli has sent in several letters praying Lord Elgin to put a stop to the war, and offering to take him up to Pekin to settle a treaty. But Lord Elgin, of course, will not listen to this, and in his answer states that in consequence of the unsatisfactory reply to the demands of the British Minister, conveyed in his letter of March last, the Navy and Military are now engaged in taking possession of the Taku forts and opening a passage for him to Tientsin. Lord Elgin’s letter has been sent to Pekin, and an answer may be down to-morrow. I am most happy to inform you that our whole force is in excellent health, notwithstanding all the difficulties they have had to contend with. There is not above one per cent. sick. The horses are also looking well and m excellent condition. I am happy also to be able to give a good account of the [p. 335] Armstrong guns. Their precision of fire is admirable, and when the percussion shell explodes, nothing can be more effective; but I am sorry to say the damp seems to have affected them, and many appear useless. The time fuzes have also got injured in the same way, and have not been used.1
TANGKOO, August 23rd.
Having reconnoitred the ground very closely, on the left bank up to the northern fort, I found by bridging several canals an approach could be got to it, and as it appeared to me it was the key of the position, I determined to attack it. I accordingly went to General Montauban and stated my proposition. The French General strongly objected, and wrote me the accompanying memo., which I forward to you with my answer. I told him, however, I was perfectly ready to undertake the attacks myself, if he did not wish to come; but he found it necessary to send a force to co-operate with me. The night of the 2oth, bridges had been made over the canals and batteries formed for heavy guns and mortars. I took 1,500 men of the 2nd division under Major-General Sir Robert Napier, two Armstrong batteries, and four 24-lb. howitzers; the French General sent General Collineau with 1,000 men and two batteries, and in the morning of the 2ist, the troops and guns being in position, the enemy from the fort and batteries on the other side of the river opened a heavy fire which, however, annoyed us little, and they were soon answered by our guns, which fired with great precision, and mortar shell fell into their magazine and exploded it. The English and French gunboats now commenced a heavy fire upon the lower north fort, and also exploded one of their large magazines. The effect of these two going off was magnificent, and it was supposed the enemy would have evacuated the forts immediately after. I, however, never saw a stouter resistance, and when our troops -English and French -got up to the walls with their scaling ladders, they fought most desperately with pikes and lances, and struck down many a brave fellow. [p. 336] Our men were, however, not to be kept back, and they got over at two parts of the wall. The poor Chinese had little hope of escape, two deep ditches ran round the walls, and between them an abattis and two broad rows of pointed bamboo stakes, which it was nearly impossible to get over. Two Tartar Generals were killed, and numbers of their men. The fort being in our possession, we had complete command of the highest one on the other side of the river, the fire of which was silenced, and as white flags were immediately hoisted upon all the other forts, we sent a flag of truce to summon them to surrender. The enemy, however, stated that they had no orders on the subject, and we proceeded to attack the lower iort on the north side. Not a shot was fired by the enemy, and we entered without any opposition. Upwards of 2,000 prisoners were taken, and numerous fine large brass guns, also several of the large guns which had been taken out of the gunboats in 1859. The white flags still continued flying on the other forts, and as the garrison were seen marching out of the large southern one, I sent a party in conjunction with the French to occupy it, and our two flags are now flying from the summit of the highest bastion. I immediately sent Mr. Parkes over who has proved himself a most useful interpreter, and has on all occasions displayed the greatest zeal and ability to confer with the Governor-General, who agreed to surrender unconditionally the whole of the guns, forts, camps, and munitions of war about the forts, and I trust that war is nearly, if not completely, at an end. I regret to say our loss has been comparatively heavy 17 men killed; 19 officers and about 153 men wounded. The French loss is, I believe, about 100. Half an hour after the attack was completed it commenced to rain very heavily, and our heavy guns could not be moved. We have been prospered in the most wonderful manner. If the rain had commenced earlier in the morning we could not have gone on with the attack, nor could we have moved a gun. I do not yet know the number of guns that have fallen to our arms, but it must be great. Admiral Hope and Admiral Charnier have proceeded up the river to-day to reconnoitre, and it is expected they will reach Tientsin. [p. 337]
August 24th.
I have heard from Admiral Hope. He had got up within a short distance of Tientsin, and the forts, etc., were all abandoned. A mandarin and deputation came out from the town and tendered their submission. Supplies, I have no doubt, will be got in abundance.
H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO MR. HERBERT.
HORSE GUARDS, November d, 1860.
My DEAR HERBERT, I cannot deprive myself of the pleasure of congratulating you on the glorious news which has reached us from China by to-day’s mail. The success of our operations seems to have been complete, and, which is still more valuable, the efficiency of the Armstrong guns is completely established. I do really think this latter success is even more important than the whole expedition to China, for we are no longer working in the dark, and can go on feeling that we are in the right direction in what we are doing. You will observe, however, that complaints are made of the weight of the carriages. I always felt that this would be the case, and I have drawn your attention to it frequently. I hope, therefore, that the lighter gun for horse artillery purposes will be at once sanctioned, and that a method will be adopted for lightening the present gun-carriages and waggons more particularly. Another most satisfactory part of the news is the admirable manner in which Sir Hope Grant has conducted the operation, and his firmness in council as regards the French General; for the whole plan was Grant’s, and he carried his point in opposition to his French colleagues. This fully justifies the choice we made when we selected him for the command, and stuck by the appointment even after it was questioned by high authorities in India. I think that Sir Hope Grant should at once receive the Grand Cross of the Bath, and I hope you will take steps with Her Majesty to authorise me to make this communication to him by the next mail. I shall try at once to promote the Ensign who planted the 6?th colour on the fort, [p. 338] and also the Lieutenants who distinguished themselves specially. There is nothing like promptness in these rewards, they are doubly acceptable. I presume that the Army will move on Pekin, after all, accompanying the Ambassadors, and I hardly think we should be justified in calculating upon any of these troops for New Zealand. I shall repeat to Hope Grant, in my next letter to him, the mode in which we think he had better dispose of the troops after their services are no longer required.
Yours most sincerely, GEORGE
MR. HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT.
WAR OFFICE, November 10th, 1860.
MY DEAR SIR HOPE, I must add to the public despatches which go out to you by this mail my own congratulations on the brilliant success which you have achieved. There is really not a drawback to it, all the departments seem to have been well up to their work, good commissariat, good medical staff, good health, and good discipline, things not to be attained without vigour and vigilance on the part of the Commander. You have every reason to be proud of the force under you, and never was a Grand Cross better won. The Queen, to whom I sent your correspondence with General de Montauban, spoke most warmly of the admirable manner in which you had behaved under trying circumstances. To your firmness in council, as well as to your just views of what was the course to be taken, must be attributed much of the success achieved. I cannot tell you with how much satisfaction I have seen this, and the Government partake of my feeling on the subject. I trust no “rancour” is left in the minds of your allies; at any rate, the joint success should remove any, if it existed.
We are looking eagerly for your next despatches, which will give us the complement of your last ones by specifying the names of those who most distinguished themselves, and bringing, I have no doubt, [p 339] the account of important events as regards the prospects of peace.
The public despatch referred to ran as follows :
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR TO SIR HOPE GRANT.
WAR OFFICE, November 10th, 1860.
I have now received Her Majesty’s gracious orders to express to you her sense of the great service you have rendered to the country, and her admiration of the gallantry and discipline which have been generally displayed by the troops under your command. Under your guidance a British force has encountered and overcome all the difficulties interposed by a dangerous climate, and by a country scarcely known, and presenting singular obstacles to the movement of troops. At a distance of thousands of miles from home the force under your command has attacked and vanquished enemies fighting in the neighbourhood of their own capital, in the midst of their resources, strong in numbers, entrenched in works, to the construction and strengthening of which all their energy and skill had been for some time directed, and possessed of a numerous and powerful artillery. Flushed with the success of a former attack treacherously made, they have displayed on this occasion, in defence of their forts, a courage and resolution which entitle them to our respect, though it proved unavailing against the superior gallantry and skill of the allied forces. The Queen deeply deplores the inevitable loss incidental to the achievement of this great success. To the relatives of those who have fallen Her Majesty offers her heartfelt sympathy, and the expression not only of her own sorrow, but that of her people for their bereavement. For the wounded she feels confident that everything will be done which care and skill can effect for the alleviation of their sufferings, for which she feels the deepest concern, and she trusts that they may [p. 340] to yourself as Commander-in-Chief, to the Generals of divisions, to the Brigadiers, and to all the officers and men engaged, Her Majesty tenders her warm and heartfelt thanks. soon be restored to the ranks in which they have so nobly fought.
SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT.TIENTSIN,
September 8th, 1860.
MY DEAR MR. HERBERT, You will see by the date of this that we are now at Tientsin. After the fall of the Taku forts the Tartar army appeared completely disorganised, and fled in utter confusion. The forts on the banks of the river above Taku were all abandoned, the guns dismounted and buried, and a deputation came out from Tientsin stating that they were ready to do everything we required of them. I encamped the British force about two miles outside the town on the right bank of the river, and the French on the left, and everything has gone on most peaceably and quietly. The forces are supplied with any amount of provisions, and the soldier thinks it necessary to have his grog iced every day, abundance of fine block ice being brought round and sold for a very small sum. The Chinese Commissioners have come from Pekin, and have agreed to everything demanded by the Ambassadors.
Unhappily, when peace was on the point of conclusion, an unexpected and apparently unauthorised attack was made on the British force, which led to the resumption of hostilities, and a march on Pekin. The advance met with little or no opposition, but was not unattended with its own difficulties.
The country at this time of the year,” wrote Sir H. Grant, “is very bad for moving in both for cavalry and infantry, as the large fields of maize with which it [p. 341] abounds, and which has just been cut down, form a covering of spikes in the ground which injures the legs of the horses, and makes it very difficult for men to walk through. The Armstrong guns have done their work admirably. I never saw anything more beautiful than the precision of their fire at long ranges, and if the fuses had only been good, the destruction ot the enemy would been much greater. The Enfield rifles appear, however, to be a mistake. They teach men to fire at long ranges, and at close distances they do not appear so effective as the old Brown Bess. I never saw a more rich country than it is about here. The fields are full of fine crops, and grapes are in abundance.
MR. HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT
WAR OFFICE, November 27th, 1860.
My DEAR SIR HOPE, I have again to congratulate you on two successful engagements, and which I hope may have the effect of procuring peace. I am glad to see that your Army continues in good health, and you have got so favourable a climate; but you have not much margin in the way of time, and as the Chinese, if they knew how to play their game, could put you in an awkward fix, we here cannot but be anxious as to the future. I am glad to hear that you do not intend wintering in Pekin, or near it. So long as you have open and clear communications with the sea you can do well. For the force which may remain in the south I presume you can get ample supplies of warm clothing, such as skins, furs, etc, etc. A country in which people sleep with a stove under their bed must require, and therefore produce, warm clothing. I have stopped all reinforcements going out to join their respective battalions, and have sent half supplies of medicines, comforts, etc; what are not wanted will keep, and can be stored at Hong Kong. The red-tapists here were, I find, much shocked at your specially recommending for the Bath. I did not see who else could if you did not, but they say [p. 342] that you should have spoken to his merits, but not specified the reward. Your accounts of the Armstrong guns are very satisfactory. The defects mentioned in the reports of your officers, had, I think, nearly all been discovered in practice here, and have been more or less remedied. The injury to the fuses, as you know, was owing to unpardonable neglect in storing on board ship, by which they got damp. The one defect which I think serious is the flying out of the breech-piece, because it can only be prevented by tight screwing up, and you cannot depend on that being done in great hurry and excitement. Those we now are fitting have a better carriage, a simple block trail. I won’t take your judgment on the Enfield as final. At Inkermann at close quarters it saved the day, for its penetration was such that it killed not only the front man fired at, but two, three, and once four behind. But if at short distances men fire high, the better the weapon the less harm they will do. The badness of Brown Bess made the ball drop so soon that a bad aim, if too high, was corrected. But it proves, I think, that our men want more training still to make the marksman equal to his weapon.
A few days later Sir Hope Grant’s despatches arrived.
SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT
UNDER THE WALLS OF PEKIN, October 9th, 1860.
MY DEAR MR. HERBERT, You will perceive we are now at Pekin, though we have not yet got into the city. Everything having arrived, the French General and I determined to go at the force under Sang-ko-lin-sin, which had taken up a position on the north side of Pekin, and on the 5th we started. I must just tell you that after the two lickings we gave the Chinese army on the 18th and 21st last month, the Prince Kung sent in letters to the two Ambassadors praying for peace, but stating nothing about the prisoners. An answer was sent back to him desiring their [p. 343] immediate release, that they had gone in under a flag of truce, and that they were unlawfully detained, that no Treaty would be signed till this had taken place. An answer came back stating that the prisoners were in their possession, and would be sent back as soon as the convention was signed. Lord Elgin and Baron Gros wrote again in very severe terms, and told the Prince that they had acted with the greatest perfidy, and that it was now in the hands of the Commanders-in-Chief, who, if the prisoners were not returned, would march on Pekin and take it. We accordingly started on the 5th, and, as the way was very difficult from trees and houses, it took us two days to get up to where we understood Sang-ko-lin-sin’s camp lay. We arrived at the position he had occupied on the 5th, but found he and all his army had decamped and retired towards a summer palace of the Emperor, which lay some four miles to the north-west. I had made up my mind to attack the place after beating his army away, and had sent the cavalry force with two guns to drive them first, and follow them up as far as possible. The French, who at the time were in my rear, also determined to follow the same course. I, however, came upon a force of Tartar cavalry amounting to some 2,000 men, who retired upon the town, and, as I was determined to drive them away, I followed them up, cleared them out of the bulwarks, and as it was getting late, and the men had had a hard day’s work, I halted within a mile of the town, where we remained. The cavalry had met with no opposition, and reached the outside of the palace, having only seen a body of cavalry which retreated at their approach. The French now came up, and took the palace with little or no opposition, and remained therein. The next day letters arrived for Lord Elgin and Baron Gros from the Prince Kung, stating that he hoped a peace would be concluded, and written in a much more subdued tone. General Montauban and I wrote, saying that if all the prisoners in the town were given up and a gate of the city, we should not attack the town. It appeared, however, that Prince Kung had left, and the Emperor and all his council, and no person was there but Hangkee, a sub-commissioner, who at once, or at least the next day, gave up the prisoners, but stated that he had no power to give up the gate, but that he [p. 344] would write to Kung on the subject. I am delighted to say Mr. Parkes, Mr. Loch, and one sowar came in yesterday, and a French officer and four privates also were given up. The whole of our people on the 28th of last month had started to join our force, and had got within 500 yards of it, when a large force of cavalry and infantry closed round them the firing began from the enemy’s lines, and they were seized. Mr. Parkes accompanied by the two others were allowed to go and remonstrate with Sang-ko-lin-sin, and his party were in consequence separated from the remainder of the party, none of whom they have seen since. They state that upon first being taken they were badly treated, their hands were tied behind their backs, they were put into a cart and taken up to Pekin, where they were confined in the common prison and put in irons, but after some days they were taken out and treated with attention. Hangkee states that the other prisoners will be returned to us in four or five days, and General Montauban and I have to-day written a letter to Prince Kung demanding a gate to be given up to is, and that if this is done the city shall be spared, and no troops shall be allowed to enter except the Ambassador’s escort. A sum of money, amounting to about 20,000, has been taken by the prize agent, at the Imperial Summer palace, which the French occupied. There were quantities of other valuable articles, which, I regret to say, have been greatly plundered by the French soldiery, and, knowing the demoralising effect this would have upon our men, I strictly forbade any of them going to the palace, and had roll calls every two lours. As, however, the men will feel very much their lot being able to secure any of the loot, seeing our alies have got so much, I have taken upon myself -and I trust I have not done wrong -to order this money to be given amongst them: two-thirds to the men and one-third to the officers; the two General officers and myself desiring no share in the prize. If the Prince Kung will not give up the gate, we must only go at it and take the town; but I trust he will have more sense. We are well supplied with provisions at present, and here alone we have at least 1,200 sheep, and Mr. Turner, the Commissary-General, [p. 345] who has arrived to-day, tells me he can keep the Army for any length of time. Admiral Hope is really worth his weight in gold, and keeps us supplied by the Peiho with everything required. The heavy guns have arrived also, and plenty of ammunition, so I trust, if called on, we shall soon make a good breach in the wall.
SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT
PEKIN, October 13th, 1860.
MY DEAR MR. HERBERT, The Chinese have found it necessary to give us up a gate of the city, which is now occupied by ourselves and the French. The people and rich merchants in the town were praying for peace, and sent up a petition to the Emperor to try and put a stop to the war. Prince Kung was, however, frightened for his head, but said if the wealthy people of Pekin would support him he would do so. They at once stated their willingness, and the gate was immediately given up. All our batteries viz. four 8-inch guns, seven 8-inch mortars, and nine cohorns are now in position in an excellent place for trenching behind a thick wall of the “Temple of the Earth,” within about a hundred yards of the city walls, and I have no doubt in four or five hours we should have made a breach. The field pieces were also in position for keeping down the fire from the walls, and I have no doubt the Armstrong guns would have proved most useful. I trust, however, they will not be required. The magnificent Summer Palace of His Majesty has been occupied by the French, and completely gutted. Silver and gold was discovered in it, and innumerable beautiful articles of vertu, which all soon disappeared. We at last made a division of the spoil left, and one portion alone has been sold by auction for £1,000. I kept my men out of it, I am happy to say, as the demoralising effect on the French was terrible, and I am only too glad we have not been obliged to take Pekin, as it would have been impossible, at all events, to have restrained the French, and the [p. 346] loss of life might have been very severe, as there are 60,000 Tartars soldiers in the town, and all their wives and families were not allowed to remove, and every man would have fought for his home, or murdered his wife and family and probably himself too. We have also taken 800 guns from them since we first came to the country, and their prestige is quite broken. The population of the whole country, nearly, between this and Pehtung, have deserted their homes, and I have been obliged to destroy several villages on the line of road coming up where our Sikh messengers were fired at. Everything is, I am happy to say, going on well at Tientsin, and supplies are abundant both here and there, and the road is open all the way. It has been a most singular campaign. I am sorry to find you do not like my sending away the Indian commissariat. But everything has gone on so admirably under Mr. Turner that I have found no reason to regret it.
SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT
11 PEKIN, October 17th, 1860.
MY DEAR MR. HERBERT, I regret to say only two of the five prisoners were returned to us alive, and they give a fearful account of the atrocities committed on themselves and other prisoners with them. Twenty-one bodies in coffins have also been sent in by the Chinese chiefs, presumably to show the prisoners had not been murdered by their own hands, and amongst the number have been recognised the bodies of Lieutenant Anderson, Mr. de Norman, Mr. Boultby, and a man of the King’s Dragoon Guards called Phipps, one of the escort. The two men who came in were Sikhs, and their statement is that they were bound hand and foot behind their backs and water poured upon the cords to tighten them. That they were kept in this fashion for three days till worms burst out of their wrists, and all died except their two selves. The barbarity and treacherous conduct of these Tartars has determined me, with the full concurrence of Lord Elgin, to destroy and burn -completely — the splendid Summer Palace of Yuen-ming-Yuen, where these atrocities were first put into execution. I don’t know whether I shall be justified at home for committing this, what may be called barbaric act, but in my opinion it is a just retribution. The walls of the park contain at least forty different palaces or buildings, and it is the principal residence of the Emperor, who is the cause of these acts of barbarity having been committed. In a proclamation also in the town it appears by his orders prices have been put upon all our heads, at least for any one under the rank of an ambassador or general officer. We were to be kept, I suppose, for some special act of brutality; but they have been prevented from carrying put their vile intention, and Sang-ko-lin-sin’s Army is completely broken up. He has neither money to pay them nor commissariat to feed them, and the Mongolians have all bolted to their homes.
October 23rd.
The palace of Yuen-ming-Yuen has been destroyed, and Lord Elgin’s letter was sent to the Prince of Kung. On the morning of the 20th an answer came in, and everything was given in. The Prince of Kung agreed at once to pay the compensation money, and to sign the Treaty. One of the stipulations is that Kowlung, opposite Hong Kong, is to be given up, and I trust Her Majesty’s Government will allow barracks for the troops to be built on it, as the situation is so much superior to Hong Kong, and I have no doubt will be healthy.
25th.
The 300,000 taels have been paid up, and the Treaty and Convention have been signed. I took the 2nd division and part of the 1st into the town, and lined the streets with the men, and yesterday, in place of the 23rd, as Lord Elgin could not get anything ready by that day, we proceeded to the “Hall of Ceremonies,” where we were met by the Prince of Kung, and some 400 or 500 other mandarins. The Prince was a young man of about twenty years of age. [p. 349] He was like a puny schoolboy, brought up to be punished for some offence by his master, and kept turning his eyes about, first at Lord Elgin, and then at me, to see which had the rod. The Convention was handed to him, which he at once signed, and agreed to anything that was required of him. They all seemed excessively glad when we went away, and I have no doubt they will have a regular jollification when we march away from Pekin, which I propose to do on November 1st.
I forward a return showing the force propose leaving at Tientsin. But I must reduce it still more. The health of the men has been wonderful in this country, and it is a pity we did not take possession of it when we took India. If it had been defended, it would have been almost impossible for any foreign nation to have got into it, but the Chinese are no soldiers. The country about here is duly rich and fine. A fine range of hills lies on three sides of the town, and the country round about the city is beautifully wooded. I have been now counting this war in China four bad seasons fighting in these warm latitudes, and to be one season under tents in India is a trying time for any man’s constitution. I should be very thankful to be allowed to get home to my native land to have a good rest and setting up. I have been certainly greatly blessed with good health the whole time I have been out, but such work must try the constitution. The French sign their convention to-day, and I trust everything will go on well.
It is curious to notice how little comment was made on the destruction of the Summer Palace. Beyond mentioning the fact in the fewest possible words in his letter to Mr. Herbert, and recording in his private journal that the conflagration was “a magnificent sight,” Sir Hope Grant says not a word about it. Mr, Herbert’s letters are absolutely silent on the subject, and when moving the vote of thanks in Parliament he observed a similar reticence. Lord Palmerston [p. 349] characteristically not only gave full approval, but expressed regret that the palace in Pekin had not shared the same fate.
I am heartily glad, he wrote to Mr. Herbert (December 20th, 1860), “that Elgin and Grant determined to burn down the Summer Palace, and that “the blackness of ashes shall mark where it stood,” though the Emperor and his mandarins will no doubt take care that “the wild mother shall not scream over her famishing brood.” It was absolutely necessary to stamp by some such permanent record our indignation at the treachery and brutality of these Tartars, for Chinese they are not. I should have been equally well pleased if the Pekin palace had shared the same fate. It is satisfactory to know that in the conjoint operation our people have throughout had their own way and have led the way. I do not like, however, Shanghai being in the possession of a French garrison stronger than ours. The French are constantly swayed by such unavowed motives, and impelled by interests so different from our own, that it is not pleasant to see the welfare of a large and thriving English community so much depending upon French good behaviour. It seems to me that if the Emperor does not send orders for his troops to come away from Shanghai, we ought, if possible, not only to send at least another battalion thither, but to make our garrison equal to theirs if it can be done.
But though no doubt Lord Palmerston was right in thinking that as “a record of indignation” the destruction of Yuen-ming-Yuen made a deep impression on the Chinese, it is not clear that this justifies the action taken. The treachery shown at the fall of Rome was felt by Alaric to deserve the infliction of “a permanent record of indignation,” but the moral effect of that lesson was soon forgotten, while the sack of Rome is remembered, lamented, and condemned, to this day. At this time, few, I think, [p. 350] will deem the sack and destruction of the Summer Palace to have been absolutely necessary; and if not absolutely necessary, the destruction in a moment of the accumulated splendour of centuries, and of the finest monuments of an aged civilisation, must be a subject for regret. In all published narratives of the expedition, the subject is judiciously dealt with in the fewest possible words; but those who, like myself, remember the detailed accounts, both what they found and of what they did, given in conversation by men who took part in the destruction, cannot but feel that while doubts may well exist to the necessity of the step, none can exist as to ruthless effacement of a great monument wholly irreplaceable.
LORD HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT
WAR OFFICE, January 10th, 1861.
The public here are, I think, very much pleased the way in which everything has been done in China: firmness, temper, skill, and success. But they are puzzled as to the future; they doubt the stability of any treaty, and have a growing objection to wars which succeed in obtaining indemnities, but which cost far more than the indemnities recovered. I trust, however, that the severity of the lesson, the appearance of a hostile force in Pekin, and the rapidity and completeness of the campaign, may produce a lasting effect. In the meantime, the whole thing has been so well done, that provided it does not recur, every one seems satisfied. A first-rate General, a capital staff, an excellent commissariat, and a good medical department, are four things which the English public are especially pleased to see, and the more so, when all are got together. I hope when you are at Hong Kong you will look carefully over Kowloon. There is a strong feeling [p. 351] among the Hong Kong civilians that all the advantages of the acquisition must be reserved for them. I have urged on the Colonial Office that merchants go out to Hong Kong or elsewhere at their own risk and for their own good, but that the soldier is sent to protect the merchant, without any option on his part, probably against his will and certainly not for his good, and that the duty of the Government is to give him the best chance of health and comfort. I am about to change my appellation under circumstances which are far from agreeable. I had a very hard session last year, and got through it apparently well enough, but I have suffered from it since so much that I am forbidden to try another in the House of Commons, and I am forced, therefore, to take refuge in the Upper House by the title of “Lord Herbert.” It has been a great blow to me, for I was fond of the House of Commons, and had many and old friends in it beside whom I have been fighting through various fortunes, for a quarter of a century.
The successful termination of the operations in China was welcomed with a certain degree of satisfaction by the public; but, on the whole, little interest was shown either in the progress or termination of the war. The House of Commons, whilst it voted the sums asked for by the Government, displayed a manifest disinclination to sanction any great or continued expenditure on its prosecution. Though it formed the subject of various interpellations, only one real debate took place on the policy of the war, and that was marked rather by criticism than concurrence. Writing to Lord Elgin in the autumn (October 24th), Mr. Herbert said:
The public feeling here is not much excited by the war. The truth is they are rather tired of China wars, and still more tired of paying for them, especially [p. 352] on the present scale of expenditure. Gladstone has just received from the Indian Government a demand for three millions. On the discussion which took place on the loan no one spoke for the war, and Tom Baring’s speech against it was very well received from all parts of the House. He argued that we are spending more than the trade is worth. We want not political relations, which can’t be got except by force, but tea, which can be got without fighting for it. The Tories and the Peace party think to effect a junction against the Government on this question next session, which I do not think will be successful, though Cobden has rather persuaded the French that it will. I do not, however, think we could get any more money, except to wind up if the war is at an end. All this makes me the more anxious for a speedy conclusion. There is nothing very promising in the proceedings of our allies; we have climate, distance, and an enormous cost to contend with. The public, though this war was, after the Chinese outrages at the Taku forts, both just and inevitable, are too much engrossed by European politics to be eager about China. In short, it seems to me that whatever is to be done should be done now. Nothing must, if possible, be left to next year, and what is attempted, therefore, now would only be what is feasible this year. You will, I am confident, be much pleased with Hope Grant. He is a fine fellow, a capital officer, and a thorough gentleman. He (Hope) will do anything that can be done. We ended our session with some failure, but some great successes. I am glad to count our Fortification Bill among the latter.
Lord Elgin replied :
CANTON, January 13th, 1861.
That this war with China is unpopular is not news to me. It is, however, news to me, for I had not read the debate attentively, that Tom Baring should have uttered, and the House of Commons applauded, anything so silly as the sentiment which you ascribe to him namely, “that we want not political relations with China, which can’t be got except by force, but tea, [p. 353] which can be got without fighting.” You might, perhaps, have trade with France or with any other state in Christendom without political relations, because there is some analogy between their notions of right and wrong and our own, and some security, therefore, for the treatment to which your traders would be exposed, even in the absence of formal stipulations for their protection. But how can you trade with such a country as China without political relations? The first difficulty -and even Tom Baring must admit that it is a considerable one -is this: that the Chinese Government will not, under these conditions, allow you to trade at all. But if it should so far depart from its system as to allow you to do so, under what restrictions, in the absence of these much-abused political relations, will you exercise this privilege? I do not refer only to restrictions on trade properly so called, arbitrary imposts levied without any regard to fairness, and capricious interferences of all kinds with its course; though, perhaps, even Tom Baring’s philosophy might give way if constituents to whom he had made heavy advances proved insolvent in consequence of proceedings of this description on the part of a Government which could not be kept in check because it was not deemed expedient to have political relations with it. But these, depend upon it, are by no means the most awkward dilemmas in which you get involved when you come to apply the doctrine of non-political tea to a country like this. I should like to place Tom Baring between the horns of this, which is not a hypothetical dilemma, but one which has a place in history. Some years ago, when we were dealing in tea non-politically, a woman in a sampan was killed by the wadding of a gun from a merchant ship which was firing a salute somewhere in the Canton River. The mandarins immediately forbade all trading, and declared that they would not remove the prohibition until the sailor who had fired the peccant gun had been delivered to them. The traders of that day, being, I presume, of the Tom Baring school, and having the courage of their convictions, gave up the man at once, who incontinently disappeared from the historical page, and was probably at least beheaded and disembowelled. But this occurred before the modern civis Romanus was invented. [p. 354] Do you think that Tom Baring would have the pluck to go in for that sort of thing now, or would he prefer his Roman citizen to his trade? But then what becomes of his non-political tea? I hope that you will come to some understanding with the French Government without delay to give up this place. It is of no use to us whatsoever, and I do not understand why the French wish to retain it, except as a basis for their operations against Cochin China. I cannot say much about its condition, for the weather is so bad that I have not been able to see much. Within a week’s time I hope to have left China for good, and to be really on my way to England.
The speech in which Lord Herbert moved the thanks of the House to the Forces engaged in the war with China was the first made by him in the House of Lords.
He declined to enter on the questions raised with regard to the origin of the previous war of 1857, fully ecognising that after the disaster on the Peiho it became necessary to take prompt measures, lest the Chinese, intoxicated by their success in repulsing ur forces, destroying our ships, and capturing our guns, should rise in other places and endanger our large mercantile population. The campaign itself he described as “short, brilliant, and decisive.” He mentioned as a remarkable feature of the operations the use for the first time in war of the Armstrong gun, and he paid a graceful compliment to his predecessor, General Peel, for having had the courage to introduce it on a large scale into the Army. It had been prophesied that this gun would be found too delicate and complicated for the rough usage of a campaign, but this had not proved to be the case, and he congratulated the country on the possession of “the best gun in the world.” At the same time, as before [p. 355] the beginning of the campaign the Armstrong gun was untried in active service, each piece had been accompanied by one of the old smooth-bore construction to take its place in case of necessity.
He concluded, with some pardonable pride, by calling attention to a feature of the campaign which had distinguished it from all previous ones. There had been no failures in the Civil Department of the Expedition. It had an excellent Commissariat under Mr. Turner; it had an excellent Medical Staff, and for the first time a medical officer had been appointed for purely preventive and sanitary purposes. The greatest success had attended the operation of this system. Prevention was at all times better than cure. The cost of these precautions had been hardly criticised, and it was said that if the cost of the hospital ships were divided by the number of patients on board of them, it would show that each patient cost an extraordinary amount. That was because the Expedition had been so singularly healthy. If there had been a great amount of sickness, the cost of each patient would, of course, have been much less. The apparent large cost was the result of the success which had attended the sanitary precautions. After all, what expense, he asked, could be too great which ensured the perfect efficiency of an Army? Including casualties of all kinds, there was a better state of health and a lower rate of mortality among the troops forming the Expedition in China than usually exists among troops in tropical climates in time of peace. Hostile critics had said of English expeditions, that we could always obtain fighting men, but we could not find a General to lead them, nor a Staff to direct them, nor a Commissariat to feed them, nor a Medical Staff to maintain them in health; but Sir Hope Grant’s Army [p. 356] had given the lie to all those assertions. We had had in this Campaign an admirable force beautifully handled, and universally successful; there had not been a single reverse or drawback; and he, therefore, with perfect confidence anticipated unanimous assent to the motion which he proposed.
The Vote of Thanks was adopted without dissent by both Houses of Parliament, though not without some adverse criticism. But it was not easy to find fault with operations so speedily successful and which had been conducted with so little loss or discomfort to the troops engaged in them. Whatever differences there might be as to the policy of the war, there were none as to the excellence of Herbert’s arrangements for its conduct. On that point all parties united in a tribute of well-merited praise.
The country was tired of the subject and the campaign was soon forgotten, but it had done its work. The war of 1859 was the third which had been waged against China in a period of twenty years, but more than forty were now to elapse before British soldiers were again seen in hostile array on Chinese soil. [p. 357]
- Before the rain came there had been great danger from fire, as is shown by the following extract from Sir Hope Grant’s private journal: “The occupation of this town was fraught with the most fearful risks it has ever fallen to my lot to encounter, and had we not been protected by that great Being who rules above, terrible and fearful consequences would have ensued. The town was very small, not much more than 500 yards square, and in it were crowded 11,000 ot our men, exclusive of the French force, amounting to above 6,700 more, and about 4,000 of our horses, mules, and ponies, all stowed away in houses and in narrow lanes. The buildings were almost all thatched, fires burning, dinners cooking, men smoking in fact, all the accessories for the outbreak of a blaze. After the storm the weather became very hot, and the thatched roofs as dry as tinder. Had a spark fallen on one of them it is difficult to say what would have been the result; probably almost all our fine horses and ponies would have been destroyed, and many of the men would have been unable to effect their escape out of the narrow, thickly thronged lanes. At length heavy rain set in, and the danger of fire was much lessened, but the streets became almost impassable from the mud, filth, and dead animals.”